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This thesis contributes to the theoretical understanding of the dynamics of regional integration 
by focusing on the key elements in regional integration process: democratisation, identity, 
institutions and leadership. The thesis is based on the premise that while theorisation of the 
EU experience of integration has provided an invaluable range of theoretical tools, the 
application of these theoretical perspectives to other regional organisations is often relatively 
uncritical.  The contribution of the thesis is hence a theoretical examination of the applicability 
of concept derived from the European experience to the dynamics of integration in ASEAN.  
Specifically, the thesis analyses the importance of democratisation, identity, institutions and 
leadership as critical mechanisms and driving force in regional integration process. The thesis 
provides a systematic analysis by addressing the roles of the four factors, whether or not they 
take part in constructing and solidifying regional community, as well as the interaction and 
causal relationship between these variables in the regional integration process. The thesis 
finds that while democratisation, identity, institution and leadership are important driving 
force in the intriguing dynamics of ASEAN integration, they are interrelated and function in 
different ways from the European experience while some of them have a complicated role and 
are subject to other influential factors. Importantly, in the context of ASEAN, democratisation 
probes problematic and causes a lot of internal tension among member states. At the end of 
the thesis, it contends that the problem of democratic deficit and the divergent political 
ideologies among ASEAN members lie at the root of all emerging major criticisms as well as 
lead to a slow progress of regional integration. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the 
association’s norms should be reinterpreted to allow constructive consultation on the existing 
problems and moving towards a more participatory community could be one way to break the 
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This thesis intends to make a contribution to the comparative understanding of the dynamics 
of regional integration by focusing on the key elements in the integration process in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The thesis is premised on the observation 
that while there has been quite substantial empirical study of ASEAN, theoretical 
investigations of the region have primarily focused on its role in international security. 
Theories of regional integration per se, which have unsurprisingly emerged from the European 
experience, have been less systematically applied to the ASEAN context.  As regionalism gains 
momentum around the world, it is important for a strong comparative empirical base to be 
built upon theoretical foundations.  A strongly theoretical comparative knowledge base is 
important not only to understand the dynamics of regional integration in ASEAN and 
elsewhere, but also to provide a comparative foil for reflecting on the European experience 
itself.  The overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to such a theoretically-informed 
comparative project through a focus on the application of existing theories of regional 
integration to ASEAN. 
Specifically, the objective of this research is to analyse the importance of democratisation, 
identity, institutions and leadership as being critical mechanisms and driving forces in regional 
integration processes. As discussed in Chapter 3, these concepts emerge clearly from the EU 
experience as important drivers of integrations. It also aims to produce a systematic analysis 
by addressing the roles of the four factors, whether or not they take part in constructing and 
solidifying regional community, as well as the interaction and causal relationship between 
these variables in the regional integration process. From this analysis, a firmer grounding for 
comparative regionalism between ASEAN and other areas, including the EU, is established. 
1.1 Explanation and general understanding of regional integration  
The world has considerably changed in recent decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the 
increasingly integrated and interdependent economies of a globalizing world have taken 
centre stage in international political economy. Some scholars such as Omae (1995), Strange 
(1996) and Lupel (2004) suggest that this might lead to the end of nation-state as the 
dominant form of political organisation. Others, however, have argued that ‘globalization’ is a 
misnomer, and that regional integration of autonomous nation-states, rather than 
globalization and degradation of the nation state, is the more significant and important 
phenomena in international politics. As nation states are likely to move away from 
confrontation towards more political compromise and economic cooperation, it is argued, 
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regional integration has become a reality of the international scene and achieves new 
significance and requires more studies. 
The growth of regional cooperation has been recognized as one of the major developments in 
recent international relations (Haokip, 2012: 378). The number of regional agreements has 
multiplied in the past few decades, with the world now seeing many hundreds of regional 
cooperation agreements. One important driving force is that the perceived success of the EU 
draws attention of countries to extend their relations with other countries in order to gain the 
economic benefits that regional integration brings, creating imperatives for new forms of 
regional cooperation. Furthermore, the more recent structures of regional integration are 
increasing in terms of scope, depth and complexity as many scholars are moving their 
attention to a new mode of thinking. Regional integration has been argued to contribute to the 
development and sustainability of national governance and has been responsible for economic 
growth and prosperity. This trend highlights the significance of closer economic and political 
cooperation in the region and the need for strategically focused studies in this area. 
Regional cooperation has considerably increased in number and multiplied in the past few 
decades with most of the world now involved in more than one hundred regional agreements 
(Ethier, 1998: 1149) and many countries belong to multiple regional groupings, for example 
Mexico has 7 Regional Trade Agreement memberships and Tanzania is a member of 4 RTAs 
(ODI, 2005). According to statistics, the accumulated number of Free Trade Agreements signed 
between 1948 and 1990 was 30. From 1990 to 1995, the number increased to 79 and 
expanded to 155 in 2000. As of July 2005, the total number reached 213 (Urata, 2005: 5). By 
2007, the number of regional trade agreements climbed to 300, with every country in the 
world a member of at least one such regional trade agreement and more than one-third of 
world trade taking place within such arrangements (Di Mauro et al., 2008: 5). As of January 
2012, there have been 511 notifications of regional trade agreements in the world, of which 
319 are in force (WTO, 2012).  
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putative Free Trade Area 
of the Americas    
 Source: (Warleigh-Lack, 2008: 52)   
The definition of a region (and, by extension, regionalism) is, however, relatively fluid because 
there is no precise method to distinguish one group of states from another by geographical, 
cultural, historical, economic or other grounds. Seemingly, the only way to overcome this issue 
is just to draw a line around them on a map and their members perceive themselves as linked 
together in one or more ways (Armstrong et al., 2004: 212). Substantively, the processes of 
regional integration have their own dynamics and diverse natures which identify their different 
features and core rationales. As reproduced in Table 1.1, Warleigh-Lack (2008: 52) categorized 
the types of regional cooperation into five patterns: Structured, Dominance, Security, Network 
and Conjoined. Each type of regional integration has significant features and some of them 
might have an intersection between each other in some particular areas. In addition to types 
of integration, regional integration also varies by degree of integration, from looser to deeper 
integration. Table 1.2 shows the five such degrees of regional integration varying in their 
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respective depth: Preferential Trade Area, Free Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market 
and Economic Union (Smeets, 1996: 60). 
Table 1.2: Forms of regional integration 
                                          Preferential        Free Trade       Customs         Common         Economic  
                                          Trade Area            Area                Union              Market             Union 
 
Reduce tariff 
or free trade of                      X 
Certain goods 
Complete  
liberalization of                                                  X                       X                       X                      X 
trade in goods 
Free Trade Area 
plus common                                                                                X                        X                      X 
external tariffs 
Free movement 
of factors and                                                                                                          X                      X 
services 
Coordinated or 
common economic                                                                                                                           X 
policy 
 Source: (Smeets, 1996: 60)     
As noted above, recent regional integration projects have been heavily influenced by the 
creation of the European Union. The development of regional integration in Europe and 
deepening of relationships of European states raised concerns among their erstwhile trade 
partners as they might expect a sharp decrease of trade with Europe, which is relatively large. 
However, the stimulation to regionalisation may also include consideration of a desire for 
greater bargaining powers, as well as considering the trend whereby the world’s superpowers 
and major influential organizations began to participate in regionalization processes, notably 
through the US involvement in NAFTA. Although ‘many [regional agreements] were 
established for defensive purposes, and not all of them were based on voluntary assent’ 
(Mattli, 1999: 1), implying that the world is getting more integrated and cooperative, moving 
from a horizontal structure toward a more vertical structure. In the simplest economic sense, 
these regional agreements aim at reducing or removing altogether tariffs on trade flows 
between member countries, with some also eliminating non-tariff barriers and liberalising 
investment and other policies. At their deepest level, regional agreements expect to achieve 
the formation of political community which implies the establishment of common institutions 
(Schiff and Winters, 2003) and involving the construction of share substantial institutions. 
We can discern from the above that contemporary regionalism is a very varied phenomenon, 
from simply economic to political, and from loose to deep.  Yet dominance of the EU 
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experience in the historiography of regionalism has also arguably affected the way in which 
regionalism is theorized – whether explicitly or implicitly, the EU is taken as the paradigmatic 
example of regional integration. This highlights the centrality and the exceptionality of the EU 
and leads to a tendency to consider the EU as a blueprint of regional integration or a potential 
model for other integrating regions.  Most theories of integration emerged from examination 
of the European experience and have often been applied unquestioningly to other regional 
projects. However, several decades ago, Nye (1968: 855-856) laid the early groundwork about 
the comparison of regional integration processes as he argued that the problems of 
comparative regional integration can only be sorted by ‘the formation of precise hypotheses 
(with clearly stated limits)’ and this indicates the need for a consideration of ‘the static 
foundations upon which our dynamic or causal theories rest’. In a similar manner, Murray 
(2010: 309) argued that the historical differences between Europe and Southeast Asia made a 
direct comparison far from being productive or useful. It is this challenge that this thesis 
confronts. The approach, elaborated further below and in subsequent chapters, is not to try to 
generate a new theory of regionalism ex nihilo, but rather to take a more critical and reflexive 
approach to the application of concepts of regionalism in a comparative perspective. ASEAN is 
a compelling case to use for such a project, arguably lying at the further empirical extreme 
from the EU in terms of its scale, level of development, and extent of integration (see Table 1.3 
for basic comparative statistics). 
This position taken in this thesis – and its major contribution – is to articulate a comparative 
approach that stands between empiricism and high theorisation by focusing on the conceptual 
level.  On the one hand, as noted above, empirical differences between different regions make 
direct empirical comparison problematic. On the other hand, however, highly theorised 
approaches risk ignoring or undermining important differences for the sake of theoretical 
consistency.  By focusing on concepts derived from the theorisation of European experience, 
this thesis strikes a middle ground between empirical and theoretical analysis. The 
examination of how concepts derived from the European experiences have played out in 
ASEAN allow us both to see and understand the different empirical and historical dynamics of 
regionalism and, drawing on these differing trajectories, to reflect back on the concepts and 
theories used to make sense of regionalisation processes. 
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Table 1.3: Background information on EU and ASEAN 
 EU ASEAN 
Member states 28 states 10 states 
2 observers 





Working languages 24 languages English 
Total Population (2012) 507,890,191 616,614,000 
GDP  
- total (US$, millions) 







Area (km²) 4,381,376 4,479,210 
Key dates 1952  The establishment of ECSC  
1958  The establishment of EEC 
1967  The Merger Treaty 
1986  The signing of the Single  
          European Act aiming to create a  
          Single Market by 1992 
1992  The Maastricht Treaty 
1993  Single European Market enters  
          into force 
2002  The adoption of the euro 
2004  The European Union’s largest  
          enlargement  
2009  Treaty of Lisbon  
1967  The Bangkok Declaration 
1976  The first summit in Bali    
          and the signings of the  
          ASEAN Concord and the  
          Treaty of Amity and  
          Cooperation 
1992  The creation of AFTA 
2003  The adoption of AEC  
          proposal 
2008  The ASEAN Charter  
          entered into force 
 
1.2 The focuses of this research    
As mentioned in the previous section, regional integration is a very complex and multi-faceted 
process, but that theoretical explanations to date have tended to rely predominantly on the 
European experience. The focus of this research is to problematize these theories by explicit 
and reflexive application of key concepts to the ASEAN experience. More specifically, the 
thesis identifies four key concepts in Eurocentric theories of regionalism – democratisation, 
identity, institutions and leadership – and examines their application to the ASEAN experience. 
The dynamics of regional integration from this approach are understood to be the ways in 
which the forces of development and change in the regional integration process derive from 
the conceptual combination of these four key processes.  This allows us to use to conceptual 
advances gleaned from the European experience but without presuming a particular causal 
relationship. For instance, to prefigure some of the findings of this thesis, while 
democratisation has played an important role in the process of integration in both Europe and 
Southeast Asia, it has played out in ways that are almost diametrically opposed. As discussed 
further in the literature review, although each of these concepts has been applied with 
considerable explanatory power in the context of the EU, they are rarely studied in other 
regional integration models or in term of comparative studies.  
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Intuitively, there are clear reasons why we might expect these concepts to play out differently 
in theorizing ASEAN integration from the European experience.  Democratisation, for instance, 
has been a cornerstone of EU integration; in the 1970s, Greece, Portugal and Spain were all 
admitted to full membership only after their respective restoration of democratic government. 
In Southeast Asia, however, western liberal democracy is not considered as essential to good 
governance in Southeast Asia, unlike the European norms (Camroux, 2008: 10). Likewise, while 
the substantive nature and extent of a European identity is subject to continued debate, the 
idea that there is (and was) some form of pan-European identity is not widely disputed; 
conversely, there is little evidence of or argument for the existence of any kind of ‘Asian’ 
political identity, let alone ‘Southeast Asia’.  Indeed, while the concept of ‘Europe’ as a 
geopolitical region has often been traced back to the empire of Charlemagne at the end of the 
Eighth Century, the idea of Southeast Asia as a region at all is largely a product of the particular 
nature of Allied operational command during the Second World War (Fifield, 1976). 
1.3 Why ASEAN and the European Union?  
It is clear that there are many models of regional integration in the international system. They 
are distinct to a certain degree and structured in different environmental contexts. Some of 
them are centrally focused on free trade areas or employing external tariff regulations, while 
others formulate much deeper integration which includes, for example, the free movements of 
labour and technology. Some of them are intensely structured and institutionalized, while 
others rely on networking and informal personal contacts. ASEAN, founded by the Bangkok 
Declaration in 1967, is a model of regional integration rising as a new centre of power in Asia. 
It is generally thought that ASEAN emerged as a response to various external threats, such as 
political disorder in China, the colonial experiences, the spread of communism and the regional 
influence of external powers. It has also been suggested that ASEAN is determinedly an 
attempt to avoid a setting up of intensive institutional structures (Armstrong et al., 2004: 220).   
Even more than other regions, Southeast Asia is characterised by vast diversity and disparity, 
and ASEAN members exhibit significantly different levels of political, economic and social 
development. For instance, Singapore’s and Brunei’s per capita GDP are approximately 
between 25-30 times higher than Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.1 Their political regimes cover 
a wide spectrum ranging from electoral democracy to full-scale authoritarianism. In term of 
culture, ASEAN includes the world’s largest Muslim country, Indonesia, and the countries 
                                                          
1
 Please see IMF (2013) 
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claiming to have the highest Buddhist population density Cambodia, Burma and Thailand. 
Indeed, Southeast Asia is ‘religiously and culturally more heterogeneous than Europe, with 
significant minorities and little multiculturalism’ (Murray, 2010: 319). For these reasons, 
ASEAN integration has been very much considered as a unique political phenomenon and 
Southeast Asia itself a research area where much is yet to be explored theoretically, 
methodologically and empirically.  
1.4 Research questions and objectives  
Drawing on the above discussion, the aim of this research is to analyse the importance of 
democratisation, identity, institutions and leadership in ASEAN integration, with comparative 
reference to the European Union. It mainly intends to understand how these concepts help 
explain the experience of ASEAN integration, with the objectives both of establishing a more 
systematic base for comparative regionalism and of contributing to the development of 
regionalisation theory through the critical interrogation of Eurocentric concepts in a non-
European context. Empirically, the main research question is:   
“What roles have democratisation, identity, institutions, leadership played in the ASEAN 
integration process?”  
However, this main question can be divided into other related sub-questions as follows: 
 How are the four concepts explained and understood in the context of  ASEAN and in 
the general theories of regional integration? 
 How far and in what way have these factors shaped ASEAN? 
 How do these factors interact in the dynamic of integration? 
 Can theories of European integration be applied to ASEAN? 
All critical findings as a result of this study are outlined and analysed based on appropriate 
theoretical frameworks. Contrasting these two integration models by drawing on the same 
theoretical context could, on the one hand, provide various insights from different 
perspectives and, on the other hand, demonstrate the generalization ability (and limitations) 
of the theories in explaining different integration models. All findings from empirical studies in 
this research would help refine theoretical understandings of the four key concepts and their 
roles in the process of regional integration as well as generalization of integration theories. 
Hence, the European studies may also benefit from this research as the empirical findings 
discovered from ASEAN case appear to produce some interesting reflections on the EU. 
Overall, this study should foster a better understanding of regional integration, formulate the 
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settings of comparative regional integration studies and be a constructive guide for further 
studies or more focused research in this area. 
1.5 Research methodology  
The ambit of this thesis is primarily theoretical. In terms of research method, the primary data 
is generated through written and archival documents from a wide range of books and articles 
published in English. This includes charters, declarations, plans of action, research reports, 
speeches, website, newspapers, figures and official statistics. Most of the archival sources 
were obtained from ISEAS Library, at National University of Singapore. However, some of the 
official documents were obtained information from the ASEAN Secretariat's official website 
(www.asean.org). In addition, to supplement the archival data, this thesis has also adopted in-
depth and semi-structured interviews of scholars and key informants in ASEAN. Briggs (1986: 
61) noted that ‘the interview, along with observation, is generally the primary means of 
gaining the [empirical] knowledge’. Similarly, according to Punch (2005), an interview would 
help explore people’s perspectives and their subjective meanings for understanding of the 
realities. Burnham (2004: 219) also argued that interviewing remains the most appropriate 
techniques because it ‘brings the world of practitioners and the academic together in a 
hopefully fruitful mutual dialogue’. The interviews were conducted in Indonesia, Singapore, 
Malaysia and Thailand. Key informant interviews included former Secretary General of ASEAN, 
national permanent representatives to ASEAN, former directors of the ASEAN Secretariat and 
ASEAN eminent scholars.2  
In this research, the data obtained from the interviews is considered as a crucial supplement to 
the archival sources in which questions are designed to avoid the repetition or to obtain 
additional findings and some points that are unanswered or unclear in the documentary 
research. Consequently, the interview data was coded in order to pick out themes and 
analysed in the light of the theoretical frameworks (Burnham, 2004: 217). Content analysis was 
then applied in order to generate findings and inferences and with an attempt to obtain 
answers being in line with theoretical explanation. This is to help building knowledge and 
understand more clearly about what has occurred and, perhaps, even predict what may occur. 
Interpreting and evaluating interviewee responses required careful consideration of their 
position and positionality in respect to the thesis topic.  On the one hand, for instance, 
policymakers and bureaucrats working within ASEAN would be likely to give more positive 
                                                          
2
 See Appendix 1.1 
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views of ASEAN than national policymakers or independent analysts.  On the other hand, 
however, the responses from such policymakers can provide important insights into how 
regionalisation is perceived by different actors within the region and, hence, the relatively 
importance of different concepts to their own action.  Evaluation of interviewee responses was 
hence both read ‘against the grain’ to the extent that respondents’ own position and interests 
were taken into account when weighting their responses, but also ‘with the grain’ to the 
extent that there is no reason to dispute the self-reported importance of different concepts to 
actors’ own actions. Moreover, all findings from the primary data were synthesized with the 
secondary data acquired from empirical studies from the EU literatures (Chapter 4) in order to 
gain insights from the differences or similarities between the two models and to assess the 
generalizability of the concepts and theories. This triangulation of data would be helpful for 
cross-checking and increasing validity.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is arranged in eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 
provides a more detailed overview of historical background that underpins the development of 
regional integration in Europe and Southeast Asia. It also highlights significant progress along 
their development routes and identifies major incentives and influential factors that motivate 
countries to join the community formation. Chapter 3 critically reviews relevant theoretical 
frameworks of analysis employed in this research: neofunctionalism, liberal 
intergovernmentalism, new institutionalism and constructivism. The second part of the 
chapter aims to bring all the theoretical discussions into the context of the four key debates in 
order to reveal how the four elements are explained in the context of these theories and, on 
the other hand, how these theories illustrate the importance and functions of the four 
elements in the process of regional integration. Then, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7 are dedicated to provide European perspectives related to each concept and 
analysis of empirical findings from the ASEAN case, democratisation, identity, institution and 
leadership respectively. Chapter 8 provides a summary of the thesis by synthesizing all main 
findings from empirical chapters in order to generate main arguments and a generalisation of 
data. Then, it also reveals the theoretical implications for integration theories and the study of 
regional integration, some reflections on the European Union as well as a consideration of 
research limitations and some suggestions for future research.  
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2 BACKGROUND TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE AND 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
This chapter provides an overview of the political and economic backgrounds that underpin 
the formation of the European Union and ASEAN. It also highlights the significant progress 
made along their development routes including identifying major incentives, which have 
motivated countries to decide whether to join or not to take part in these communities as well 
as other influential factors that have shaped their formation. This chapter is divided into two 
major sections. The first section will provide a history of political community formation in 
chronological order. The second is designed to acquire an understanding of the economic 
developments in Europe and Southeast Asia as they have been markedly important in shaping 
their economies and regional integration. 
2.1 Introduction 
Many hundred years ago, Europe created a nation-state system, the most effective form of 
political organization, through a series of wars and conflicts. Until the twentieth century, it was 
considered to be the only way of organizing politics (Leonard, 2005: 210). Then, after the end 
of the Second World War, regional integration clearly began to mature and prosper, with the 
prime initial objective being to avert wars and conflicts between nations as well as foster a 
constructive sense of cooperation. Later, Europe started inventing a new model in the second 
half of the twentieth century. Other parts of the world watched the success of Europe’s 
growing new form of organization and began to develop their own unions based on the same 
principles of peace and international laws as a core ideology. Along the way, we have seen a 
significant progress step by step, in the European Union, with its degree of integration now 
going far beyond a single market and, in fact, moving closer to what Winston Churchill termed 
in 1946 a ‘United States of Europe’. 
Being a forerunner of having a regional identity and becoming the largest contributor to the 
world economy, the European Union could act like the chief conductor of an orchestra. That is, 
they could aid the promotion of intra-regional cooperation, foster economic integration, 
finance regional infrastructure projects, and enhance regional organizations contributions to 
security (Leonard, 2005: 210). Moreover, being the world’s biggest economy it could 
accelerate progress and negotiations regarding the removal of regional trade barriers 
internationally. With the increasing importance in international politics strengthening region-
to-region relationships, instead of dealing individually as nations, could prove beneficial, 
especially to weaker nations. Already in this regard, Europe has taken the initiatives through 
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region-to-region collaborations, such as EU-Mercosur, ASEM and EU-AU3, in the last few 
decades.  
In recent years, ASEAN has evolved as another interesting model rising up as a new power in 
the Eastern world created for the purposes of the acceleration of economic growth and the 
protection of peace and stability within the region. It is a good example of a successful 
organization that has been responding to external pressures and common challenges 
(Limtanakool, 2010: 17). However, many argue that while the EU is approaching the position of 
inaugurating itself as a unitary entity, ASEAN still lags behind to a certain extent due to its 
considerable diverse structures and heterogeneity as well as the limited capacity of its 
governments, which seem to have deterred growth and development in the region. 
Nevertheless, the extended cooperation to other three East Asian countries (ASEAN+3) 
indicates its significant deeper and wider integration in the region as well as its posing a new 
challenge to the current world order. 
2.2 The emergence and evolution of regional integration  
 
“We must build a kind of United State of Europe” 
    Winston Churchill, on September 9, 1946 
The history of regional integration dates back hundreds of years. For example, the provinces of 
France proposed the signing of a customs union in 1664, whilst Austria and five of its 
neighbours had agreements on free trade during the 18th and 19th centuries (Schiff and 
Winters, 2003: 4). Subsequently, it was successively followed by a series of integration 
attempts: the Bavaria Wurttemberg Customs Union; the Middle German Commercial Union; 
the German Zollverein; the North German Tax Union; the German Monetary Union; the 
German Reich; and economic and political union in Italy and Switzerland (Mattli, 1999: 1), 
including many other colonial empires that were based on preferential trade arrangements. In 
the last decade of 19th century, the idea of European integration was reinforced by projects 
supported by a number of politicians, economists, philosophers and journalists such as Fritz 
Fischer, Giuseppe Mazzini and Victor Hugo. However, all such projects were finally fruitless and 
came to nothing (Mattli, 1999: 2).     
                                                          
3
 The European Union – African Union. 
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From the beginning of the 20th century onwards, the world witnessed a significant 
transformation of the global trading system as countries struggled with economic slump and 
several major conflicts. Although the exact causal explanation of these circumstances during 
this period is still under debate, most of the discussions pinpoint the consequences of two 
world wars and the Great Depression as being major causes of the frustration. As a result of 
the two world wars, European countries experienced their hardest times, with there being 
unprecedented human and economic catastrophes. Millions of people died and European 
nations were desperate to secure a lasting peace. In order to ensure that such circumstances 
could never happen again, regional alignment was adopted by many as the most effective way 
to recover from the suffering and sustain peace as well as to confront any possible incoming 
threats in the future. In 1946, Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, delivered an 
important speech at the University of Zurich calling for the creation of a ‘United States of 
Europe’ under the operation of a ‘Council of Europe’, with a reduction of trade barriers, free 
movement of people, a common military and a High Court (Palmer and Lambert, 1968: 111). 
This led to the foundation of the Council of Europe later in 1949 by the Treaty of London. 
However, although its membership greatly expanded and it later made considerable progress 
on human rights and cultural issues, the Council did not go any further from being a loose 
intergovernmental organization and hence, was not what most Europeans were looking for 
(McCormick, 2002: 64). 
In 1947, the US showed support rebuilding of Europe and economic cooperation among its 
countries by introducing the Marshall Plan. That is, given the destruction of the Second World 
War, the plan was aimed at reconstructing Europe’s economic and political base as well as 
preventing Soviet hostility and the rise of domestic communist parties (Hogan, 1987: 26-27). 
The goals of the Marshall Plan are still hotly debated today. On the one hand, although many 
believed that the plan was put forward as it would be a profitable investment for the United 
States, on the other hand, they could not deny that it promoted the idea of European 
integration, whereby its countries would be encouraged to collaborate together and thus 
underlined the interdependence among their economies (Urwin, 1995: 20-22).  
“It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the 
return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political 
stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or 
doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.” 
       George Marshall, on June 5, 1947 
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One year later, on 17 March 1948 the three Benelux countries, France and the UK agreed to 
sign the Treaty of Brussels. The most crucial feature in this agreement was probably the last 
item of its title, collective self-defence (McAllister, 2007: 10-11), which was intended to ensure 
the mutual defence and security of the member states. Later, the signing of the Treaty of 
Brussels spurred the European countries to engage in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), in 1949. This security alliance was an expansion from the Brussels Treaty, 
covering other European and North Atlantic countries, including Italy, Denmark, Iceland, 
Norway, Portugal, Canada, and notably the participation of the US who had the goal of helping 
their European allies to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area 
(McCormick, 2002: 62). 
The achievements of acquiring defence and security from the Brussels and NATO Treaties as 
well as the US’s support for economic reconstruction from the Marshall Plan were key 
successes as a primary step towards integration, which thereafter had considerable influence 
over the creation of the European community. However, the first major event considered as 
the instigation of European integration took place on 9 May 1950 at a press conference held at 
the French Foreign Ministry in Paris. After having discussions with the Planning Commissioner, 
Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, declared a plan, known as the 
Schuman Plan, to merge the coal and steel industries of France and Germany under the control 
of a single mutual administration (McCormick, 2002: 56). This subsequently led to the 
formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, which was agreed by France, 
West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg under the enforcement of the 
Paris Treaty. 
“The pooling of coal and steel production will immediately assure the establishment of 
common bases for economic development as a first step for the European Federation. 
It will change the destiny of regions that have long been devoted to manufacturing 
munitions of war, of which they have been most constantly the victims. This merging of 
our interests in coal and steel production and our joint action will make it plain that 
any war between France and Germany becomes not only unthinkable but materially 
impossible.” 




“There will be no peace in Europe, if the states are reconstituted on the basis of 
national sovereignty… The countries of Europe are too small to guarantee their peoples 
the necessary prosperity and social development. The European states must constitute 
themselves into a federation….” 
               Jean Monnet, on August 5, 1943 
After the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, Europe embarked on 
travel along a long harmonisation road. In the meantime, the world also witnessed the rise of 
regional integration schemes in other regions, for they had monitored the successful 
development of the European project and the way that it had empowered small countries to 
have a firm position on the international stage, without the need for vast wealth, a strong 
military capacity or a large population size. What is more, across the globe it was recognised 
that regional integration could help to avoid future conflict among neighbouring countries as 
well as fostering democracy and economic development. 
 
Figure 2.1: Regional trade agreements notified to the GATT/WTO (1948 – 2009) 
Source: WTO Secretariat http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm 
Figure 2.1 shows the configuration of regional arrangements as notified by GATT/WTO 
between 1948 and 2009. According to the WTO, in the period 1948-1994 the GATT received 
124 notifications of regional trade agreement relating to trade in goods. Since the 
establishment of the WTO in 1995, a dramatic increase in the number of regional agreements 
has been witnessed, with at least 300 additional arrangements notified. 
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As a result of the significant changes in international politics since the middle of the 20th 
century, such as the loosening of the Cold War, the decolonization of states from the Western 
empires and, in particular, the successful development of the forerunner European integration 
which played a key role in the surge of later regional integration activities, other regional 
integration schemes emerged accordingly. The Organization of African Unity (later changed to 
African Union in 2002) was founded in 1963 and this was followed by the creation of ASEAN in 
1967, with Mercosur established in 1991. Then, the Andean Pact and the Central American 
Common Market (CACM) were set up, in 1991 and 1993, respectively. Next, NAFTA was 
formed in 1994 when the free trade agreement between Canada and the US was extended to 
Mexico, and for the first time a developing country merged with influential countries as an 
equal partner. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was signed in 1997 and 
transformed itself into the South Asian Free Trade Area, which now represents the world’s 
largest regional agreement in terms of population size. 
As Mark Leonard (2005: 207) stated, “while the global institutions such as the United Nations, 
the IMF and the World Bank continue to be playthings of the great powers, these regional 
organizations are starting to deliver real benefits”. Perhaps, this is because regional integration 
has come to be seen as a way that countries can leave behind their historical conflicts and 
tensions. As mentioned above, it has also enabled small countries to gain more bargaining 
power on the international scene, despite lacking wealth, military forces or having a small 
population size. The cooperation of neighbouring countries has changed considerably since the 
1990s, moving from a security-driven pattern, towards a more dynamic and multidimensional 
one concerned with matters of economy, culture, politics and social aspects. In sum, the world 
seems to be moving in a multi-polarity direction involving a diverse range of matters under the 
perspective that this is the best way to create a durable path that can represent the various 
needs of a complex world and provide long-term stability. 
2.3 The development of regional integration in Europe  
The idea of a united Europe has been repeatedly put forward for centuries, but tangible efforts 
to promote a European Community of nations really began in earnest in the 1950s, the period 
after the Second World War. Since the signing of the Treaty of Paris, which created the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the progress of European integration has 
continuously developed, step by step. However, soon after the establishment of the ECSC, 
there were at least two significant attempts to make further progress to this end, but they 
failed hopelessly. First, the European Defence Community (EDC) was aimed at promoting 
western European cooperation to unify military forces without the rearmament of West 
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Germany. But the scheme failed to be ratified and was rejected by the two influential 
countries, France and the UK, because they did not desire to give up their control over their 
armed forces (Urwin, 1995: 63). Second, the European Political Community was ambitiously 
intended to forge a premature experiment for a European Federation. However, with the 
collapse of the EDC, the hope of this being achieved was accordingly impossible. 
The failure of the two integration efforts influenced the operation of the ECSC. Jean Monnet, 
the man who played a crucial role in initiating the Schuman Plan and was the first president of 
the ‘High Authority’ (what later became the European Commission) of the ECSC, resigned its 
presidency, because of disillusionment and political resistance to his work (Monnet and 
Mayne, 1978: 398-404). In reality, the ECSC scheme was a solid achievement and relatively 
successful because it was at least the first time that European countries gave up their 
sovereign power to a supranational organization, thus signifying the feasibility of European 
integration (McCormick, 2002: 66). In addition, the High Authority was regarded as the first 
ever supranational institution serving as the executive body of the focal community. However, 
the capability of the ECSC was limited and European integrationists felt that something more 
needed to be done in order to revive the European ideal and give the momentum back.  
Later, a meeting of the ECSC foreign ministers at Messina in June 1955, participated in by 
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg, resulted in the affirmation of 
the Benelux Proposals to establish a general common market and an atomic energy 
community (Weigall and Stirk, 1992: 94-97). It was further agreed to set up a working 
committee to develop the details of the proposals and for it subsequently to report back. The 
committee was known as ‘The Spaak Committee’, being chaired by the Belgian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak. Apart from working on the proposals, the committee was 
tasked with sketching the broad outline of the future European Economic Community (EEC) 
and European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) (European NAvigator, 2011a). As a 
consequence, the two Treaties of Rome were signed on March 25, 1957 by Belgium, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany as an extended cooperation from the 
earlier European Coal and Steel Community. The treaties were divided into 2 parts, one 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the other creating the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 
The passing of the EEC treaty is universally considered to be the origin of European economic 
integration. Its first key aim was to set up a common market by removing all restrictions on 
internal trade and imposing a common external tariff for all goods imported into EEC nations. 
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Furthermore, it was intended to reinforce the free movement of people, services and capital 
as well as developing agricultural and transport policies, along with establishing financial 
institutions: a European Social Fund and a European Investment Bank (McCormick, 2002: 66). 
Meanwhile, Euratom was targeted at setting up a common market for nuclear energy, but this 
was considered to be less important and remained only a minor actor in the process of 
integration due to it focusing mainly on research (McCormick, 2002: 66). From an institutional 
point of view, both organizations were modelled according to the procedures of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), including maintaining of the supranational elements 
(European NAvigator, 2011b). 
The EEC subsequently emerged as the most significant organization in Europe and, along the 
way, it made several noticeable achievements. First, the removal of barriers for internal 
market was sufficient to enable the member countries to agree on common external tariffs in 
1968 and to declare an industrial custom union (McCormick, 2002: 68). Second, as a 
consequence of economic integration, the quota restriction that the countries had used to 
protect their domestic markets from imported products was removed, resulting in a 
substantial increase in intra-EEC trade, which was growing almost three times since 1958 
compared to the rate of non-member countries (Urwin, 1995: 130). Third, although the 
working committee encountered some conflicts of interests due to the disparities in the size of 
production units, the production costs and the volume of agricultural products exported 
(European NAvigator, 2011c), the Agreement on a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was 
succeeded in 1968 with the creation of a single market for agricultural products, resulting in 
improvements in production and productivity (McCormick, 2002: 68-69). Last, the EEC 
provided a cooperative platform for member countries to work more closely together on 
international negotiations in which they could perform better than by negotiating individually 
(McCormick, 2002: 69). 
However, the UK remained the most obvious absentee in the community as the British 
continued seeing themselves as a superpower and insisted on maintaining their 
Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the UK did not resist European integration, but was deeply 
suspicious about what had been proposed by the French and rather, preferred 
intergovernmentalism to supranationalism, so instead, decided to raise the idea of an 
intergovernmental organization. In 1960, Britain suggested the creation of European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) with the emphasis being on intergovernmental policy aimed at the 
creation of a free trade area with the removal of tariffs and control over exports (Bono, 2003 : 
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191-192). Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal, countries excluded 
from the EEC, agreed to join the scheme and signed up in January 1960.  
Under the umbrella of EFTA, the scheme did cut tariffs but it was not sustainable in the long 
term, because most of its members did more trade with countries in the EEC than their EFTA 
partners (McCormick, 2002: 69). Consequently, it soon became clear that the association 
would not be successful as it was not efficient enough to reconstruct the economy. Given the 
impressive progress in economic and political growth of the EEC countries, the UK realized that 
it was actually viable and by staying out of the EEC the country could face domestic political 
pressures and economic exclusion. Accordingly, the UK decided to submit an application to 
obtain full EEC membership in 1961, along with Denmark, Ireland and Norway, and the 
negotiations began in early 1962. 
Charles de Gaulle, the President of France who had played a dominant role in the process of 
European integration, was clearly in opposition to the British accession. He viewed the British 
as rivals to the French regarding influence in the community and ‘a continuing threat to the 
emergence of preferred kind of ‘third force’ Europe’ (Camps, 1964: 504). As a result, Charles 
de Gaulle vetoed the British application and delivered a speech at a press conference in Paris 
explaining his stance.  
“Whether Great Britain can now place herself like the Continent and with it inside a 
tariff which is genuinely common, to renounce all Commonwealth preferences, to cease 
any pretence that her agriculture be privileged, and, more than that, to treat her 
engagements with other countries of the free trade area as null and void” 
     Charles de Gaulle, January 14, 1963 
     Source: (Nicholson and East, 1987: 30-32) 
As it was a joint package of application, Denmark, Ireland and Norway were also rejected from 
joining. Meanwhile, soon after, 1963 and 1964 were considered as one of the most productive 
periods in the construction of the community (Marjolin, 1989: 346) due to the consolidation of 
the CAP, which shaped its direction for the rest of the 1960s.  
Moreover, before the end of the decade, there was some considerable further reconstruction 
of the community. First, in 1965 in Brussels, the executive bodies of the three organizations 
originated by the Treaty of Rome (ECSC, EEC and Euratom) were combined into a single 
institutional body together known as ‘The European Community (EC)’. Second, a crisis about 
policy scope and balance between the institutions as well as about the power of members to 
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interrupt the integration process (McAllister, 2007: 27-28) led to the Luxembourg compromise 
of 1966. As Charles de Gaulle’s self-centred actions to ensure their interests in France’s 
agricultural products would remain unhindered, this agreement resolved the problems of 
majority voting in the Council by promoting unanimity voting as the norm and that members 
would agree to practically acceptable solutions within a reasonable time. Overall, the 
consequences that resulted from these crises delayed the enforcement of a merger treaty and 
shaped the political climate in which the community operated during the next decade (Dinan, 
2005: 51). 
Then, the second Britain accession application for the EC membership was made in May 1967, 
along with Denmark, Ireland and Norway. Charles de Gaulle restated his opposition when he 
announced during his biannual press conference that British accession to the EC ‘would 
obviously mean the breaking up of a Community that has been built and that functions 
according to rules which would not bear such a monumental exception’ (Nicholson and East, 
1987: 52-53). The rejection by the powerful French man, with the same reasons as before, 
resulted in the application being stalled again and Britain could do nothing but await a 
favourable moment to renegotiate. Two years later, defeat in a French referendum on regional 
and senate reform was a profound setback that resulted in Charles de Gaulle resigning from 
his position. After that, in 1969, Georges Pompidou replaced him and thus held the key to the 
future of the EC as the President of the French Republic. This replacement provided a more 
positive stance to the pending requested application by the UK and also an ‘open sesame’ 
perspective for the future development of the community (McAllister, 2007: 32). 
In the meantime, West Germany, under the control of its new Chancellor Willy Brandt, 
recovered and became growing economic power with political influence (Dinan, 2005: 57), 
eventually emerging as the region’s driving force. The changes of leadership in France and 
West Germany in 1969 brought new momentum to the community and the EC was once more 
on the move. Georges Pompidou was less antagonistic than the former French president, de 
Gaulle, towards strengthening community ties, while Willy Brandt was strongly in favour of 
British entry and monetary union (McCormick, 2002: 73). Subsequently, Britain reactivated its 
application and this time it was accepted. That is, membership was actively discussed during 
1970-1971 and the UK, Denmark and Ireland finally joined the EC in January 1973. Surprisingly, 
Norway would have joined as well but was blocked by the result of a public referendum in 
September 1972 that narrowly disagreed with membership. For Denmark, it would have been 
economic suicide to stay out of the enlarged community due to the vast majority of their 
exported products pouring into Britain and Germany, while the Irish were very much 
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economically tied to Britain, so it would have been idiotic to stay outside once Britain went in 
(Dinan, 2005: 63). 
Soon after, the leaders of the three most influential countries in the community were 
substituted in 1974. That is, Harold Wilson won the British election and returned to office, 
whilst Helmut Schmidt became the new chancellor after the resignation of Willy Brandt. 
Georges Pompidou unexpectedly passed away in 1974 and Valery Giscard d’Estaing won the 
election to become the president (Dinan, 2005: 63). These significant transformations had a 
considerable impact on shaping the future of the EC. Furthermore, as a consequence of the 
US’s abolition of dollar convertibility in 1971 and the oil crises in 1973 which both pushed the 
EC into recession for the rest of decade, governments began to act more protectively and the 
road to a complete integrated union became far more implausible than previously (Williams, 
1991: 50).  
The next development of European integration was the European Monetary System (EMS), 
launched in 1979, aimed at linking members’ currencies in order to create a zone of monetary 
stability and prevent the community from global fluctuating exchange rates. The scheme was 
initiated and much credited to Roy Jenkins, Commission president from 1977-1981, also known 
as the Jenkins Commission. At the latter stage, the EMS was taken over by the French and 
German leaders, Giscard d’Estaing and Schmidt. They, as good collaborators, replaced Jenkins 
and took a leading role in the formation of what became the EMS (Dinan, 2005: 79). The 
beginning of the EMS ‘came from a clear convergence of French and German interests, 
confirming the two countries’s leading roles in the Community’ (Simonian, 1985: 277). The 
Deutsche Mark and the German Bundesbank were undoubtedly the centre of the EMS, due to 
their strength and the growing dominance of Germany within the EC. According to Dinan 
(2005: 79), the British did not participate from the beginning, because of their resentment of 
the close Franco-German relations and doubts about the scheme’s validity. On the whole, the 
EMS did represent a major step in economic integration and later became the fundamental 
platform for the establishment of the euro.  
According to the terms of their 1973 entry, the new member states were forced to comply 
with all the community’s regulations as they stood. From then on, the UK appeared to be the 
most problematic member state in the EC, because of the high costs of membership, such as 
higher food prices, substantial amounts in customs levies and high budgetary contributions 
(Jones, 1996: 19). As Britain’s economic structure had a relatively small agricultural sector and 
greatly relied on food imports, it would not gain any significant benefit from the Common 
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Agricultural Policy. As a result, there followed a series of negotiations and budget rebates 
during the 1970s-1980s. For instance, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, who had replaced James 
Callaghan in 1979, was not interested in the EC’s institutions and policies, as arguing that 
Britain was paying too much and receiving too little (Dinan, 2005: 81). The obstructionism of 
the UK raised political tension among member states and restrained the ability of the 
community to address the further issues of integration (Williams, 1991: 77).           
In the 1980s, it was a time for an additional round of enlargement and the potential candidates 
were three European countries from the southern periphery: Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
Greece had first showed interest in joining the EEC in the late 1950s, but had been turned 
down due to its economy being too underdeveloped, however it was given associate 
membership in 1961 as a path to full accession (McCormick, 2002: 70). After the Greek military 
coup in 1967, the hope to become a part of the community became very improbable, but on 
returning to civilian government in 1974, their membership application was actively remade in 
1975 and at this time the community agreed membership would help rebuild democracy. 
Finally, it became the tenth member in 1981. 
Similar to the Greeks, Spain and Portugal submitted membership applications soon after the 
formal transition to parliamentary democracy, in 1977. In principle, they both had strong and 
direct trade links to the EC and desired to gain the entry as a way of stabilizing their newly 
established democratic institutions. Nevertheless, by the time of membership application, the 
surrounding conditions had become more demanding as both the community and the 
applicants had many difficulties with each other, due to several apparent differences between 
the EC9 and the three Southern applicants, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Moreover, Spain had a 
large economy and its influence were seen as likely to affect both industrial and agricultural 
producers within the community (McCormick, 2002: 67). However, the EC believed that 
membership would encourage democracy on the Iberian Peninsula and foster good relations 
between the two applicants and Western Europe (McCormick, 2002: 72). The negotiation for 
this enlargement was difficult and complicated. In fact, it took a long time to reach agreement 
and the treaty of accession was not signed until 1985 with Spain and Portugal, having just 
become democracies, entering EC territory in January 1986. 
Almost immediately, the next step was progress towards the single market, signed in February 
1986 and which came into force in July 1987. The Single European Act was seen as a major 
revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome and widely considered as the most crucial and successful 
step of European integration since the Treaty of Rome. It was brought about by the 
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intergovernmental conference in September 1985 as a revival of the original outlined goal of 
creating a single market. The act identified the measures required to overcome all obstacles 
and set a detailed timetable for the removal of all barriers by 1990 (European Commission, 
1985). That is, the 1986 Single European Act defined itself as ‘an area without international 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’ 
(European Parliament, 2000). However, the negotiation towards this end experienced some 
difficulties in arriving at a consensus. Finally, the member states revised the Treaty of Rome 
and agreed to sign the Single European Act subject to it being on the basis of majority voting, 
rather than the usual unanimous form, for most of the measures outlined in the single market 
programme (Williams, 1991: 90). 
In more detail, the process of creating a single market had been introduced in the 1960s and 
most tariff barriers had consequently been eliminated. The act itself was an extension to the 
previous attempt, which was aimed at eliminating the remaining barriers and in particular, 
sought harmonization of some newly pioneered areas, such as: procurement, designs, 
technical standards, taxation, R&D, and the environment. This included social policy, which 
had often been overlooked by European leaders, with the focus being on helping the poorer 
parts of Europe. Besides, the Single European Act also had one significant political implication. 
That is, apart from gathering member states to work towards radical issues more closely, the 
commitment to employ majority voting on most of the measures, mainly related to taxation 
and health matters, was seen as an essential key feature for the success of the programme 
(Williams, 1991: 98).  
Indeed, the Single European Act paved the way for further institutional reform and the 
Maastricht Treaty, which brought about the EC and the EMU. There was no guarantee that the 
Single European Act would raise concentration of economic integration, but the success of the 
scheme relied very much on global economic relationships as well as economic and political 
development within the community. Accordingly, between 1986 and 1992 the EC created 
about 280 single pieces of legislation geared towards unveiling closed national markets and, in 
most areas, 12 sets of national regulations were replaced by one common European rule, 
which greatly lessened the complications and costs for any business operating throughout the 
community (European Commission, 2002b). However, the task of building the single market is 
a permanent job without end and even today the Parliament, the Commission and the 
participating members spend much time in reaching agreement on complicated pieces of 
legislation affecting many different interest groups in the community. 
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A few years after the establishment of the Single European Act, there was an important 
historical occurrence that would greatly affect the future economic integration and the 
balance of political influences in the community. This was the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 
November 1989, for the defeat of the communists that had held half of Europe for many 
decades, was a watershed and symbolized a stronger united Germany. Moreover, it paved the 
way for the coming of democracy to Central and Eastern European nations as they broke away 
from Soviet control. In general, for a generation that had grown up with the fear of war and 
global communism, the collapse of the wall was a welcome tiding (Scaliger, 2009). The fall was 
a beginning of the process of European reunification and implied that the union could become 
much larger. In fact, the size of potential market was doubled, not only Germany itself 
becoming the largest market in Europe but also other former communist states such as 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania now becoming large promising growing markets.  
“The European Union Treaty... within a few years will lead to the creation of what the 
founding fathers of modern Europe dreamed of after the war, the United States of 
Europe.” 
       Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor, 1992 
A few years later, the European community officially became known as “The European Union” 
for the first time by the endorsement of the Maastricht Treaty, or the so called the ‘Treaty of 
the European Union’. It was signed in February 1992 and came into force in November 1993. 
After the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and subsequent German 
reunification, member states desired to seek a commitment to reinforce the Community's 
international position and to extend the achievements of the Single European Act with other 
reforms (EUROPA, 2007). The Maastricht Treaty represented a new stage in European 
integration, bringing several new important aspects to the community. Apart from renaming 
the community ‘the European Union’, the treaty served two overarching purposes. First, there 
were several initiatives set out under the Single European Act, which involved creating a new 
framework based around three 'pillars', covering economic relations, foreign affairs and home 
affairs. Second, there was the deepening of integration, geared towards the process of 
Economic and Monetary Union, which would lead to the creation of the euro (CIVITAS, 2010). 
However, the Maastricht Treaty is widely recognized ‘not only for the long and fractious 
negotiations and baffling terminology involved in drafting it, but also for the difficulties many 
member states had in ratifying it’ (BBC, 2001). 
  “We're not just here to make a single market, but a political union”   
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      Jacques Delors, EU Commission President, 1993 
The Maastricht Treaty was also considered as the blueprint for Europe's biggest project for the 
next decade: Economic and Monetary Union. It identified the three stages of achieving the 
EMU, which would eventually lead to the employing of single currency, and drew the 
convergence criteria or economic tests that member states had to be qualified (BBC, 2001). 
Structurally, it reconstructed the way in which the organisation had been established. That is, 
while the Commission retained responsibility for the economic 'pillar' of EU activity, the 
European Communities, the new 'pillars', the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJC), were to be controlled by the 
European Council, not the Commission. However, the three separate pillars would all be linked 
under the overarching structure of the European Union (CIVITAS, 2010). Table 2.1 
demonstrates the three-pillar structure of the EU. 
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Table 2.1: The three-pillar structure of the EU 
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        Source: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/droit_communautaire/droit_communautaire.htm 
One major radical issue stemming from the Maastricht Treaty was the proposal to substantially 
enlarge the EU over the next few decades. At their summit in Copenhagen in 1993, this was 
the first time that the EU member states formally made a definitive decision declaring 
enlargement as an explicit goal of the European Union. They drew up what has become widely 
known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, which have to be fulfilled if a country is to be eligible to 
join the European Union. That is, by the time they join, new applicants must meet the three 




• stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities;  
• a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union;  
• the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including support for the  aims of 
the Union. They must have a public administration capable of applying and managing EU 
laws in practice.  
These regulations were called ‘acquis communautaire’, the body of the EU’s law used as a 
standard frame in order to measure a country’s ability to meet the requirements to join the 
European Union (Hillion, 2004: 2). In other words, the Copenhagen criteria stipulate that the 
candidate country possesses a consolidated market economy that performs free movement of 
goods, capital, people, and services; a consolidated democracy, rule of law, and consequently a 
well-established human rights regime, which also encompasses protection of the rights of 
minorities; the candidate must be aiming at monetary, economic and political union with the 
EU member countries, and the adoption of the acquis communautaire, and related laws, 
regulations and EU treaties (Müftüler Baç, 2002: 12). 
In the long run, this declaration had legal consequences for aspiring member countries. It is 
also interesting that issues such as rules of law and human rights, were for the first-time 
included in the formal set of criteria. The collapse of socialist countries and the German 
unification produced a growing number of Eastern European requests for associate or full 
membership with the EU. The larger entity, particularly extending to the east, meant that the 
EU became more linked to problematic areas and this meant it had to develop a strategy to 
tackle these challenges. As a consequence, institutional reform of the Union without losing 
coherence and any ability to act was recognised as being crucial by member states (Woyke, 
2001: 385).  
At the same time, the enlargement process of the EU made significant progress in January 
1995 when Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the community, although Norway had a 
referendum result that once again went against EU membership. This enlargement seemed 
simple, straightforward and less controversial because the economic conditions of the 
candidate countries were superior to many existing member states, having appropriate 
structures capable of implementing the EU legislation (Dinan, 2005: 135). As a consequence, 
the impact of the 1995 enlargement brought changes to the community in a variety of ways. In 
particular, it can be clearly seen that the EU extended into the far north of the continent, with 
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an increase in size of 33 percent, GDP by 7 percent and its population by 6.2 percent (Dinan, 
2005: 141). Furthermore, the joining of the two widely respected Nordic counties, Sweden and 
Finland, improved the standard of democracy, civilian participation and transparency of 
government, seemingly a desirable development at an appropriate time of widespread public 
concern about accountability and legitimacy in the EU (Spence, 1997: 24). In terms of the 
institutional and policy implications, the fourth enlargement extended the period of each 
country rotating the presidency from 6 to 7.5 years and also increased the number of votes in 
the council from 76 to 87, as votes were allocated in accordance with population size (Jones, 
1996: 277).  
On the other hand, the new accession also brought another stream of questioning, but this 
time from Sweden rather than the UK, as they did not seem to be interested in EU 
membership. That is, while Austria and Finland were both satisfied with the community, 
Sweden appeared to be one of the most EU sceptical countries in the group and having only 
achieved a narrow victory in the referendum on EU accession (53.1% yes vote), with only a few 
tangible benefits of membership being recognised, this aggravated the distrust of the Swedish 
people. In fact, in accord with public opinion in 1998, the Swedish government decided not to 
participate in the final stage of EMU (Dinan, 2005: 142). However, it was very unlikely that 
Sweden would leave the community because, as with other member states, EU membership 
would probably be essential for long-term economic prosperity. 
As the EU was moving closer to political union and preparing for the next enlargement, 
another two treaties were ratified between 1997 and 2001. First, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
was signed in October 1997 and came into force in May 1999. Indeed, the treaty did not 
achieve any significant progress on enlargement of the union as it had been expected. 
Disappointedly, the Council was unable to agree anything more than modest changes to the 
institutional structure in preparation for future enlargement (McCormick, 2002: 74). However, 
it did make progress in the field of justice and home affairs, social policy, employment and 
environment. According to Dinan (2005: 169), ‘the Amsterdam Treaty was a fitting testimonial 
to the impossibility of reconciling the complexity of EU governance with citizen’s demands for 
greater simplicity and comprehensibility’. Second, the Treaty of Nice was signed in February 
2001 and came into force in 2003. Mainly, this agreement amended the two previous treaties, 
the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Rome, with the intention of adapting the institutional 
structures to meet the challenge of enlargement. Unfortunately, the treaty achieved only a 
limited institutional reform in preparation for enlargement and its most important outcome 
was to mitigate the accession criteria (Dinan, 2005: 172), including redistributing the votes in 
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the Council and increasing the size of the European Commission and the European Parliament 
(McCormick, 2002: 75). 
In 2002, there was a watershed moment in the financial and economic integration of the 
community. That is, on the first of January 2002, twelve of the fifteen member states 
implemented the euro for first time, which represented the first pan European currency since 
the fall of the Roman Empire, with Denmark, Sweden and the UK remaining outside (European 
Commission, 2002a: 9). This combining of national currencies was a dramatic step forward on 
the economic front, as trade among the EU countries had previously been frequently disrupted 
by instability and fluctuation of exchange rates between these currencies. That is, the prior 
adoption of the single market programme could not be fully exploited on the grounds that high 
transaction costs of currency conversion and uncertain exchange rates persisted. Furthermore, 
it was considered to be consistent with the notion of the Single Market Programme regarding 
which the view was that the continuation and efficiency of the scheme required the financial 
stability that monetary union could deliver.  
Once the scheme came into force, monetary policy was in the hands of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), an independent financial unit specially created for that purpose, and the national 
central banks of the participating member states, which were together known as ‘the 
Eurosystem’. However, major parts of fiscal policy and other structural policies, such as labour, 
pension and capital markets, were the responsibility of national governments, but they did 
agree to cooperate with the ECB in order to achieve the common goals of stability, growth and 
employment (European Commission, 2011). All in all, the euro now is a common recognized 
entity and is a part of everyday life in 16 European member states as well as having become 
the second most important international currency after the US dollar.  
Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the aftermath of the euro implementation has had several 
significant impacts on the European Union. It makes the community look more robust and 
vibrant. Moreover, apart from making all financial matters and travelling easier, the integrated 
currency initially stimulated the European economy. As mentioned before, the single currency 
is a sensible addition to the earlier Single Market Programme, for it has made the scheme work 
more efficiently. The increase in terms of size and stability is likely to protect the community 
from external sensitivity such as oil price rises, economic shocks and turbulence in the financial 
markets. Also, it does multiply the importance of its currency and bargaining power as being 





Just two years after the adoption of the euro, the EU took the most crucial steps in their 
enlargement with the accession of ten Eastern European and Mediterranean states: Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
Although this enlargement did not imply any explicit implications in terms of economic 
development and size of population owing to their economies being relatively much smaller 
than most of the existing members, the real significance of the 2004 enlargement is that the 
EU now is “no longer an exclusive club for wealthy west Europeans” (McCormick, 2002: 77). 
Moreover, the cases of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania who had been under Soviet occupation 
confirmed that the Cold War has completely ended as they now became part of the union. The 
2004 enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe was truly an essential part of political, 
economic and cultural restoration across the continent (Dinan, 2005: 143).  
Without a doubt, the obvious differences in development between the existing members and 
the newcomers subsequently produced tensions between these two different types of 
members. Obviously, apart from the need for serious institutional reform, the enlargement 
would have a considerable impact on the two largest sectors of EU expenditure: agricultural 
policy and cohesion policy (Dinan, 2005: 154). These concerns resulted in a growing opposition 
to enlargement as well as leading to unresolvable arguments about such matters as mass 
immigration, employment, social security and contributions to huge subsidies to the poorer 
states. That is, with the wider EU it became more difficult to achieve deeper integration and, 
with so many members, more and more difficult to manage and be able to agree on anything 
(BBC, 2007). This raised the troubling question about what were the appropriate limits of EU 
enlargement, for in the Maastricht treaty (1993, article 6) it states that any European country 
can apply to join the community if it meets the Copenhagen Criteria: ‘principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law’. 
More recently, the latest progress of the EU was the joining of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. 
This enlargement extended the EU’s external territory further east, closer to sensitive areas in 
the Balkans. In terms of structural changes, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania increased 
the EU’s population by 6% and GDP by less than 1%, with two more seats added to the 
European Commission and 54 to the European Parliament (BBC, 2007). Apparently, they were 
the poorest countries in the EU and experiencing problems of high-level corruption and 
organized crime. Nevertheless, both were seen as a connection to the Balkan and Black Sea 
regions for possible future enlargement. At present, Turkey, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro 
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and Iceland have acquired the status of EU official candidate and Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Serbia are expected to join this list in the future. Last, the 2007 enlargement also 
geographically had political implications because it expanded the EU’s borders to meeting 
those of Russia, thus implying ‘the EU has now become a Black Sea Power…further drawn into 
closer involvement in the area of the former Soviet Union’ (Flenley, 2008: 189).  
On the whole, the 2004 and 2007 as well as future enlargement further east have confronted 
the European Union with unprecedented institutional and political challenges. That is, as 
enlargement continues to be a major issue in the community, the future of the EU will largely 
depend on the achievement of institutional reform, having effective institutions to tackle the 
wider range of differences between existing and incoming members as well as adaptation of 
the EU standards and legislation. 






(billions of USD) 
GDP per cap 
(USD) 
2004 Enlargement 
Estonia 1.4 45226 15.5 11000 
Latvia 2.3 64589 21.0 8900 
Lithuania 3.6 65200 30 8400 
Poland 38.8 312685 373.2 9700 
Czech Republic 10.2 78866 157.1 15300 
Hungary 10.0 93030 134 13300 
Slovakia 5.4 48845 67.3 12400 
Slovenia 1.9 20253 37.1 19200 
Malta 0.4 316 6.8 17200 
Cyprus 0.8 9250 9.4 15000 
Subtotal 74.6 738260 851.4 11413 
2007 Enlargement 
Bulgaria 7.5 110910 49.2 6500 
Romania 22.3 238391 169.3 7600 
Subtotal 29.8 349301 218.5 7332 
Total (Inc. 2004) 104.4 1087561 1069.6 10245 
     Source: www.factindex.com/e/en/enlargement_of_the_european_union.html 
The two world wars, originated by suspicion and hostility, physically demolished most 
European countries after which they were pulled into a military and economic vacuum as the 
United States and the Soviet Union gained rising power and influence, becoming the dominant 
forces in world politics (McCormick, 2002: 77-78). As a consequence of the collapse of 
communism in the central and eastern regions following the fall of the Berlin Wall, European 
countries become ever closer neighbours. The 1986 Single European Act, setting out the 
timetable for the creation of the single market by 1993, represents the completion of the 'four 
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freedoms': movement of goods, services, people and money as well as bringing about the 
world’s largest trading area. The Schengen agreements allow people to travel without having 
their passports checked at the borders, thus facilitating millions of people studying or working 
in other countries. The subsequent adoption of the single currency ‘the euro’ inaugurated a 
new era of economic integration. Finally, the series of enlargements significantly grew the 
community, particularly in terms of size and weight of international bargaining power. 
The EU has clearly shown several facets of united cooperation to the rest of the world, 
covering many policy areas, such as foreign policy, trade policy, financial policy, social policy, 
agricultural policy, environmental policy etc. However, it is widely believed that it is time for 
the EU to have a constitution, but it will not be easy to agree on what form this should take 
and hence would appear for many a rocky road to go down. That is, it is likely that the process 
of ratification of such a constitution will trouble many of the citizens of the EU and hence is 
probably the biggest challenge it faces for the foreseeable future. However, although a 
constitution would seem to be advantageous, it is not absolutely essential. As Dinan opined, 
‘arguably, the EU needed better leadership and more congenial political and economic 
environment to restore its luster and sense of purpose’ (2005: 182). 
 
Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Supranational_European_Bodies.png 
Figure 2.2: The relationship between supranational organizations in Europe 
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2.4 The development of regional integration in Southeast Asia 
Similar to the EU zone, the Second World War brought enormous consequences to Southeast 
Asian nations. Southeast Asia unofficially acquired the status of a geographical region during 
the Second World War through the formation of an allied group, as a part of US-Britain military 
operations in the region. That is, the South-East Asia Command (SEAC), a group of military 
allies comprising Siam (Thailand), French Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) and the 
Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), was created in 1943 with the purpose of liberation of the 
Japanese occupied territories. Although the SEAC was not the originator for what has become, 
Southeast Asia today, it did signal political implications of the notion of a region with strategic 
and political coherence (Emmerson, 2005: 1-21). In 1954, there was another cooperative 
agreement concluded in Manila. The South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was signed 
by the US, Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, France, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand, with 
the purpose of providing security for the region against Sino-Soviet power. However, SEATO 
was not successful and effective, which consequently led to the failure of its operations. As 
Segal (Segal, 1990: 238) stated ‘SEATO never made much practical sense and was more a 
public-relations organization. Certainly in Comparison to NATO, it lacked a regular unified 
command’.      
The war resulted in deep suffering being inflicted on the native populations of the region and 
the Japanese occupation triggered the development of nationalist movements, either explicitly 
or implicitly (Stockwell, 1992: 336). Hence, after the war the European colonial powers were 
confronted with the local waves of nationalism. Consequently, during the following few 
decades, a series of decolonizations occurred in the region, as India, Burma, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia and Singapore all were given their independence. Brunei 
came later, only gaining independence from the British in 1984 although it had been self-
governing since 1959. Finally, Timor-Leste, annexed by Indonesia in 1975, gained full 
independence in 2002. 
34 
 
Table 2.3: The Southeast Asian states 
Country Capital     Population    
      (millions) 
              Area  
      (Miles2) 
    
Brunei Banda Seri Begawan 0.4 2,227 
Cambodia Phnom Penh 12.3 69,900 
Timor-Leste Dili 1.0 5,794 
Indonesia Jakarta 231.4 741,100 
Laos Vientiane 5.4 91,428 
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur 23.1 127,316 
Myanmar (Burma) Yangon (Rangoon) 51.0 261,969 
Philippines Manila 84.6 115,830 
Singapore Singapore 4.5 264 
Thailand Bangkok 63.0 198,270 
Vietnam Hanoi 81.6 127,243 
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook (in Weatherbee, 2005: 3) 
The history of regional integration in Southeast Asia was significantly bolstered during the 
Second Indochina War in the 1960s, when Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines formed the 
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), with the main objective being to promote cultural and 
economic cooperation (Turnbull, 1992: 615). Although the achievements of this cooperation 
attempt were considered relatively limited, this arrangement has been widely seen as the 
forerunner of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). Afterwards, in the mid of 
1960s, there were many important changes of leadership in Southeast Asian nations, notably 
in Indonesia and the Philippines. The different styles of administration of the new leaders 
improved relations among non-communist countries in Southeast Asia and paved the way for 
further regional cooperation (Wunderlich, 2007: 80). Finally, the foreign ministers of five 
countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, introduced the ASEAN 
Declaration on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, or commonly known as ‘the Bangkok Declaration’, 
forming a geo-political and economic organization with the establishment of Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the words of Thanat Khoman, the Foreign Minister of 
Thailand:  
“building a new society that will be responsive to the needs of our time and efficiently 
equipped to bring about, for the enjoyment and the material as well as spiritual 
advancement of our peoples, conditions of stability and progress. Particularly what 
millions of men and women in our part of the world want is to erase the old and 
obsolete concept of domination and subjection of the past and replace it with the new 
spirit of give and take, of equality and partnership. More than anything else, they want 
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to be master of their own house and to enjoy the inherent right to decide their own 
destiny ...” 
      Thanat Khoman, on August 8, 1967 
In comparison, although this formation was motivated by the consequence of wars and gaining 
independence, ASEAN was not intended to act as a collective defence organization like NATO, 
but rather the existence of this regional cooperation was seen similarly to a repetition of the 
birth of European Integration. Besides, the Bangkok Declaration did not set up any legal 
framework or institution unlike the Treaty of Paris or Treaty of Rome. There was nothing about 
the challenging of national sovereignty in the region and, in fact, it was more likely to foster 
nation-building and confidence building, which provided space for the member states to 
consolidate their power and start thinking about economic development. Thus, the primary 
goal of the community was economic development, not political integration. Interestingly, 
ASEAN is also considered as the only successful attempt in regional cooperation among the 
world’s developing areas (Hsiung, 1993: 137). Subsequent to its establishment, deteriorating 
relations between China and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, as the former sought closer 
ties with the US, created a power triangle in the region. In 1971, ASEAN reacted to the change 
by forming the Declaration on the ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality’ (ZOPFAN), an 
adjustment to accommodate their diverse interests and preferences (Wunderlich, 2007: 84). 
However, this was a highly ambiguous concept and did not progress much in terms of deeper 
integration because the agreement was just seen as a statement of good intention. 
Importantly, the next remarkable progress came in 1976, soon after the communist victory in 
Vietnam in 1975, when for the first time the heads of government of ASEAN met at the 1st 
ASEAN Summit in Bali. There were two crucial agreements signed: the ASEAN Concord and the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The purpose of the first Declaration 
was to ‘consolidate the achievements of ASEAN and expand ASEAN cooperation in the 
economic, social, cultural and political fields’ (ASEAN, 1976a). Meanwhile, the second 
Declaration was underpinned by the desire to “enhance peace, friendship and mutual 
cooperation on matters affecting Southeast Asia consistent with the spirit and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations … and the settlement of differences or disputes between their 
countries should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, 
avoiding negative attitudes which might endanger or hinder cooperation” (ASEAN, 1976b). 
Both agreements provided ASEAN with something similar to a legal framework, which was 
considered to be necessary to manage a regional community (Wunderlich, 2007: 84). 
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Nonetheless, unlike the EU treaties, neither the TAC nor the ASEAN Concord made changes to 
the political structures of member countries. Just a year later, ASEAN leaders, as a group, met 
the leaders of Japan, Australia and New Zealand at the 2nd ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, 
which was the first time that had held a meeting with leaders of non-ASEAN countries. The 
meeting was generally agreed to have strengthened the cooperative framework on human 
resource development, regarding such matters as eliminating poverty, women and youth 
development, rural development, literacy and drugs. 
During the foundation years of ASEAN regionalisation, the conflicts in Indochina were a 
fundamental factor for the development of community. The intensified hostilities in Vietnam 
in the 1960s were, of course, among the factors driving the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. 
The ensuring communist victory, which led to them gaining control of Indochina, signified a 
substantial change of the security environment in the region and ASEAN responded to the 
volatile situation with the setting up of the TAC and the ASEAN Concord. Subsequently, the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 led to the deterioration of these developments and 
in fact, challenged the core principles and functioning of ASEAN. Soon after, ASEAN worked 
hard for resilience and acted in response to the Vietnamese occupation by calling an 
emergency meeting in January 1979 demanding its withdrawal of all troops from Cambodian 
territory (ASEAN, 1979). In truth, this incident was further away from a simple conflict of two 
nations. The Jakarta Post expressed its nation’s position as ‘it is high time to spell out clearly to 
our ASEAN partners, as the largest archipelagic state in Southeast Asia with a growing national 
interest to protect, that we simply cannot afford the endless prolonging of the Kampuchean 
conflict’ (Lee, 2006). 
The case of the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia reflects the incapability of ASEAN in 
resolving conflicts among member states. The threatening actions of Vietnam not only violated 
sovereignty of another country, but also the two core principles of ASEAN: non-intervention 
and the rejection of use force in regional conflicts. Although ASEAN played a great role in 
reconciling this hostile incident and actually worked quite actively, both individually and 
collectively, it was still widely thought not to be powerful. As a consequence it needed to seek 
help from a larger more influential body, namely, the United Nations. In other words, in this 
case the UN actions imply the powerlessness of ASEAN as an organization itself (Lee, 2006).   
“ASEAN is an association, not an alliance and certainly not a military, but overall a 
cultural, social and economic alliance.” 
      (ASEAN, 1998: 75-76) 
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The period of the 1990s witnessed ASEAN taking a major forward step again. This was perhaps 
driven by the difficulties in international trade negotiations at the Uruguay Round, the 
influences of the 1987 Single European Act programme as well as the creation of the NAFTA 
(Wunderlich, 2007: 112). In 1992, the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore resulted in the 
Singapore Declaration, focusing on economic and security cooperation, as well as enlargement 
issues, which were similar to those of the EU. In addition, the Singapore Declaration also 
introduced the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) established as a key mechanism aimed at 
increasing competitive advantage as a single production unit as well as promoting greater 
economic efficiency and productivity. All existing tariffs were supposed to be reduced to 0-5% 
within a 15-year timeframe and as such, it was a drastic change with the goal of the 
liberalisation of intra-ASEAN trade. Interestingly, one core instrument of AFTA was the 
agreement on Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT). This scheme was intentionally 
designed, on the basis of safeguarding measures, which enabled countries to impose tariffs on 
goods entering from outside ASEAN, while items originating within ASEAN were to be applied 
at the aforementioned tariff rate of 0-5 % (ASEAN Secretariat, 1993: 29-39). 
For Southeast Asian countries, AFTA was seen as the first major step in helping them to 
achieve a better position for their respective economies against external powers such as China, 
Japan, the US and the EU. Further, the establishment of AFTA was geared towards attracting 
more foreign investment and also to offer a solution to the decline of foreign investment in the 
region, as each of the five ASEAN original members had experienced a considerable decrease 
in their share of global FDI flows during 1990-1992, falling from 35% to 24.3% (Nesadurai, 
2003: 81). Moreover, it was believed that AFTA could, in particular, intensely help to challenge 
China, as the main competitor for FDI, as a result of its economic opening up. This can be 
inferred from the statement of Thailand’s Prime Minister in 1993, Mr. Chuan Leekpai, who 
noted that ‘the possible diversion of direct foreign investment… is a perpetual reminder that 
smaller countries have to unite’ (in Business Times, 8 Jan 1993). 
In the late 1990s, there was another significant challenge coming to hit the ASEAN community. 
That is, the economic and financial crisis during 1997-1998 ended the region’s impressive 
economic performance and deterred the ongoing successful development of ASEAN. The 
destructive flow of the crisis swept over the region and severely undermined the confidence 
and capability of Southeast Asian regimes, which spread to affect many other countries in the 
region. The crisis hit Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea particularly hard and there were also 
economic slumps in such places as Hong Kong, Laos and the Philippines. In fact, the economies 
of the entire region fell like dominoes. 
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Consequently, soon after the crash of ASEAN economies, the IMF came to take part in the 
economic restoration, particularly regarding the structural adjustment programmes for 
Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. That is, the fund was called in to provide financial 
assistance as well as to reform the economic structures and regulate the macroeconomic 
policies of the damaged countries. It was seen as an opportunity for the US to prove that what 
the ASEAN countries had done so far, including incomplete liberalisation and bad governance, 
was not working and that their neoliberal policies represented the best way to resolve the 
problems (Wunderlich, 2007: 124). However, many scholars later observed that the IMF era 
brought further economic and political difficulties to ASEAN members and in particular, that 
the implementation of its structural adjustment programs aggravated the situation (Beeson, 
2007: 208-210, Stiglitz, 2000).         
On the plus side, the crisis brought ASEAN’s members together to work more closely and 
seriously and what could be seen after the cooperation was that many practical and expedient 
measures had been taken to improve the situation. Soon after the crisis struck, in December 
1997 its members met, in order to resolve the deteriorating economic situation and maintain 
the stability and confidence of the community. At this time, ASEAN Vision 2020 was issued to 
call for socio-economic development and closer economic integration within the region. In 
particular, the statement also demanded the creating of a stable, prosperous and highly 
competitive ASEAN economic region, in which the free flow of goods, services, investments 
and capital was ensured (ASEAN Insurance Council, 2009). In addition, as an aftermath of 
ASEAN Vision 2020, its members were agreed to extend the level of cooperation to include 
three other countries: Japan, China and the Republic of Korea, known as ASEAN plus three.  
The next essential achievement of ASEAN took place during 2002-2003. In November 2002, its 
heads of government discussed a proposal to establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
by 2020. After they resolved to pursue comprehensive integration, this was formalized in the 
following year by the declaration of Bali Concord II, which provided milestones for reaching the 
goals of ASEAN Vision and establishing the three pillars: the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). 
Regarding financial and monetary integration, this was blueprinted through the Roadmap on 
Monetary & Financial Integration of ASEAN (RIA-FIN), concerning market development, 
financial and capital liberalisation and currency cooperation. However, AEC, as an primary 
ultimate goal, will be a place ‘where there is a free flow of goods, services, investment, and 
freer flow of capital, equitable economic development, and reduced poverty and socio-
economic disparities in year 2020’ (Guerrero, 2009: 54). 
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According to Plummer (2006), AEC was formulated and driven by many factors: the desire to 
create a post-AFTA agenda, the need to deepen economic integration within the increasing 
role of free trade areas (FTAs), the possibility that bilateral FTA agreements would jeopardize 
ASEAN integration and the lessons from the recent Asian financial crisis that highlighted the 
importance of regional cooperation. Certainly, once all measures and required conditions have 
been agreed upon, ‘the AEC shall establish ASEAN as a single market and production base, 
turning the diversity that characterizes the region into opportunities for business 
complementation and making the ASEAN a more dynamic and stronger segment of the global 
supply chain’ (Guerrero, 2009: 54). Moreover, the AEC is supposed to increase regional 
prosperity, stability and also minimize the development gap among member countries. 
However, it is still not clear what sort of model the AEC is going to be and discussions 
regarding this are still ongoing. 
ASEAN continued seeking the remarkable achievement of building a regionally integrated 
market in the region. Then, this made significant progress as a result of the 12th ASEAN 
summit in 2006 in Cebu when its leaders agreed to accelerate the establishment of an ASEAN 
Economic Community, with the original target of achieving the goals of monetary and financial 
integration being brought forward five years from 2020 to 2015. Subsequently, the declaration 
of the AEC Blueprint was signed at the 13th Singapore summit in November 2007 calling for a 
single market and production base. In detail, the AEC blueprint is a single and coherent plan 
developed to identify the priority measures and actions with clear targets and timelines 
(ASEAN, 2008). It is also composed of twelve priority integration sectors designed to speed up 
the establishment of the AEC by 2015. 
The AEC is a very crucial development milestone, both in ASEAN itself as an organization and in 
its efforts to strengthen regional economic integration. That is, the blueprint could be a turning 
point for ASEAN because it is a clear departure from its tradition, as it is the first time that a 
roadmap has been created before achieving its objectives and also the first time that the 
targets have not been left open-ended. In sum, with the AEC blueprint, ASEAN now has 
departed from a process-driven integration into a goal-driven one with clearly defined 
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Essentially, ASEAN was designed to prevent conflicts among member countries and create a 
peaceful and stable scene for economic development and governing domestic concerns. 
Undoubtedly, the large sum of Japanese direct investment in the region embedded greater 
production networks and indirectly facilitated economic integration of the ASEAN countries. 
The 1997-1998 financial crisis that massively hit the region was a crucial lesson for them to 
learn, for it explicitly brought member countries together to cooperate more closely and made 
ASEAN increasingly aware of the importance of cooperation among members and non-
members (Limtanakool, 2010: 17). The completion of the AEC, as a core mechanism of the 
ASEAN Community establishment, would ensure the commitment of the ASEAN members to 
achieve significant progress in economic integration and it would be a major breakthrough in 
building a stronger, more united and cohesive community. Although ASEAN integration has not 
yet met many of its long term goals, it is generally a force for good as it has begun to engage its 
member governments in constructive meetings, consultation and cooperation. Furthermore, 
ASEAN integration is not only important in terms of economic development, but also the way it 
is contributing to politics through the building up of confidence as well as establishing peace 




In comparison to the EU, perhaps the most obvious differences between the two organizations 
lies in the method of decision making and the institutional forms. The European Union is 
clearly an example of supranational integration with its ruling bodies residing above all 
member states, while ASEAN, by contrast, remaining under the influence of national 
governments. ASEAN has weak institutional structures as a baseline preference, which are 
characterized by the ‘ASEAN Way’, the principle of non-intervention and flexible engagement, 
thus resulting in a high degree of autonomy for national governments in regulating domestic 
policies (Acharya and Johnston, 2007: 78). Furthermore, the influential countries’ degree of 
involvement is another interesting matter. In the EU, France and Germany took a crucial role in 
shaping the integration of community while Indonesia, as the largest population and 
geographical entity in Southeast Asia, did not favour very much influencing or receiving 
intervention from ASEAN as it was rather more concerned with its own domestic interests. 
Both organisations were formed after having different historical backgrounds as well as their 
motivation for integration being divergent. Thus, it is relatively hard to find common ground 
between ASEAN and the EU since their goals are different and ASEAN’s members are much 
more diverse than the latter’s. However, as a pioneer, the EU can serve as an exemplary 
testing model for ASEAN and other subsequent integration attempts. 
In summary, the Second World War fundamentally changed the global setting and thus had 
profound implications for the Southeast Asia region. That is, it facilitated decolonization in the 
region and lessened the colonial influences of Western European countries. In the early stage 
of regional integration, security interdependencies and geopolitical essentiality were among 
the most important driving factors. Later, economic prosperity became more crucial as 
globalisation came to foster liberal ideology and changed the role of nation state. This was 
accompanied by the emergence of cooperation at the regional levels, leading to the 
emergence of new layer of governance between the global and national arenas. Regional 
integration created a stable environment providing a productive space for member countries 
to consolidate their power and focus on economic development (Wunderlich, 2007: 91). It also 
came to be seen as an imperative direction to take, if small and medium-sized states were to 
increase their bargaining power across the globe. 
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3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS 
3.1 Introduction 
Neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism predominantly continue to underpin the 
theorizing of the process of regional integration, particularly the early phase of European 
integration. On the one hand, neofunctionalism assumes that ‘supranationality is the only 
method available to states to secure maximum welfare and then offers a subtle account of 
how integration unfolds over time, using concepts such as functional spillover, updating of 
common interest and subnational and supranational group dynamics’ (Mattli, 1999: 19). On 
the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalism contends that ‘Integration is viewed as a 
sequence of interstate bargains triggered by a convergence of policy preferences among states 
…it serves to maximize state’s wealth and power’ (ibid). Both theories have emerged to 
conceptualize, clarify and predict the process of regional integration. Although both represent 
two antagonistic ends of the theoretical spectrum as they are competing and contrary in most 
respects, Puchala (1972) reckons that the different theories can only explain different aspects 
of the integration process. That is, one should not consider either as the opposing polarity 
because they both have analytical focuses on different aspects and describe the phenomenon 
of regional integration as being driven by different forces. Alternatively, as has been 
mentioned by a number of scholars, for example, Cornett and Caporaso (1992), existing 
theories of integration do not need to be overarching, but rather a combination of different 
theories or multi-causal frameworks that offer various instruments for different aspects and 
levels of analysis. In other words, in relation to explaining the dynamics of integration, perhaps 
it is more fruitful to progress towards a variety of analytical frameworks and to create more 
workable tools from different approaches, as understanding the whole process by relying on 
one single theory is not feasible. 
Another interesting question frequently asked is that, as most of the integration theories are 
rooted in or applicable only to European integration, are they capable of explaining regional 
integration projects in other regions or, otherwise, whether other more effective approaches 
need to be developed and applied. In this research, four key issues of interest, namely, 
democratisation, identity, institutions and leadership, are selected to be examined. Two other 
relevant theoretical concepts, namely new institutionalism and constructivism, are drawn 
upon to compensate for those aspects of regionalism that the two integration theories are 
found to be incapable of explaining.      
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In the previous chapter, the background and path development of the regional integration 
process in Europe were reviewed to provide understanding of the internal dynamics within the 
union. This chapter presents an overview of the relevant existing theories as analytical 
frameworks employed in this research project. As pointed out above, neofunctionalism and 
liberal intergovernmentalism have emerged as the most influential schools of integration 
theory providing decisive explanations for the whole process as well as the individual 
elements. More recently, constructivism has gained increasing credibility, becoming one of the 
most favoured approaches in international studies and new institutionalism has been engaged 
with to provide a more precise explanation regarding specific aspects of the EU. Hence, all of 
these perspectives are considered in part one. The second part of the chapter aims to map the 
selected key issues with the theoretical perspectives that have been presented in the previous 
section. That is, it brings all the theories into the context of the four aforementioned focal 
elements in order to explain their role in the regional integration process.   
3.2 Analytical framework of the research 
As explained above, as has been frequently observed, in the study of regional integration no 
theory appears to be capable of explaining the whole process, because each of them tends to 
focus on different areas. However, these endeavours have not been fruitless because, at least, 
the theorists have provided tools to acquire an explanation of some aspects of this process, 
which when taken together, allow a capturing of its multidimensionality. In this section, the 
theoretical concepts that are considered to be relevant to this research are briefly outlined. As 
mentioned above, this research focuses on democratisation, identity, institutions and 
leadership by drawing on the theories of: neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, new 
institutionalism and constructivism. 
3.2.1 Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism has continued to dominate the debate about regional integration right from 
the outset, with its prime focus being on the European context. The theory mainly highlights 
the importance of supranational entities viewing regional integration as an incremental 
process, which increasingly develops by spillover effects as a mechanism for integration. It also 
focuses on the existence and roles of subnational actors or non-state actors, such as interest 
groups, that are influential in shaping the integration process. Furthermore, although regional 
integration is multi-faceted and puzzling to conceptualize, neofunctionalism is to some extent 
capable of capturing the entire process and hence has been adopted in nearly all studies of 
regional integration, particularly those about the governance of the EU.  
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Neofunctionalism, with its roots in the seminal work of Ernst B. Haas (1958), is a pluralist 
theory of international relations founded on the critique of Mitrany’s functionalism. Its 
proponents  re-established the ideas, refined the analytical tools and embedded the concepts 
of functionalism into an analytical framework aimed at understanding regional integration, 
rather than internationalism (Mattli, 1999: 23). Initially, it was designed in order to theorize 
the European integration movement during the period from the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community to that of the European Economic Community. After 
studying the integrative organizations involved, Haas developed a theory of integration which 
differed from its predecessor, both in terms of the basic concepts and scope of application 
(Mutimer, 1994: 26). In his ground-breaking book “The Uniting of Europe”, Haas (1958: 16) 
made the following radical statement: ‘political integration is the process whereby political 
actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, 
and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction 
over the pre-existing national states’.   
Fundamentally, the main analytical emphasis of the theory itself is placed on the involvement 
of non-state actors, such as interest associations and social movements, in providing the 
dynamic for further integration (Schmitter, 2002). That is, neofunctionalism puts the focus on a 
political community rather than a nation-state and searches for the suitable conditions in 
which this new type of entity will evolve (Özen, 1998: 2). Interestingly, the important point of 
departure from functionalism is the critique about the separation of the political from the 
economic. Haas (1964: 23) wrote in his second book “Beyond the Nation-State” stating that: 
“Power and welfare are far from separable. Indeed, commitment to welfare activities 
arises only within the confines of purely political decisions, which are made largely on 
the basis of power considerations. Specific functional contexts cannot be separated 
from general concerns. Overall economic decisions must be made before any on 
functional sector can be expected to show the kind of integrative evolution that the 
Functionalist describes.”  
And, as he continued in his subsequent work, ‘the history of the European Union movement 
suggests that the relationship between politics and economics remains somewhat elusive’ 
(Haas, 1967: 315). 
In the works of Mutimer (1989, 1994) regarding the critique of functionalism and the 
development of neofunctionalist integration, he described that this raised two major 
questions. First, how does neofunctionalism explain the dynamics of integration? In simple 
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terms, the answer is that integration is a result of a response to the pressures created by the 
process of spillover. Moga (2009) claimed that spillover is one of the most significant features 
of neofunctionalism and that is an improvement its functionalist predecessor, regarding its 
ability to explain this important aspect of European integration. As Haas (1958: 292) wrote: 
“Thus a spillover into new economic and political sectors certainly occurred in terms of 
expectations developing purely in the national contexts of the elites involved. Yet these 
expectations were reinforced along supranational lines not only because action was 
demanded of the High Authority but because continuous joint lobbying with labour 
leaders from other countries became both necessary and possible.”  
In a similar vein, Mutimer (1994: 29) argued that the various matters of states and regions are 
interconnected in the sense that problems in one area will raise problems, or require solutions, 
in another area. In this regard, when particular economic functions are held by central bodies, 
the need to look for solutions beyond the originally integrated area will lead to a demand for 
increased power at the centre. These solutions do not require the agreement from states, but 
rather a consolidation of similar interests within the scope of the original common 
undertaking.              
Being introduced by Haas and subsequently developed by Lindberg, there are two types of 
spillover. First, functional spillover (some scholars call it ‘economic spillover’ or ‘sectoral 
spillover’) is rooted in the fact that, as the different sectors of modern economy are greatly 
interconnected and cannot be isolated, any integrative activity in one sector can lead to a 
condition in which the original objective can only be ensured by further integration in other 
related sectors (Lindberg, 1963: 10). This can be clearly understood by the spillover of 
integration in some areas, for example, in energy or the environment, which technically need 
harmonization among members. Second, political spillover implies the incremental shifting of 
expectations, the changing of values, increased politicization as well as the blending of national 
interest groups and political parties at the supranational level in response to functional 
integration (Mattli, 1999: 26). Bache, George and Bulmer (2011: 14) described political 
spillover as being about creating political pressures in favour of further integration among 
members. That is, once one sector of the economy becomes integrated, the interest groups 
operating in that sector will have to apply pressure to the organization in charge at the 
supranational level. Hence, the organization will contain representatives of related industries 
in all of the member states as they switch their lobbying from national governments to the 
new supranational bodies. 
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The second question pertaining to neofunctionalist enquiry, according to Mutimer (1989, 
1994), relates to the results of the spillover process and is: What is the final product of 
integration or what will integration produce? Regarding this, Haas (1970: 631) opined that 
‘political community, security community, political union, federal union - are inadequate 
because they foreclose real-life possibilities’. Mutimer (1994: 31) interpreted Haas’s statement 
to imply that neofunctionalism conceives of integration as a process which allows for an open 
ended product and hence does not require the identification of the final destination of 
integration or even offering any alternative. However, although the final product is unclearly 
specified, both Mutimer and Sweeny agreed that it is intended to be institutional, for as the 
latter put it, ‘institutions are an important outcome of the integration process, that is, they are 
a measure of the success of the integration project’ (1984: 25). Further to this, but in a similar 
vein, Caporaso (1972: 27) contended that ‘the end result would be a community in which 
interest and activity are congruent and in which politics is replaced by problem-solving’.  
In general, neofunctionalism introduces the idea of the ‘pooling of state sovereignty’ or what is 
simply called ‘supranationality’. That is under this lens, the spillover process will bring the 
extension of the sovereignty of states to the supranational authority in which sovereignty is 
pooled with that of its members (Mutimer, 1994: 31). Hence, under this theory this pooling of 
sovereignty will act as the catalyst for the creation of a federal state as the end product of 
integration. Naturally, neofunctionalism resembles federalism in the sense that both 
approaches expect to see a supranational state or political community at the final stage of 
integration as well as both being in search of means to avoid international conflicts. However, 
they apparently differ regarding the way to reach their ultimate goal. That is, Özen (1998) 
illustrated that the method of neofunctionalism is directly taken from functionalism and while 
federalism clearly aims to see a federal state as the end product of integration, 
neofunctionalists view integration as an incremental process with no end point, proceeding 
step by step from economic sectors spreading to political fields aimed at creating a 
supranational political community, which arises as a new centre of almost all activity in the 
community. 
Moreover, Haas (1958: 16) viewed political integration as directly associated with the 
emergence of ‘a new political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones’, which is 
derived from the shift of the loyalty of political leaders from the national to the supranational 
setting. The setting up of well-suited institutional bodies and the transfer of the necessary 
competencies would limit the role of national governance of participating members. 
Moreover, the newly established supranational organs are expected to supply judicial 
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frameworks, or autonomous procedures for dispute resolution, in order to satisfy those needs. 
Sweet and Sandholtz (2010: 7-8) noted that neofunctionalism views the creation of 
supranational authority as bringing ‘changes in the expectations and behaviour of social actors, 
who in turn shift some of their resources and policy efforts to the supranational level’ and 
supranational institutions become the centre of all kinds of political activity, inducing the 
creation of transnational associations and interest groups. 
In relation to the economic viewpoint, apart from a concern about how supranational 
institutions are formed, the theory itself also focuses on how national economic interests 
contribute to these institutions. As shown in his book ‘Beyond the Nation State’, Haas (1964) 
clearly outlined that political integration is derived from economic integration, as this starts in 
an economic sector and spills over to other sectors, thereby creating strong interdependence 
and increase in wealth (Özen, 1998). In particular, the integration process will develop more 
rapidly in areas which are dependent on technical knowledge and dialogue between 
participants (Cummings and Chand, 2007: 9). Therefore, in order to achieve a political 
community, it is necessary to begin with the integration of national economies and markets 
under a supranational institutional structure based on the idea of the delegation of national 
sovereignty. Moreover, while its predecessor theory affirms the separation of political power 
from economic welfare, neofunctionalists claim that the two features are essentially 
interlinked and inseparable. As Haas (1968: 152) put it, ‘the supranational style stresses the 
indirect penetration of the political by way of the economic because the purely economic 
decisions always acquire political significance in the minds of the participants’. In sum, 
neofunctionalism accepts the connections between economics and politics in the integration 
process and claims that cooperation must begin in the relatively low politics areas, the 
economic, technical and social ones (Dash, 2008: 9). 
With regards to its limitations, neofunctionalism is much the same as other theories in social 
science that claim to be unable to explain perfectly every important element in relation to the 
topic of inquiry. At the early stage, neofunctionalism was pleasingly practicable, particularly in 
explaining the transition from the European Coal and Steel Community to the European 
Community. However subsequently, the 1960s seemed to be a challenging time as 
neofunctionalist approaches did not fit most events. The most prominent obstacle to its 
justification was the so-called ‘empty chair’ crisis of 1965–66, when there was the use of the 
power of veto by the French president Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle’s nationalism paralyzed 
the operation of the EEC for seven months and thus exposed failures in the Council's workings. 
Since then, the flourishing time for neofunctionalist theory in its original form came to end, 
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with the acknowledgement that national governments clearly had retained a lot of power and 
were still able to determine the nature of integration as well as determine its speed (Bache et 
al., 2011). As a result, neofunctionalist scholars had to rethink the theory and reformulate its 
inadequate analytical concepts. However, despite some reformulations of the theory, many of 
its weakness remained, and hence it fell out of favour until the early 1980s. Then, with the 
revival of European integration in the mid-1980s it regained popularity in the IR literature. 
It is arguably the case that the development of supranational administration in Europe was 
one of the greatest political innovations of the last century and neofunctionalism appears to 
be capable of explaining the process quite handsomely. Consequently, a significant of number 
of people have supported or truly believed in neofunctionalist ideology, of which Jean Monnet 
would be one of the obvious examples. However, neofunctionalism has been strongly 
challenged by intergovernmentalists, who have criticised the downplaying of the roles of 
national governments. That is, neofunctionalists argue that the precedence of national 
governance will no longer exist, declining in the light of a central supranational authority. By 
contrast, intergovernmentalists claim that national governments will still play a key role in 
international affairs and external policies. For example, Cini (2003) has contended that it is in 
the interests of the states to have national representatives in the EU Commission in order to 
protect their state interests. Interestingly, Wiener and Diez (2009: 51) pointed out that 
neofunctionalism is not applicable to all settings of regional integration, claiming that the 
model only works in particular conditions, such as democracy and high levels of development 
and hence, is not capable of explaining integration in other regions. In addition, in relation to 
the spillover process they argue that neofunctionalism pays too much attention to the internal 
dynamics of integration and ignores a more general concept of this integration as well as its 
international surroundings. 
In relation to this research, neofunctionalism, as a comprehensive theory of European 
integration, is indispensable when attempting to understand regional integration, particularly 
in Europe. Firstly, it identifies the existence of supranationality and the requirements for 
institutional settings, which are supposed to become a new centre of governance. Secondly, 
neofunctionalism uncovers the fact that interstate politics are not always driven by rational 
sentiments and hence, regional integration is not just a place where state interests are pooled 
and balanced. For, there are many other important concerns, not least ideational values, such 
as belief and identity, rather than simply matters of interest or power. Lastly, although 
neofunctionalists are not quite accurate in their claim regarding the incrementality of the 
integration process as it sometimes can get stuck, it is true in the sense that regional 
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integration is an ‘unstoppable’ and ‘irreversible’ project. This is because it involves substantial 
mutual commitment and interdependence between countries and hence, would prove 
punitively costly in many respects if were suddenly reversed or abandoned. 
3.2.2 Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
On the other side of the spectrum, liberal intergovernmentalism does not see regional 
integration as an incremental process amplified by spillover effects, but rather as the 
converging national interests of states. The theory was developed from the original version of 
intergovernmentalism, based on realist ideas, arguing that the state, and its government, play 
a key role in international relations and control the degree and pace of integration. The goals 
are literally achieved through intergovernmental negotiation and interstate bargaining, rather 
than through the administration of a supranational body. The outcome is thought to be 
determined by their relative bargaining powers within the community, that is, it is frequently 
dominated by larger states. With these sorts of assumptions accompanied by the emphasis on 
welfare and economic interests, liberal intergovernmentalists claim to reflect political reality of 
contemporary regional cooperation, as a process guided by accompanying rules and framed by 
institutions, whereby participating states are willing to delegate their sovereignty only as 
sufficiently as required.     
In detail, Liberal Intergovernmentalism was initially originated from Intergovernmentalism, 
presented by Stanley Hoffman in 1965, as a counter-argument to neofunctionalism. Later, in 
1993, Andrew Moravcsik revised it into a new version by building on the fundamental critiques 
of neofunctionalism, which, as explained above, had experienced difficulties in explaining the 
development of the EC. Moravcsik repeated most of the main principles of 
intergovernmentalism, particularly the importance of absolute and relative gains, the 
importance of security in the state’s calculation of its interests as well as the implications of 
anarchy for the prospect of international cooperation and international institutions (Pollack, 
2001). 
In the main, intergovernmentalists reject the idea of neofunctionalists that the process of 
supranational integration would bring peace to the region. Rather, peace is likely to be 
maintained because of the progress in democratization in those countries and the increase of 
economic interdependence between them, which results in the costs of war becoming a lot 
more than in the past. This can be associated with Keynes’ idea in the early 20th century 
arguing that free trade can promote peace and harmony among countries. Basically, the 
theory profoundly emphasizes the importance and influence of national governments in the 
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process of integration as they legally gain formal sovereignty from their countries and fully had 
legitimacy, as being the only elected officials in the integration process, to perform activities in 
international sphere. Moreover, the theory recognizes the impact of domestic politics upon 
governmental preferences and rejects the concept of spillover as well as the significance of 
supranational bodies as proposed by neofunctionalism.   
In general, Moravcsik’s liberal Intergovernmentalism has achieved the status of a baseline 
theory (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 67) and has been widely read and cited in the 
study of regional integration. In his book “The Choice for Europe” he starts from 
intergovernmentalist assumptions and then gathers evidence to modify this perspective. In the 
end, he proposes what he regards as a revisionist explanation of the course of European 
integration (Puchala, 1999: 326), liberal intergovernmentalism, which draws its elements from 
many other fields of study, such as international relations theory, international political 
economy and bargaining theory (Disegni, 2010). The scope of Moravcsik’s (1998) analysis 
covers the motives for the Treaty of Rome up to consideration of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Furthermore, as liberal intergovernmentalism is grounded in a more consistent and discerning 
underpinning of what regionalism entails, it allows for specification of the motivation of all 
actors in the international arena and can ‘derive predictions of aggregate behaviour or 
dynamic effects from their interaction that can be subjected to empirical tests’ (Moravcsik, 
1998: 13-14). 
Interestingly, Moravcsik (1998: 3) wrote his ‘central claim’ at the beginning of his exposition 
“...is that the broad lines of European Integration since 1955 reflect three factors: 
patterns of commercial exchange, the relative bargaining power of national 
governments, and the incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments. 
Most fundamental of these was commercial interest. European integration resulted 
from a series of rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued 
economic interests – primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic 
producers and secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental 
coalitions – that evolved slowly in response to structural incentives in the global 
economy. When such interests converged, integration advanced.”  
He also highlighted the significance of economic gains as they have affected the trends of the 
post-war international political economy:  
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“The resulting expansion of intra-industry trade both predated the EC and induced 
policy changes regardless of whether the countries in question were members of the 
EC. Similarly, in the 1970s and 1980s, rising capital mobility undermined the autonomy 
of national macroeconomic policies, creating greater pressures for monetary 
cooperation. At its core, I argue, European integration has been dictated by the need to 
adapt through policy coordination to these trends in technology and in economic 
policy.” (Moravcsik, 1998: 3)    
At the heart of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the core of theory relies on two main basic 
assumptions. Firstly, states are seen as the critical actors on an international stage, because 
they achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiation and bargaining, rather than 
through the administration of a supranational body (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009). 
This classical realist view is relatively captivating in relation to explaining the dynamics of 
European integration every time it suffers from a crisis, stagnation, or even conflicts between 
its members (Disegni, 2010). Secondly, states act as rational actors. That is, they calculate the 
utility of alternative courses of action and, in order to achieve goals and objectives, define 
their priorities through policy options in terms of costs and benefits. Collective outcomes are 
seen as the result of aggregated actions based on efficient pursuit of these preferences and, 
also, cooperative efforts or attempts to set up institutional bodies are seen as the outcomes of 
rational state choices and intergovernmental negotiations (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 
2009: 68). 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism describes the integration process as being divided into three 
stages of analysis: national preferences, interstate bargaining and delegation of sovereignty. 
Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009: 69) posit that each stage is specified by a separate 
theory, with each feeding into the successive step, these being: a liberal theory of national 
preference formation, a bargaining theory of international negotiations and a functional 
theory of institutional choice. The first stage, preference formation, is undertaken by national 
governments who aggregate the interests of their domestic constituencies. Then, collective 
preferences are defined and prioritized, which national governments position and articulate 
towards intergovernmental negotiations, where agreements reflect the relative power of each 
member state and where supranational institutions have only little or no causal influence 
(Pollack, 2001: 225). Regarding national preferences, Moravcsik (1993: 517) wrote that it is the 
economic interests of producers that shape national preferences. Furthermore, he added that 
‘important changes in the priorities, policies and preferences of national governments appear 
to have reflected shifts in the domestic and international economic environment’ and the 
52 
 
action in favour of Europe, for example, is a reflection of the preferences of national 
governments, not supranational organisations (Moravcsik, 1998: 474).  
The second stage is interstate bargaining, which pertains to how varied antagonistic national 
interests are reconciled at the negotiating table. Moravcsik (1998) explained that involved 
member governments or private individuals are the ones who initiate and mediate major 
negotiations, not supranational officials. Similarly, the bias, if any, in the supply of proposals 
considered by governments are in favour of political viability, not the vision of supranational 
bodies. Moreover, whether or not supranational actors intervene, negotiated agreements 
appear to be efficient because preferences are transparent. Finally, he concluded that 
‘supranational actors have only a rare and secondary impact on the efficiency of negotiations’ 
(1998: 485) and the final distributional outcomes will reflect the relative bargaining power of 
governments. 
The third stage is delegation of sovereignty, which seeks to explain the circumstances under 
which governments delegate powers to supranational institutions (Bache, 1998). In other 
words, the integrating community establishes institutions to secure their desired outcomes in 
the case of uncertainty. In this regard, Moravcsik tested three relevant frameworks to uncover 
the patterns of institutional choice: federalist ideology, technocratic management and credible 
commitments, with three aspects of observable implications: cross-issue and cross-national 
variation, domestic cleavages and discourse, and institutional form. As a result, he found that 
the credible commitments perspective best explains the delegation and pooling of state 
sovereignty.  More specifically, Moravcsik (1993) concluded that the potential gains from 
cooperation, the level of uncertainty regarding the details of specific delegated or pooled 
decisions and the level of political risk for individual governments or interest groups with 
intense preferences are the reasons that countries decide to delegate their powers and 
become involved in institutional establishment. Furthermore, those delegated supranational 
organs are ‘deliberate instruments to improve the efficiency of bargaining between states’ 
(Moravcsik, 1993: 507). On this point, Pollack (2001: 226) added that ‘the supranational 
institutions only serve to provide member states with information and reduction of transaction 
costs, not leading to the transfer of national sovereignty to the supranational level as 
neofunctionalists had predicted’.                             
One matter of interest is that of how Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism differs from the 
neorealist approach to intergovernmentalism, its predecessor. In this regard, Pollack (2001) 
wrote that, basically, liberal intergovernmentalism represents a two-fold departure from 
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neorealism. First, national preferences are thought to be generated by domestic concerns, 
particularly in economic matters, and not derived from security concerns in the international 
system. Second, bargaining power is regulated by the intensity and relative degrees of 
preference, not by military capabilities. More specifically, Moravcsik pointed out that major 
intergovernmental bargains are driven by a gradual process of preference convergence among 
the most powerful member states. In sum, while its forerunner illuminates state behaviour, 
liberal intergovernmentalism addresses the limitations existing in intergovernmentalism by 
adding the theory of national preference formation and analysis of interstate negotiation (Lee, 
2006: 15). 
However, Moravcsik’s theory itself is not immaculate for it is insufficiently universal to explain 
every aspect or the whole process of regional integration. As a result, subsequent to liberal 
intergovernmentalists having presented their newly developed version from the prototype, 
there have been a significant number of scholars who have classed themselves as being 
against the theory, by highlighting three of its fundamental flaws. First, a group of 
constructivists drew attention to membership issues arguing that membership matters can 
change the preferences and the identities of national leaders involved in the process of 
regional integration (Risse-Kappen, 1996, Sandholtz, 1993, Sandholtz, 1996), which liberal 
intergovernmentalism by its very nature has ignored. Second, institutionalists contend that the 
influence of existing supranational institutions on intergovernmental policy making has been 
overlooked. In general, they argue that the theory fails to provide an active role for the EU 
institutions, such as allowing for qualified majority voting for agenda setting (Pollack, 2001). 
Also, they are sceptical about the capability of liberal intergovernmentalism to explain the EU 
legislative process as they believe that EU institutions are the critical actors that shape or 
constrain the integration process. The third group of scholars would appear to be the most 
forceful opponents of liberal intergovernmentalism. Their main argument is that the EU should 
be explained by the multi-level governance concept, which draws attention to the involvement 
of diverse actors in the process. For example in this regard, the Acquis Communautaire 
involves the participation of national leaders, subnational political actors and supranational 
actors (Lee, 2006: 19). 
On the whole, according to Moravcsik, welfare and economic interests are the dominant issues 
in the process of integration that the EU member states wish to cooperate on. That is, the 
primary goal of national governments during this process is the balance between the 
competing economic interests within the domestic sphere, rather than political concerns. 
Moreover, being in possession of formal sovereignty and legitimacy, national governments are 
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the most critical actors who are eligible to control the speed and outcome of regional 
integration. That is, most significant international bargains are not driven by supranational 
actors regarding their outcomes, but by the accumulated bargaining power of the individual 
states. Further, potential gains from integration, such as the lessening of political risks and 
uncertainty, are the most plausible reasons regarding why states decide to delegate their 
powers and participate in supranational institutionalization. This claim is substantiated by the 
findings of Manfield (1993), who discovered that trade is higher among countries that are 
cooperating and lower among those that are actual or potential enemies. In sum, liberal 
intergovernmentalism does not view the integrated region as a challenge to the nation state, 
rather as a mechanism for strengthening state sovereignty (Craig and De Búrca 1999). 
In relation to this research, liberal intergovernmentalism is indispensable for shedding light on 
the significant antagonistic attitudes in relation to the European integration story. Basically, it 
is more universal and a better fit for the facts than neofunctionalism, in the sense that it can 
also accommodate other regional integration settings, in this case ASEAN, which are almost 
entirely based on intergovernmental arrangements. The downplaying of supranational 
institutions does not imply that liberal intergovernmentalism rejects the need for institutions. 
Instead, under this lens the establishment of institutions is required in order to secure mutual 
commitments, ensure the effectiveness of policy implementation and to reduce uncertainty. 
Moreover, the emphasis on the importance of national governments shows the convergence 
of power and influence among member states as it embraces the need for important debates 
on such matters as leadership, power distribution and institutional design. Finally, when the 
case of the EU is taken into account, the liberal intergovernmentalist stance views 
democratisation as an important mechanism as it maintains peaceful relations among member 
states and thus ensures that disputes and complications are reconciled collectively on a 
legitimate basis. 
3.2.3 New Institutionalism  
Institutions, nowadays, have become a key factor in any analysis of policy making as they 
construct the input of social, economic and political forces and have considerable influence on 
policy results (Bulmer, 1998). While the old institutionalism set itself the task of analysing the 
formal forms of government institutions from a comparative perspective, new institutionalism 
is a theory that provides a broader means of evaluating institutions beyond this classical view. 
Moreover, the insights gained from this perspective have come to dominate the study of 
international politics, for it is now widely acknowledged across all the social sciences that 
‘institutions matter’. It represents an extension ‘beyond the formal organs of government to 
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include standard operating procedures’, such as norms and conventions of behaviour, which 
may influence the pattern of political behaviour (Bulmer, 1993: 355). That is, new 
institutionalism treats institutions as shaping political strategies by imposing an independent 
or intervening influence on political outcomes (Steinmo et al., 1992). However, even though 
the importance of institutions in shaping political outcomes has been clearly acknowledged, 
the scope of new institutionalism is broad and divided into several diverse views. According to 
Pollack (2009: 2), new institutionalism ‘has evolved into plural institutionalisms, with rational 
choice, sociological and historical variants, each with a distinctive set of hypotheses and 
insights about the EU’. Regarding which, three main categories of institutionalism have been 
developed with their own explanations of institutions, as discussed next. 
Arguably, one of the most influential frameworks in EU studies in recent decades, Rational 
Choice Institutionalism is a theory that accounts for the significance of both structures and 
actors in the international arena. Historically, it came about as a result of a study of 
congressional behaviour by American political scientists in the late 1970s in order to 
understand better institutional factors, including the formation of institutions, the behaviour 
of political actors and the outcome of their interactions. Although this form of institutionalism 
originated from the context of American political institutions, it is, to a certain extent, 
applicable across a range of other comparative and international political contexts including 
the study of regional integration (Pollack, 2009: 3). 
Importantly, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) and Huber and Shipan (2002) studied the 
transaction costs of political institutions. That is, they argued that political institutions are 
deliberately and systematically created to minimize the transaction costs associated with 
collective activity and policy making. Moreover, institutions do not produce behaviour or 
shape actors’ preferences directly, but rather they influence their behaviour by affecting the 
structure of the situation in which actors choose strategies for the acquisition of their 
preferences. Further, it is contended that people follow the rules of institutions because they 
are rational actors who want to maximize their personal gain (Steinmo, 2008: 162). In addition, 
under the lens of rational choice institutionalism, institutions are created and continued to 
ensure the desired gains from cooperation that the designers and participating actors value 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996). According to Pollack (1996: 433), it ‘employs a functionalist logic to 
institutional choice in which institutional creation and design is a consequence of rationally 
anticipated effects.’ As a consequence of these pioneering works accompanied by the main 
assumption of rational choice institutionalism arguing that institutions matter and can radically 
affect the actions of states, scholars could study institutions both exogenously, as the rules of 
56 
 
the game, and endogenously, as particular patterns or procedures designed by actors to 
secure mutual gains.  
Sociological Institutionalism describes institutions in a much broader way than rational choice 
and historical institutionalism, to include the socio-cultural structures in which action takes 
place. That is, it embraces conventional practices and informal norms as well as formal rules, 
emphasizing their ability to socialize actors and thereby influence interests and identities 
(Rosamond, 2000). While rational choice institutionalism considers actors as strategic utility-
maximizers whose preferences are taken as a given, sociological institutionalism assumes that 
‘people act according to a logic of appropriateness, taking cues from their institutional 
environment, as they construct their preferences and select the appropriate behaviour for a 
given institutional environment’ (Pollack, 2009: 127). In other words, as March and Olsen 
(1996: 249)  argued, institutions should be viewed as a constituting units providing actors with 
‘identities, conceptions of reality, standards of assessment and behavioural rules’. As a 
consequence of these insights, organizational forms and practices are interpreted as ‘being 
culturally embedded, reflecting culturally specific practices, rather than functional efficiency’ 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996: 948).   
Lastly, Historical Institutionalism fundamentally locates its position in between the two former 
strands, drawing attention to the effects of institutions over time (Thelen, 1999). That is, this 
theoretical perspective shares some common features of rational choice institutionalism, such 
as the interpretations of formal and informal institutions and actors’ pursuance of interests, 
but its main departure is about preference formation. This difference is explained in 
Lindblom’s work, in which he argued that the participation in a policy-making process is 
regarded as an educating force in which actors learn many things, such as how to form policy 
positions, what policy positions are feasible and how to tune up those positions in order to 
increase the chances of success (Lindblom, 1968). That is, under this lens preferences are 
created through processes of interaction with other actors and the formal and informal 
institutions themselves, so they are endogenous to the political system (Lindblom, 1968). 
Furthermore, according to the functionalist view of institutions, they are, very little or, not at 
all concerned with historical legacies, but rather deliberately designed by actors for the 
efficient performance of specific functions. Pollack (1996: 437-438) explained that historical 
institutionalists reject this assumption and argue that ‘institutional choices taken in the past 
can persist, or become “locked in,” thereby shaping and constraining actors later in time’.  
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In relation to this research, consistent with Lecours (2005: 6) stance that ‘political analysis is 
best conducted through a focus on institutions’, it is held here that new institutionalism can 
provide crucial insights and features into many key subfields of political science, such as 
comparative politics, public policy analysis and international relations. Moreover, institutions 
shape individual behaviours, influence policy outcomes, impose constraints and offer 
opportunities for action, being the rules of the game or patterns of behaviour which link all 
actors and their actions together. In line with the stance of neofunctionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism, new institutionalism confirms that institutions do matter and they are a 
prerequisite for constructing a regional community. For instance, according to rational 
institutionalist assumptions, institutions are created to minimize the transaction costs and to 
ensure the desired gains from cooperation. In general, it is contended here that in addition to 
the EU where institutions are solidly established, an institutionalist perspective can be 
fruitfully employed for analysing the case of ASEAN where certainty and stability are still 
problematic and lack consolidated commitment. 
Indeed, the researcher is of the opinion that new institutionalism opens up a new world of 
regional integration studies. That is, by focusing on a central driving mechanism of the EU, 
namely, the nature of its institutional structures this represents a major shift in regional 
scholarship that can provide solutions to key questions that are outside the limits of 
integration theories. It is possibly the case that new institutionalism is relatively more 
practicable than the two integration theories in the sense that it does not need to distinguish 
between high and low politics, because it can apply to all levels, and it ignores the endogenous 
effects of actors on the integration process (Oneuropenow, 2011). Finally, according to 
historical institutionalism’s concept of path dependency, this form of new institutionalism 
concurs with the neofunctionalist contention that ‘once a country or region has started down a 
track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the 
entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial 
choice’ (Levi, 1997: 28). 
3.2.4 Constructivism 
Constructivist theory has become one of the most favoured IR approaches in recent years, 
gaining strong credibility since the 1990s, as a result of the failure of realism and liberalism to 
predict the end of Cold War, and thus becoming an important approach to international 
politics. This theoretical perspective supports the institutionalist arguments by partially 
emphasising the normative as well as material structures, by focusing on the importance of 
institutions to state action, and their relationships to norms in shaping the interests and 
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identities of states. Basically, the key assumption of the theory is the belief that international 
political action is socially and historically constructed and shaped by ideas, collective values 
and social identities. This is to say, as an essential premise it allows researchers to examine the 
processes involved in the forming of the state’s identities and interests. 
It is logical to tell the story of the development of constructivist ideas starting from the Cold 
War period. As background, Guzzini (2000) pointed out that, without a forceful arbiter, states 
have to face the dilemma of two equally costly options: do not arm and you risk defeat 
(insecurity); arm and you risk escalation (insecurity). To put it simply, the two contrasting 
political ideologies at the time, led by the US and the Soviet Union, identified each other as 
enemies and defined their national interests in antagonistic terms. Once they no longer 
perceived each other in these terms, the Cold War was bound to eventually come to an end. 
This shows that states are indeed motivated by constructed interests and identities, rather 
than their structures or natures. The end of the Cold War by Guzzini’s explanation is consistent 
with the view that the world of international relations is not fixed like the natural world, which 
is completely independent from human action and cognition. That is, the international system 
is ‘a system whose rules are made and reproduced by human practices. Only these 
intersubjective rules, and not some unchangeable truths deduced from human nature or from 
international anarchy, give meaning to international practices’ (Guzzini, 2000: 155). Similarly, 
Koslowski (1994) explained that, within the international political sphere, the system does not 
exist because of its structures, but depends on the reproduction of structures as determined 
by the practices of the actors and significant changes in this international system will only 
happen when actors change the rules and norms through these practices. In other words, 
changes in international politics are caused by the alteration of beliefs and identities of 
domestic actors and this can subsequently alter the rules and norms that are constitutive of 
their political practices.  
The rise of constructivism has had a significant impact on the development of international 
relations theory and analysis. At the very least, it has brought a new level of conceptual clarity 
and theoretical implications to the analysis of international society as well as led to a re-think 
about what has long been treated as a given in the study of international relations, which has 
recently penetrated into the scholarship of regional integration. Regarding its substance, the 
principal argument underpinning constructivism is that state interests and identities are 
socially and historically constructed and thus understanding state behaviour is equal to 
comprehending the international context in which it evolves (Narine, 1998). In the notorious 
words of Alexander Wendt (1994: 385), constructivism is defined as follows: 
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“Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the 
following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international 
political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are inter subjective, rather 
than material; and (3) state identities and interests are an important part constructed 
by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human 
nature or domestic politics.”             
Narine (1998: 39) pointed out that identities can be divided into two types: corporate and 
social identity. The former generates basic state demands, such as the desire for security, 
stability recognition by others and the development of citizens’ lives, whereas the latter refers 
to how states perceive themselves in relation to international society. As this author explained, 
states construct their interests on the basis of these two identities (ibid). However, corporate 
identity is prioritized and will provide the motivating force for state action, whilst social 
identity will be structured to fulfil the needs of the former. 
In relation to the functions of institutions, constructivists see the relation between them and 
states as that of mutually constituting entities. Moreover, Wendt (1992: 136) defined an 
institution as a: 
“relatively stable set or "structure" of identities and interests. . . . Institutions are 
fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how 
the world works.” 
That is, according to this perspective, the social relationships that define state identities and 
interests are developed within the context of institutions, which represent the constitutive and 
regulative norms and rules of international interaction. Therefore, they define, shape, 
constrain and give meaning to state action. In the meantime, they continue to exist because 
states produce and reproduce them through practices (Narine, 1998). Moreover, 
institutionalized norms and ideas ‘define the meaning and identity of the individual actor and 
the patterns of appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by those 
individuals’ (Stack, 1989: 12). Furthermore, Wendt (1995, 1992) added that state identities and 
interests can be changed at the systemic level through various types of institutionally 
mediated interactions.  
Reus-Smit (2005: 198) posited that actors’ identities and interests are shaped by normative 
and ideational structures through three mechanisms: imagination, communication and 
constraint. The first mechanism concerns what actors consider necessary and possible, in both 
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practical and ethical terms: how they think they should act; what the perceived limitations on 
their actions are and what strategies they can imagine. For instance, a prime minister in a 
liberal democracy regime will only imagine and think about certain strategies to enhance his or 
her power, and the norms of the liberal democracy will condition his or her expectations. Next, 
normative and ideational structures can be influenced through communication. Reus-Smit 
(2005) argued that when states seek to justify their action, they will usually refer to the 
established norms of legitimate conduct, such as the conventions of the executive 
government. Lastly, even if normative and ideational structures do not affect actors’ behaviour 
by shaping their imagination or by providing communication, they still can control their 
behaviour. Regarding this, under a constructivist perspective it is concluded that 
‘institutionalized norms and ideas work as rationalizations only because they already have 
moral force in a given social context. Furthermore, appealing to established norms and ideas 
to justify behaviour is a viable strategy only if the behaviour is in some measure consistent 
with the proclaimed principles’ (Reus-Smit, 2005: 198). 
Notably, Checkel (1998) wrote that constructivism is an approach, rather than a theory, which 
is based on two assumptions: 1) the environment in which states take action is social as well as 
material; 2) this setting can provide states with understandings of their interests . By way of 
explanation, Checkel pointed out that the first assumption reflects the view that material 
structures are given meaning only by the social context through which they are interpreted. 
The second assumption addresses the relation between states and broader structural 
environments. This opens up what Powell (1994: 326) calls ‘the black box of interest and 
identity formation’ for neoliberals and neorealists. Moreover, one indicative account of 
constructivism is a model of state behaviour which is controlled by rule-governed action and 
logics of appropriateness. Checkel explained that such logics involve reasoning by analogy and 
metaphor and are not about ends and means, but rather pertain to norms helping to provide 
understanding of interests. 
This contrasts with the rational choice perspective, which uses a behavioural model based on 
utility maximization, whereby states when confronted with various options will select the best 
one that serves their objectives and interests. Realists and neoliberalists agree that norms 
serve a regulative function, helping states with given interests to maximize their utility, and as 
such are built on a material base. By contrast, constructivists consider norms as collective 
understanding that influences state behaviour as they constitute state identities and interests 
and do not obviously regulate behaviour (Checkel, 1998). Moreover, Reus-Smit (2005) pointed 
out that constructivism treats interests as endogenously determined by social interaction, 
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which is learned through processes of communication, reflection on experience and role 
enactment. He added that, while rationalists view society as a place where actors pursue their 
interests, constructivists see it as a place that generates actors as knowledgeable social and 
political agents, or arguably the realm that makes them who they are. From this, it is clear why 
they are called “constructivists”, for their emphasis is placed on the social determination of 
social and political agency and action. In addition, neo-realists and neo-liberals would appear 
to ignore where state preferences come from, whereas constructivism consider society, both 
domestic and international, as a strategic domain where previously constituted actors stay to 
pursue their goals. Thus, in the view of constructivists, focusing on the social identities of 
states is important in order to understand the formation of state interests and to explain the 
existence of international political phenomenon (Reus-Smit, 2005). 
However, constructivism is often introduced in a superficial and misleading manner, superficial 
in the sense of it being presented as a substantive theory and misleading in that it is promoted 
as a coherent position (Jørgensen, 2010: 160). In reality, it is not a substantive IR theory and 
did not even originate from this field, but rather should be perceived as a general approach to 
social theory. That is, fundamentally, constructivism provides grounds for including social 
ontology in research into politics and economics. In general, the focus of the theory on the 
importance of institutions to state action, their relationships to norms as well as the roles of 
identities, ideas and values in the development of state relationships provide a platform to 
generate a completely different set of questions when examining regional integration 
phenomena, such as: What are the social structures characterizing the region? How do states 
and those of their neighbours perceive their identities? and What kinds of interests are 
followed as a result of these perceptions? (Narine, 1998). 
In relation to this research, it is taken as given that constructivism does contribute to the study 
of regional integration by highlighting the solid ties that exist between institutions and identity 
in the integration process. It is also accepted that regional integration is a process of social 
construction in which ideational factors play an important role as they help to construct and 
consolidate this process. That is, in the view of constructivists, regional integration is not 
viewed from material perspectives, but rather ideational ones. Therefore, mutual 
responsiveness, trust and beliefs, or what is called ‘cognitive interdependence’, are required in 
order to construct regional cohesion based on a solid sense of community (Fawcett and 
Hurrell, 1995: 64). Additionally, if we stick with the line of reasoning of Wendt (1994: 385), 
constructivism informs us that states are the key principal actors in the process, whereby their 
identities and interests are constructed by the social structures of the system. At the same 
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time, very much along with the new institutionalist assumptions, institutions considered as 
regulative norms and rules of the game play a key role in defining, shaping, constraining and 
giving meaning to state action. So, understanding state behaviour means understanding the 
environmental context in which it evolves. To sum up, the contributions of constructivism to 
this research is the affirmation of the complexity of the integration process as well as the 
needs for institutions and a certain degree of shared identity among members. 
3.3 Operationalization of the theoretical concepts 
The previous section provided an overview of the theoretical frameworks that underpin this 
research. This section is assigned to putting the selected theoretical frameworks into 
operation, thus transforming them from an ideational level into a more concrete one within 
the research context, in order to make the concepts more distinguishable and to understand 
them in terms of empirical observations. Regional integration is a very broad, complex and 
multi-faceted subject. Consequently, even grand theories in political science, which have a 
broad range of explanatory power, cannot explain the whole process. Thus, a combination or 
set of theoretical concepts is required. However, it is important to provide a clear explanation 
as to how each of the relevant theories can be operationalised so as to reveal comprehensive 
insights into the focal elements of this research, namely: democratisation, identity, institutions 
and leadership. Basically, this section aims to formulate the main concepts of this research by 
mapping the specific issues that are going to be investigated with the theoretical concepts in 
the previous section in order to see what sorts of explanation the different theoretical 
perspectives can provide for each selected issue.  
From the previous section, it is apparent that each theory reveals a particular agenda 
indicating what to look at specifically in the integration process and thus taken together help in 
the identification of the research focus. From this review, the issues of democratisation, 
identity, institutions and leadership in regional integration process are chosen for investigation 
in this research. In general, although each of them has been extensively studied in the context 
of the EU, they have rarely been studied in other regional integration models or in relation to 
comparative studies. This is despite the fact that they are widely thought to be important 
elements in ensuring the continuity and progress of regional organization. For instance, 
leadership is probably one of the most complex issues and as such is poorly defined and 
understood, being hence subject to recurrent controversy in the contemporary debates about 
the EU (Young, 1991: 281). Democratisation is another interesting issue as it highlights the 
uniqueness of European integration and shows an obvious contrast between the two cases of 
the integration model. That is, the EU uses the attractive membership as a key method to 
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incentivise democratisation while there is no similar attempt in ASEAN, which is also the case 
in most other regional organizations. Recently, regional identity has also become a popular 
debating issue in Europe, which is derived from the idea that the EU needs to establish a 
common set of values to define the meanings of mutual commitments and to deal with the 
multicultural societies in the union. However, systematic research of the impact of regional 
identity has been generally lacking and that which there is has been focused heavily on the EU. 
Needless to say, the issues relating to the form and functions of institutions have been covered 
widely in the existing literature, with it being argued that regional organizations need to create 
institutions in order to shape perceptions and behaviours as well as to reduce uncertainty and 
anxiety among member states. Furthermore, such institutions are considered as one important 
factor that set an integrating region apart from a state or an ordinary international integration.                   
Regarding this research setting focusing on ASEAN, this is likely to be particularly revealing, 
given that democratisation, identity, institutions and strong leadership have been in short 
supply in its member states. Contrasting ASEAN with the EU by drawing on the same 
theoretical context could, on the one hand, provide various insights from different 
perspectives and, on the other hand, demonstrate the generalization ability of the theories to 
explain different integration models. All the empirical findings from this research are intended 
to contribute to the study of ASEAN and the hope is that European studies might also benefit 
from this work, both empirically and theoretically. Next, in this section, the four selected 
elements subjected to theoretical discussion in order of range of coverage, that is, from the 
broadest to the most specific debates, this order being: democratisation, identity, institutions 
and leadership. 
3.3.1 Democratisation 
Democratisation, owing to its wide ranging conceptualisation would appear to be remote from 
specific arena of regional integration studies. Perhaps, this is because it is a rather general 
political ideology adopted by governments or international organizations to support the 
spread of a political system that is widely believed to be the best available for citizens, with the 
claim that under this arrangement all adult citizens have freedom and equal say in any 
decisions that affects their lives (Diamond and Plattner, 2006). As such, it did not originate or 
was rooted in the concept of regional integration, but it does seem to have been a crucial 
element in European integration. Also, democratisation is thought to be a concern of domestic 
conditions, such as social structures, industrialisation, urbanisation and education, rather than 
conditional on international political factors. As a consequence, whilst literature on the EU 
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highlights the importance of the democratisation, in other regional integration contexts it has 
largely been ignored  (Warleigh, 2004).  
However, despite the Eurocentric bias, other international or regional scenes can also be 
places where democratisation forces play out. For example, apart from direct 
intercommunication and intercooperation between governments, the influence of democracy 
promotion can stem through transnational relations, such as cross-border interactions and 
exchanges, in which at least one actor is not a government (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 
2010). For instance, as witnessed in the Arab Spring, political demonstrations generated by 
successful democratic transition in another country can also encourage and help the spread of 
democratisation. In the long run, some economic factors, such as the intensification of trade 
and investment, might make people more active, change their attitudes and motivate them to 
demand civil liberties and political rights as well as through social and cultural exchanges 
(Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2010).  
According to the extant literature, democratisation originally stemmed from the democratic 
peace theory, one of the most sustainable ideas in politics and most influential contributions 
to the debates on the causes of war and peace. The main idea underpinning it is that 
democracies do not fight among themselves. This was first proposed in 1795 by Immanuel 
Kant in his classic work ‘Perpetual Peace’ and later this work influenced many modern political 
thinkers. According to Maoz and Russett (1993), the reasons why democracy can reduce the 
likelihood of war can be categorized into two forms. First, according to the structural 
perspective, democracy possesses many mechanisms that can help to prevent countries going 
into a war, such as an electoral system (leaders can be replaced), the promotion of individual 
freedom and public opinion as well as separation of power. Second, under the normative 
perspective it is contended that when facing each other, democracies expect the other side to 
resolve disputes through a peaceful reconciliation process rather than violent conflict. 
Later in the 1980s, Kant’s philosophy was built on by Michael Doyle and since then the idea has 
been widely acknowledged, having now become the most sustainable concept of peace. Doyle 
(1983: 206) began by taking Kant’s definition of liberalism as having ‘been identified with an 
essential principle - the importance of the freedom of the individual. Above all, this is a belief 
in the importance of moral freedom, of the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as 
ethical subjects, and not as objects or means only’. He also added that this sort of principle 
initiates rights and institutions in international society. Furthermore, he noted that no 
explanation had clarified why liberal states are peaceful only in relations with other liberal 
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states and he claimed that Kant’s explanations were a key guidance to the question. According 
to the Perpetual Peace, Kant posited that peace will be guaranteed by the acceptance of three 
‘definitive articles’: republicanism, a treaty of the nations among themselves and the operation 
of a cosmopolitan law (Doyle, 1983: 225-227). In the end, Doyle (1983: 235) concluded that it 
is not the resources and morale, but constitutional structures that help to establish peace 
among democracies.  
Although democratic peace theory does not deal with regional integration directly, this notion 
has been used by some scholars as a way to explain cooperation among new democracies after 
the collapse of dictatorship (Caballero Santos, 2008: 8). In general, the theory suggests that 
democratic states can sort out disputes among themselves peacefully. However, in cases of 
disputes between democracies and authoritarian nations, war seems highly inevitable, due to 
the inherently aggressive nature of the latter, which tend to deny peaceful negotiated 
settlements (Grayson, 2003: 8). That is, under these circumstances, war is considered the only 
way of defending against threatening forces. Hence, if Kant and Doyle were right, democracy 
would be absolutely crucial for regional integration in the sense that it helps to create a zone 
of peace and cooperation. That is, it is profoundly logical to promote it because Kant’s effects 
of democracy means that such a security situation can only come into play when all members 
share these values.            
In addition to the democratic peace theory, there needs to be more clarification about why 
democracy matters in the regional integration process, and vice versa, and hence why it needs 
to be promoted. One general explanation is that regional integration and democracy are to 
some extent linked and therefore likely to reinforce each other. More specifically, regional 
integration fosters democracy by bringing states within the realm of liberal democracy, which 
makes them more legitimate by increasing the generation of public goods (Mattli, 1999). 
Perhaps more importantly, regional integration poses new significant challenges to democracy 
as it changes ‘the ways in which public policy is made, political structures are built and used, 
and individuals relate to both each other and the various political and economic orders in 
which they live’ (Warleigh, 2004: 310). On the other hand, democracy is a vital factor for 
regional communities, because regional integration is based on a high degree of voluntarism as 
participating countries join the union not because of hegemonic pressure or fear of military 
attack (Schulz et al., 2001). This would lead to the likelihood that the union would work 
democratically and attempt to avoid the alienation of its member state publics (Warleigh, 
2004). Moreover, democracy would relax the pressures that maintain the unity of the state, 
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allowing for the opening up of space for subnational actors to extend their range of activities 
and, in particular, facilitating the creation of cross-border regions (Schulz et al., 2001).  
In the case of the European Union, democracy promotion has been directly and significantly 
concerned with the enlargement, being an important political conditionality for EU accession. 
Sets of democratic rules and practices (such as democratic elections, human rights and the rule 
of law) are employed as conditions that the candidate countries have to meet in order to gain 
membership or other benefits, such as financial assistance (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 
2010). In general, the conditionality is positive and there is no penalty imposed on countries 
that fail to meet the conditions. Notwithstanding this, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2010: 445) 
have contended that ‘the impact of the EU on democratisation in the neighbouring countries 
will be a function of the size and credibility of the rewards it offers in return for increased 
democratisation’. While in Southeast Asia, the concepts of democracy have been facing an 
ideological challenge and are very much characterized by the notion of ‘Asian values’.4 This 
concept is widely considered as one of the most recognized claims made among ASEAN 
leaders in order to deviate from the general understanding of democracy in the region. In this 
regard, it has been claimed by a number of political leaders that democracy is ‘an unaffordable 
luxury until sufficient economic prosperity was achieved’ (Thompson, 2004: 1083). Given this is 
also the position of some Southeast Asian governments, the role of democracy in constructing 
a regional community across this location remains ambiguous and needs to be examined.    
Theoretically, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism do raise the matter of 
democratisation as a part of the enlargement mechanism. In general within these stances, the 
matters of democratisation are grounded in the fact that the progress of regional integration 
would be eased and accelerated, if all participating members have the same kinds of political 
and ideological norms or perspectives, specifically democratic, which are unlikely to cause 
conflicts between members. Therefore, in the views of Kantian theorists, enlargement would 
be seen as a spread of zone of peace in Europe. However, both theories provide some decisive 
insights about enlargement in terms of a broad explanation. In connection with 
neofunctionalism, according to Miles (1995), the more efficient the management of conflict, 
the inherent expansion of tasks assigned to supranational institutions, the significance of 
supranational elites and interest groups, and the concept of spillover are considered to be four 
elements of regional integration that link this perspective with the concept of enlargement. In 
                                                          
4
 a detailed discussion of Asian values is provided in Chapter 5 
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particular, in relation to spillover, described as the process whereby successful integration in 
one area brings a series of further integration, is most relevant, for as Miles (1995: 7) 
explained, the success of integrative attempts ‘would eventually lead to a progressive and 
gradual altering of attitudes among these elites in favour of further European integration 
(Political Spillover)’. However, Miles (1995) continued that, in the context of enlargement, the 
concept of spillovers need to be interpreted more broadly and flexibly to include the notion 
that political spillover, which can also emerge from the outside in as new members and their 
political leaders bring their own preferences for shaping the character of further spillover and 
EU cooperation. Conversely, the substance and direction of spillover can also be influenced by 
enlargement, because at the time when accession is being negotiated intergovernmental 
bargaining is still admittedly influential (Miles, 1995). This is one of the important limitations of 
neofunctionalism in the context of enlargement.        
Intergovernmental insights would appear to be more in tune with the context of EU 
enlargement than neofunctionalism as its framework can provide a better analytical 
explanation for subsequent events. In fact, enlargements increase the diversity of national 
interests and ideological perspectives within the union, which thus complicate the agreements 
and negotiations, making it more difficult to achieve consensus. Moreover, while 
neofunctionalism fails to explain the economic impacts of enlargement, the accession of poor 
countries highlights the intergovernmental perspective as this brings economic disparities, 
which can impair the cohesion and effectiveness of current policies as well as the public 
attitudes towards European integration (Miles, 1995). Furthermore, the more diverse 
environment that is followed by a greater prioritising of national interests in order to compete 
for scarcer resources, then the more governments will act defensively to ensure that national 
interests remain intact (Miles, 1994). Lastly, Miles (1995: 29) also pointed out that 
enlargement encourages intergovernmental manifestations, such as ‘the pragmatic 
tendencies’, ‘the use of opt-outs’ and ‘the pursuit of political and economic expediency’.            
In the context of EU enlargement, neofunctionalism is found wanting as it overlooks the 
continuing importance of national governments. That is, enlargement has resulted in critical 
decisions in the EU, such as accession negotiations, still being resolved in the national 
dimension rather than by supranational elites; one prominent example would be the French 
attitude towards British accession. Indeed, as the union has become larger, neofunctionalism 
seems not to provide a framework to understand the competing plurality of interests, in the 
way that intergovernmentalism does (Miles, 1995). Perhaps, the former was intentionally 
created for the purpose of explaining the development of a relatively firm and homogeneous 
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organization, such as that covering the original six founders of the EU. In sum, the evidence 
suggests that employing an intergovernmental perspective is likely to hold for understanding 
the future of bigger union than that of neofunctionalism (Miles, 1995). 
To a certain extent, the regional integration process could be a democratisation process in 
itself, because it tends to increase cross-border interactions and transnational linkages, both 
among governments and people. Regarding which, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2010: 446-
447) proposed that ‘the level of democracy in a country increases with the intensity of the 
transnational linkages that it entertains with democratic countries in its international 
environment’. Empirically, integration theories do not seem to be interested in whether or not 
participating members have to become democratically governed. What do matter are the 
consequences after democratisation or enlargement, in relation to whether these heighten the 
diversity or impair the homogeneous environment within the union. For instance, democratic 
peace theory suggests that democracy is a very important factor to ensure peace and stability 
among nations. Subsequently, once trust is established between member states, laws and 
institutional settings can be adopted across a region to secure mutual commitments. In this 
sense, democratisation would be considered as an important mechanism for founding a zone 
of peace and long-term cooperation in the region in question. 
3.3.2 Identity 
In recent decades, regional identity has increasingly gained attention from scholars and the 
public as a way to support European integration. This has been increasingly urgent since the 
EU has recently been experiencing significant internal problems and external challenges. The 
main belief among some is that the EU should offer some sort of values that link nations and 
their citizens together, thus providing them with a sense of identity and community. 
Surprisingly, a well-established study of regional identity that identifies its importance and 
impact has been rarely conducted. Regarding this, as loyalties are shifted from national to 
regional levels, this can raise a number of important issues, including: whether identity should 
also be constructed at regional levels, what consequences this would bring to the regional 
community and can regional and national identity persist dually. 
In a broad sense, optimal distinctiveness theory has given an explanation of how identities are 
formulated in that ‘social identity is derived from the opposing forces of two universal human 
motives – the need for inclusion and assimilation, on the one hand, and the need for 
differentiation from others on the other’ (Brewer, 1999: 188). In the context of the EU, 
Brigevich (2011: 2-3) has pointed that regional identities work at two levels in support of these 
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motives. That is, national identity serves the individual’s need for differentiation, while that of 
inclusion is satisfied by European identity at the regional level. However, according to the list 
of theories in the previous section, constructivism seems to fit the research context more 
precisely than the others. That is, it contributes and directly relates to the issues of identity, by 
providing explanations and understandings in almost every dimension. In particular, it 
highlights the significance of internal socialization and the belief that regional community is 
created from common interests and understanding of the key issues along with the 
construction of identity (Zhang, 2007: 3). 
In relation to identity, constructivism defines it as a creation of meaning and views the regional 
integration process as a socializing structure that shapes the actors’ identities and interests. 
According to Copeland (2000: 189), it ‘focuses largely on the intersubjective dimension of 
knowledge, because they [constructivists] wish to emphasize the social aspect of human 
existence - the role of shared ideas as an ideational structure constraining and shaping 
behaviour’. Along the same lines, Wendt (1999: 231) stated that ‘interests presuppose 
identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is’. Regarding how 
actors gain their identities, constructivism argues that, in the context of regional integration, 
states can obtain meaning - ‘who they are, their goals, and the roles they believe they should 
play’ (Copeland, 2000: 190) - from both domestic and regional levels. However, before 
interacting at the regional level, states have already defined themselves through domestic 
social and cultural contexts, which thus inform them with whom to interact and with what 
intention, at least in part. Subsequently, the state’s behaviour will be constrained by regional 
norms and at the same time identities will be redefined through systemic interaction aimed at 
generating regional cooperation (Wendt, 1992: 392). That is, these norms are not only 
functioning to regulate a particular state’s behaviour, but are also redefining its interests as 
well as developing the construction of collective identities (Acharya, 2001: 4). 
Moreover, identity and institutions are strongly correlated, which is because once states have 
constructed their identities, they create institutional structures to protect them at both the 
domestic and international levels (Chafetz, 1997: 665). Similarly, Jepperson et al. (1996: 62) 
stated that ‘states seek to enact their identities (potentially shifting or multiple ones) in 
interstate normative structures, including regimes and security communities’. However, during 
the institutionalization process at both the domestic and political levels, states are shaped by 
domestic and international environments too (Katzenstein, 1996: 22). On the whole, in 
explaining the regional integration process, constructivism provides another important piece 
of the jigsaw, as it commits itself to describing the issues relating to identity involved. That is, 
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under the constructivist lens, identities are a crucial element that plays a key role in providing 
meaning to state actions, to those individuals who act in the name of state, and the 
foundations of state interests. 
A key contribution in this respect, with direct reference to ASEAN, is Jones’ (2011) analysis of 
the norm of non-intervention in ASEAN, which he clearly and directly links to the dynamics 
evolution of the institutions underpinning the region’s emergence. In his own words: 
‘ASEAN’s sovereignty regime can only be properly understood in relation to the social 
conflicts underpinning ASEAN states, and the wider context of economic and 
geopolitical transformation in which they are embedded. The historical survey of 
ASEAN’s sovereignty regime since its inception to the present day falsified the notion of 
non-interference as a timeless, unchanging norm, showing that the principle is actually 
relatively dynamic, shifting in terms of its content and application as the nature of 
state power and the challenges faced by state managers have evolved.’ (Jones, 2011: 
211)  
Furthermore, he argues that ‘ASEAN should abandon the non-interference principle – would 
not necessarily lead to greater regional peace and cooperation’ (Jones, 2011: 226). 
3.3.3 Institutions 
It is logical to begin with the definition of institutions as the term has been widely defined with 
a variety of conflicting explanations, and also the reasons why they are created and continued. 
In a broader sense, institutions are simply rules and practices where all political behaviour is 
founded or so-called ‘the rules of the game’ are played out. Moreover, they provide space for 
members to exercise their power and influence. Indeed, they structure politics and are a 
prelude to social and political organization. In general, they are important as all modern 
governance nowadays occurs in and through institutions and as such they play a key role in 
shaping political perceptions and behaviour as well as powers of political actors.  
To be more specific, (new) institutionalism provides the means to think theoretically about 
institutions and their influences on behaviour and outcomes. It was introduced as an 
alternative way of viewing institutions by focusing on their sociological aspects, in particular 
the way they affect society, the way they interact with other institutions and the way they 
shape the behaviour of their members through rules and norms. The three strands of new 
institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism, although they share the notion that ‘institutions matter’, they offer different 
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definitions regarding their characteristics. Historical institutionalism highlights their historical 
determination, defining them as ‘the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and 
conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy’ (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996: 938). Whilst rational choice institutionalism focuses on rational decisions, 
seeing institutions as sets of rules, which are agreed upon the actors, created for the purpose 
of facilitation (Thelen, 1999), whereas institutions are viewed more broadly by sociological 
institutionalists to include conventional practices and informal norms: ‘Institutions are 
conceived of as influencing and determining the norms of acceptable behaviour, providing 
scripts and determining the actor’s preferences and identity’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 948).  
Fundamentally, new institutionalism suggests that institutions can govern the behaviour of 
actors and organisations in one of two ways (March and Olsen, 1976, Schmidt, 2010). Firstly, as 
suggested by rational choice institutionalism, they can influence actors to act based on positive 
cost-and-benefit calculations, the so called ‘logic of consequence’. That is, subsequent 
decisions will be calculated and made on the basis of rational choice. Secondly, as contended 
under sociological institutionalism, institutions can cause actors to behave out of duty or to act 
according to what they are supposed to do, or the so called ‘logic of appropriateness’, as they 
feel the action is appropriate or perceive that there is some kind of moral obligation. This logic 
is ‘based on normative beliefs that make behaviours or actions appropriate under certain 
conditions and inappropriate under others’ (Nalbandov, 2009: 25). That is, actors possess their 
own social identities that shape their actions in the international arena and the logic of 
appropriateness ‘essentially leads us to derive actions from given identities’ (Goldmann, 2005: 
44).  
Another important point to be noted about institutions is that they are rigid and not changed 
easily. More specifically, according to Steinmo (2001), new institutionalists argue that once an 
institutional equilibrium sets in and an institution becomes stabilized, the rules will become 
difficult to change because of the uncertainty about any alternative. This is because 
institutions shape strategies, so changing the institutional rules would imply new strategies 
throughout the system. On the whole, institutions do matter because they reduce uncertainty 
and transaction costs, facilitate greater efficiency and cooperation as well as ‘provide a system 
of incentives and punishments to encourage the desired behaviours’ (Williams, 2010: 2). 
Overall, the new institutionalist treatments confirm that EU politics have to be understood in 
the context of institutional competition (and cooperation), not in terms of intergovernmental 
competition (and cooperation) between the member states (Peterson and Shackleton, 2011). 
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How do the two integration theories depict institutions? In fact, both neofunctionalist and 
intergovernmentalist approaches view institutions as a central unit in the integration process. 
That is, they both accept that all political activities occur and are understood through rules, 
norms and procedures within an institutional context (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999). 
Neofunctionalists see supranational institutions, such as the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice, as playing a central role in the integration system. In line with 
intergovernmentalist accounts, member states established the union to serve their own 
purposes and in order to achieve collective goals, but the member states also felt that new 
institutions were required (Pierson, 1996). However, the neofunctionalist stance diverges from 
intergovernmentalism in that supranational institutions are considered by the former as new 
actors on the political scene, possessing their own interests, which may vary from those of 
their creators (Moe, 1990). Moreover, under neofunctionalism the EU is viewed as a complex 
political game with increasing numbers of players and interests and these political organs are 
clearly the tools of the member states (Moe, 1990, Pierson, 1996).  Furthermore, Pierson 
(1996: 21) added that institutions exist due to ‘the need to create arrangements that would 
allow reasonably efficient decision-making and effective enforcement despite the involvement 
of a large number of governments with differing interests’. 
Institutions are closely associated with the process of spillover of the neofunctionalist 
approach, which can be split into two elements: sectoral (functional) spillover, which involves 
the expansion of integration from one sector to another, and political spillover, which means 
politicization of sectoral activity (Moga, 2009). Neofunctionalists, for example Sweeny (1984) 
and Mutimer (1994), have recognised that the final product of the spillover process is very 
likely to be institutions at the supranational level, where the member states’ interests are 
pooled and balanced. These established agents will provide mandatory frameworks and 
procedures for reconciliation of disputes and will later become the centre of the union 
politically. Member states that are subject to the new supranational institutions are expected 
to change their behaviour and expectations as well as transferring some of their resources and 
policy functions to the supranational agents. 
In intergovernmentalist accounts, institutions are viewed as efficient instruments that can 
facilitate the integration process. Moravcsik (1993: 507) argued that ‘modern regime theory 
views international institutions as deliberate instruments to improve the efficiency of 
bargaining between states’. Frequently, member states have always guarded their national 
interests and strictly limited the transfer of sovereignty to central institutions, such as the 
European Commission, that could weaken their independence and instead have preferred to 
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work through intergovernmental institutions, such as the Council of Ministers (Moravcsik, 
1991). More importantly, there is uncertainty about the preferences, intentions, and reliability 
among member states, thus making agreements difficult to be completed and enforce. 
Institutions can assist in addressing this sort of problem by providing information reliably, 
monitoring compliance and linking across issues that give actors incentives to reach mutually 
beneficial agreements (Keohane, 2005, Pierson, 1996). They also can help in lowering 
bargaining costs and reduce uncertainty through the provision of ‘a forum and vocabulary for 
the signalling of preferences and intentions’ (Stone, 1994: 456). Briefly, in the view of 
intergovernmentalism, supranational institutions are only critical in the ways that they serve to 
provide the union with information, certainty, reduction of transaction costs and secured 
outcomes (Pollack, 2001).    
Constructivism is another engaging approach focusing on the importance of institutions to 
state action in relation to norms, as they construct identities and interests. Under this lens, 
rules and institutions are seen as products made by human practices and states as well as 
institutions are viewed as cognitive and correlative entities. Moreover, the outcomes are 
shaped by the current institutions and also by actors’ learning through the previous ones. 
More importantly, according to Narine (1998), almost all international relationships that shape 
states’ identities and interests are developed within an institutional context and institutions 
themselves act as representatives of the rules and norms of these international interactions. 
Furthermore, institutions, in the constructivist’s view, are not rigid as argued by new 
institutionalist scholars. Accordingly, they, including interests and identities, can be altered by 
the integration process at the systematic level through various kinds of interactions (Wendt, 
1992, Wendt, 1995).   
With this in mind, constructivism brings to the fore that surrounding environments, external 
constraints and international contexts are crucial for understanding institutions in regional 
settings. The EU provides an international context by creating the platform for an interacting 
process in which its norms are used as a supporting resource for the interaction. That is, EU 
institutions are viewed as ‘arenas for communication, deliberation, argumentation, persuasion 
and socialization’ (Cini, 2007: 131). Along with their norms, they play an important role in 
constructing regional identities and socializing the member states. All in all, although 
constructivism is not considered as a theory of integration, its nature and positions provide 
important insights into the ways in which regional substance, such as norms, ideas and 
discourses are established and played out through EU institutions as well as penetrating into 




The issues of leadership in international cooperation are complex and relatively poorly 
defined. This is not helped by the fact that integration theories do not clearly specify what the 
substantial matters of leadership in regional integration process are. This is because, according 
to them participating countries are expected to delegate functions of their agenda 
management to the supranational or intergovernmental institutional bodies and, undoubtedly, 
they have no desire to be subject to the influences of any other countries, expecting to be 
treated equally as individual sovereign states. Therefore, in this respect, leadership does not 
seem to give much of an impression of being an essential element or a critical factor steering 
the dynamics, or determining the success of regional integration. Consequently, most formal 
communicative discourses regarding leadership within the community tend to make reference 
to the formal sense of leadership, which is the presidency, or the chairmanship, of the union or 
regional institution that is held on a rotating basis by the various member states. As explained 
by Tallberg (2006: 13), ‘through the rotating Presidency, governments take turns in providing 
the efficiency-enhancing functions of agenda management, brokerage, and representation, 
leaving limited demand for supranational entrepreneurship’. 
In the European Union, the structures of power are relatively horizontal, whereby power is 
shared among the member states and the various supranational institutions. Significant 
decisions are made by agreements and coalitions among national governments and 
institutions. That is, they are interdependent and rely on each other, so no single 
administrative body is able to dictate to the rest of the organisation. The European 
Commission, the European Council and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have augmented 
powers from the member states and have thus established themselves as powerful agents. 
They are encouragingly supposed to play a leading role in the union, but so far they have not 
met this expectation. This is not helped by the fact that unlike other international 
organisations, such as the UN, they have no clearly defined leader promoting their respective 
policies. However, the European Union is clearly different from such organizations as it is much 
more complex, so managing it is a very challenging task. Moreover, although it is widely 
accepting across the EU that there should be the conventional ability to influence decision 
making, the rotating presidency is still chosen by members and hence, this would appear to be 
the leadership arrangement most trusted for handling the EU so far. That is, it seems that 
member countries prefer the diffuse benefits arising from taking turns in exploiting the 
privileges of the presidency, rather than relying on supranational institutions or a longer term 
elected chairman (Tallberg, 2006: 219). 
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According to Tallberg (2006: 17), formal leadership in the EU concurs with rational choice 
institutionalist approach which integrates core elements of rationalist bargaining theory. That 
is, fundamentally, this views political leadership as ‘a series of contracting dilemmas that may 
prevent or inhibit mutually advantageous exchange’ (Tallberg, 2006: 17) and this leads to 
hypotheses about the delegation of powers to the chairmanship, as well as about the influence 
of the chairmen of negotiations on political outcomes. This author’s central assumption is that 
‘the chairmanship as an institution in political decision-making should be understood as a 
functional response to collective- action problems in decentralized bargaining. When designing 
international negotiation bodies, states create the office of the chairmanship and delegate 
powers of process control to this office, in the expectation that it will mitigate problems of 
agenda failure, negotiation failure, and representation failure’ (Tallberg, 2006: 20). However, 
in the sense of informal leadership, for example, the influence of the Franco-German axis in 
the EU, new institutionalist approaches cannot say anything more than ‘it all depends on the 
institutional configuration’ (Webber, 1999: 7)    
As mentioned above, in case of the EU, leadership does not imply only the highest formal 
administrative status of the union, for it also includes the superpowers or the most influential 
countries within the group who possess the ability to persuade others to accept the need for 
change. For instance, if the keyword ‘leadership in the European Union’ is entered into any 
online search engine, most articles that will appear relate to the roles of France or Germany in 
Europe, or Franco-German relations. Recently, according to a broad literature survey, there 
has been a substantial number of articles calling for leadership in Europe, particularly when 
facing a crisis, such as the ongoing debt crisis in the Eurozone, which is shaking up the union 
and creating confusion and distrust amongst its citizens. These demands for leadership have 
increased as the EU has been seen to be more and more ineffective at dealing with these 
crises, which has been attributed to the lack of an identifiable leadership (Paterson, 2008). 
Thus, what is important to the EU now is the need for someone, who has credibility and 
capability, to steer the union and to increase the probability of success. Indeed, it is leadership 
in the symbolic and informal senses and not the rotating presidency that is being called for. 
Notably, Young (1991) wrote about the nature of institutional bargaining and the 
differentiation of various forms of leadership that usually come into play when establishing 
international institutions. According to Young, leadership 
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“refers to the actions of individuals who endeavour to solve or circumvent the collective 
action problems that plague the efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in 
processes of institutional bargaining” (Young, 1991: 285).  
Furthermore, he argued that leadership can be divided into three different modes: structural 
leadership, entrepreneurial leadership, and intellectual leadership (Young, 1991: 287). In his 
words:  
“The structural leader is an individual who acts in the name of a party (ordinarily a 
state) engaged in institutional bargaining and who leads by devising effective ways to 
bring that party's structural power (that is, power based on the possession of material 
resources) to bear in the form of bargaining leverage over the issues at stake in specific 
interactions. The entrepreneurial leader, by contrast, is an individual who may or may 
not act in the name of a major stakeholder in institutional bargaining but who leads by 
making use of negotiating skill to influence the manner in which issues are presented in 
the context of institutional bargaining and to fashion mutually acceptable deals 
bringing willing parties together on the terms of constitutional contracts yielding 
benefits for all. And the intellectual leader, or sometime called ideational leader, is an 
individual who may or may not be affiliated with a recognized actor in international 
politics but who relies on the power of ideas to shape the way in which participants in 
institutional bargaining understand the issues at stake and to orient their thinking 
about options available to come to terms with these issues.” (Young, 1991: 287-288) 
Leadership in the process of European integration would fit the role of Young’s structural 
leader, which is based on the possession of material resources. Clearly, France and Germany, 
as the two largest economies whose power comes from their wealth and the abundance of 
material resources, have continued to be the essential engine to the progress of the EU, i.e. 
they have been the principals in the EU negotiation process. As for possessing great structural 
power, Young (1991: 288, 290) argued that ‘it is natural for such leaders to espouse 
institutional arrangements that seem well suited to the interests of the states they represent’ 
and ‘they need only lay out the provisions of proposed constitutional contracts that others are 
in no position to oppose’. This is why it has been seen frequently that many crucial policy 
decisions in the EU were made by Franco-German agreements. According to Endow (2003: 
203), regarding every aspect of political and economic development, the EU ‘is directly 
affected by intergovernmentalist sensitivities of the member states, revolving around the 
Franco-German core’. However, the Franco-German axis as an engine although being essential, 
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has not always been sufficient for addressing the problems faced by the EU, particular most 
recently. In relation to Young’s concepts, if leadership indeed does raise the probability of 
success, but a structural leader does not seem to work well in the EU, then one of the other 
two leadership concepts might be an option.  
In connection with this, the notion of ‘Soft power’ pioneered by Joseph Nye perhaps can 
provide additional insight regarding the provision of leadership. As Nye (2008: 29) proposed in 
his book, soft power is ‘getting the outcomes one wants by attracting others rather than 
manipulating their material incentives. It co-opts people rather than coerces them’. In relation 
to Young’s three modes of leadership, this is probably most equivalent to a combination of 
entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership. Nye (2004: 5) further supported his position by 
pointing out that ‘a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other 
countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and 
openness – want to follow it’. Moreover, he illustrated that a source of soft power can be 
associated with intangible assets, such as ‘an attractive personality, culture, political values 
and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority’ (Nye, 2004: 
6). The idea of soft power is popular in international politics today as a substitute for structural 
power; it can take the form of a non-coercive means of peace and trust building in 
constructing cross border communities. 
In relation to integration theories, neofunctionalism suggests that, based on economic and 
political spillover processes, ‘the development of increasingly legitimate and powerful 
supranational organs and a waning of the influence of national governments’ are expected 
(Webber, 1999: 5). Although neofunctionalism allows for an open-ended product and does not 
specify the length of time for completion of the process, the regional integration community is 
viewed as involving political systems similar to the federal states, such as the US, in which 
supranational organs take control of functions and power. In addition, the most important 
assumption here is the notion that control and power have ‘slipped away’ from national 
governments to supranational institutions (Marks et al., 1996: 342). Interestingly, although 
neofunctionalism emphasizes the roles of supranational bodies in the integration process, it 
also implies that those of interest groups are actually key actors who provide a driving force 
for the integrating region. Nevertheless, regarding the issues of leadership in regional 
organizations, the assumption, that national governments experience a significant loss of 
control, renders the theory irrelevant and misplaced in this context.    
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Perhaps, intergovernmentalist frameworks are more preoccupied, or at least provide better 
insights and more space for discussion of leadership in the EU in this respect, rather than 
neofunctionalism which emphasizes the pivotal roles of the supranational authorities and non-
state actors as well as seeing regional integration as an incremental process. Smith (2004: 102) 
argued that in an intergovernmental setting, where states reject the delegation of their 
powers to supranational organizations, the most powerful countries often have the most 
influence. In this context, power is normally defined in material terms and, in the case of the 
EU, France, Germany and the UK are considered to have exerted the most influence over 
collective outcomes. For example, Moravcsik (1991) argued that the Single European Act was 
achieved only due to the determination of France, Germany and the UK as they had 
convergent national interests. Furthermore, neofunctionalists claim that the ability of national 
governments, individually and collectively, to control policy-making outcomes at the EU level is 
likely to decline as the supranational authority increases (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). On the 
other hand, intergovernmentalism, which emphasizes resources and economic power, allows 
actors to exercise and carry out their power and resources independently. For instance, 
according to Hoffman (1966), the European Union could be a site for exercising the classical 
concerns of international politics in Europe, including issues of sovereignty, coalition formation 
and state interests. 
In sum, as stated in Moravcsik (1993), integration is a result of rational self-interested states 
bargaining with one another and those states who possess more ‘power’ are likely to have 
more of their interests fulfilled. In the case of the EU, as expected, many of the agreements 
have been in line with the preferences of France and Germany, the so-called ‘Franco-German 
core’. Moreover, a number of intergovernmental studies have pointed out that national 
leaders who are involved in major integrative decisions are driven by the desire to strengthen 
the power of their nations, rather than the will to unite Europe (Castaldi, 2010). However, 
intergovernmentalists have rarely stressed the importance of leadership or nature of its role in 
the integration process. Instead, they have chosen to view its function in regional cooperation 
as a common phenomenon that has emerged from the difference in the possession of power 
and resources among the rational actors in the multilateral bargaining system. That is, 
although they do stress the predominance of the governments of the most influential states in 
the decision-making process, they do not offer a solution to the question of who should lead 
the EU or about other matters of leadership. Indeed,  faith in the prospects for leadership in 
the EU, both as having a presidential and hegemonic status, would seem to be misplaced 
(Moravcsik, 1998).  
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On the whole, the theoretical literatures on the regional integration process have provided 
limited insights into the issues of political leadership as well as the relative power and roles of 
member states. In the context of regional dynamics, leadership is a necessary factor in the 
process of integration, because it helps in overcoming some impediments, such as difficulties 
in finding mutually acceptable outcomes in multi-party negotiations and other coordination 
problems. In the wider global community, regional leaders are largely expected to champion 
and represent the interests of the regional community (Park, 2012: 295). Consequently, testing 
the role of leadership on other regional projects is required. In sum, whether it is in the formal 
or informal sense, the answer to the question of ‘who’ will speak on behalf of the regions is 





4 DEMOCRATISATION IN ASEAN 
4.1 Introduction 
Democratic regimes have significantly multiplied and spread across the world since the third 
wave of democratization beginning in the middle of the 1970s and Southeast Asia was one of 
major regions affected by this development. However, although some new democracies have 
been witnessed in the region, authoritarianism and a general reluctance to embrace 
democratisation is still the case in most of its countries. Owing to the fact that democracy has 
increasingly become an important international norm for good governance5, failing to assert 
democratic values and respect political and civil rights can result in deterioration of 
international reputation and credibility as well as loss of economic opportunities. ASEAN is an 
example of organization that has been struggling to promote democratic values due to its vast 
political diversity and some remaining constraints. Moreover, commitment to democracy 
among ASEAN leaders has often been lacking, with the spreading of the belief by some that 
Asian culture is significantly different from that of the West and hence, the latter’s liberal 
democracy is unlikely to fit in the context of the former. This raises the matter of how 
important is democracy in ASEAN’s regional integration process and whether its promotion is 
the best way forward for greater collaboration between its members.          
In relation to integration theory, there seems to be no correlation between the political 
ideologies of member states and the progress of integration. In fact, under the liberal 
intergovernmentalist perspective, the only thing that matters is the consequences of 
democratisation, in terms of whether these increase the diversity and/or impair the 
homogeneous environment within the association. According to Kant and Doyle’s works 
discussed in Chapter 3, there are some strong ties between democracy and regional 
integration as they tend to reinforce each other. In more detail, democracy can enhance a 
regional integration process by fostering the creation of a zone of peace and cooperation, 
particularly when democracies encounter like-minded states. Furthermore, it is also argued 
that the progress of regional integration can be eased if all participating states share same 
kinds of political ideologies and values. In Chapter 4 it emerged that democracy is a 
fundamental norm of the EU, whereby member states have chosen to embrace it as a common 
value of the union. Moreover, the democratic characters of member states as well as active 
participatory citizens help to keep the EU functioning smoothly. However, in relation EU 
                                                          
5
 See McFaul (2004) and Panebianco and Rossi (2004) 
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democratisation the levels vary significantly across the community. That is, some of its 
members’ decisions to join the EU have based on a cost-benefit calculation, which has resulted 
in democracy being imported rather than generated from within.  
However, the case of ASEAN appears to have taken a different course, for the data presented 
in this chapter show that intrusively promoting democracy across the region could potentially 
trigger tensions between member states and undermine the unity of the association. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of signs showing that democracy is crucial for the 
development of ASEAN integration, especially when considering international reputation and 
credibility and the way towards becoming a more participatory community. This chapter starts 
with the European perspectives on democratisation and then continues to provide an 
overview that aids understanding of the political conditions in ASEAN member states and the 
development path of the grouping in promoting democracy. The following section presents an 
evaluation of ASEAN’s role in democratising its member states, through consideration of the 
factors that have been hindering this process. The final section provides further discussion, a 
summary of the important findings and suggestions for addressing the problem issues. 
4.2 European perspectives 
Democratisation is an important element of the EU that highlights the uniqueness of European 
integration. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the issues of democracy have not been 
directly addressed as part of the mainstream debates in regional integration studies. Rather, 
the focus has been on the community as a political system that lays emphasis on equality and 
freedom of citizens as well as setting international norms for good governance, peace and 
prosperity. However, the European Union has become one of the most remarkable 
international organizations that regards democracy as a fundamental norm of the group, most 
prominently through the framework of an enlargement policy, whereby all member states 
must agree to embrace democracy as a common value of the union. In fact, when considering 
the EU as a promoter of democracy in Europe, it emerges that the way in which it has 
developed the strategies to this end has been unique and far more successful than any other 
previous approach. As Jora (2006: 18) argued in his work, when compared to other 
democratising actors, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and NATO, the ‘European Union 
has proved to be the most persistent, articulated and influential’. 
Regarding this, for example, as stated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union formally proclaimed in December 2000, ‘Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, 
the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality 
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and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law’. Moreover, the 
Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 
stipulated that ‘the union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy 
covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be… to develop 
and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’. In addition, in article 130u (2) of the Treaty of Rome, it clearly states that 
‘Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’. 
In relation to democracy promotion, Morlino (1998: 1-8) wrote about the main  internal 
factors that have taken the EU down this particular path. The first is through this strategy it has 
been able to increase substantially its capacity and resources, which consequently has 
improved its position on the international stage. Second, the weakness in its military capacity 
has led to the transformation of the EU into a civil organization that seeks to promote stability 
in the region through economic cooperation, democracy and the rule of law. Third, even 
though the union emphasized economic cooperation at the beginning of its life, it has emerged 
to become what has been called ‘a community of values’ or ‘a constitutional order’. From a 
different perspective, Morlino also identified some external factors influencing the EU’s 
democratisation strategies. Firstly, during the 1970s and 1980s, the EU needed to deal with the 
attempts to consolidate democracy in the Southern European countries by making it a crucial 
conditionality of accession into the union. Next, the fall of the Soviet Union and the decision to 
take on ten new Eastern member states, put immense pressure on the EU to develop and 
strengthen its strategies and instruments in the area of democratisation, thus leading to the 
most extensive democratisation policies ever undertaken. Moreover, the EU has been strongly 
linked to democratisation activity since 1960s due to the colonial history of many of its key 
member states, such as France, the UK, Spain, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands. Finally, 
Morlino (ibid) also indicated that the EU sees democracy as a crucial element of peace and 
material development as well as the way to maintain security in the region. 
As was elicited in the previous chapter, democratising through enlargement has been one of 
the most successful and effective EU policies. That is, strict political conditionality as found in 
the EU accession policy has helped the union to build up relations with candidate countries. 
The pre-accession process, together with opinions, accession partnerships, national 
programmes for the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria and regular reports are embedded 
around the progressive meeting of the Copenhagen criteria (Baracani, 2004: 43). Moreover, 
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the EU has assisted potential candidates by providing assistance programmes in democracy 
promotion with a long-term perspective so as to ensure that they stay on track (Grossmann, 
2006: 5). On the other hand, prospective countries are highly attracted by the EU membership, 
not only because it symbolizes security and economic prosperity, but also due to the fact that 
new members are eligible for massive financial inflows in the form of structural funds and 
subsidies (Grossmann, 2006: 1). Moreover, EU membership offers them an opportunity to 
influence the decisions of their powerful western member states and at the same time 
increases their bargaining power when negotiating with external international actors. 
The core of EU membership-related democratisation policy is laid out in the Copenhagen 
Criteria and the Acquis Communautaire of the union. Before joining the EU, candidate 
countries need to meet the conditions for membership as stated in the former, which requires 
‘the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities’ (European Commission, 2012). At the same time, the Acquis 
Communautaire is simply the accumulated pieces of legislation of the union, which candidate 
countries have to accept and implement in order to become an EU member. It is divided into a 
variety of chapters, with each relating to a specific policy area. In order to implement these 
rules effectively in good time before accession, candidate countries have to meet EU standards 
of institutions, management capacity and administrative and judicial systems at both the 
national and regional levels (European Commission, 2012). In general, to become a member 
and receive rewards, such as financial and economic assistance, the EU requires potential 
candidates to adopt a set of democratic rules and practices, mainly those associated with 
liberal political norms (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008: 191). However, although only few of 
these conditions that the EU requires candidate countries to meet are directly related to 
democracy, almost all of them, for example the rule of law, freedom of speech and human 
rights, are positive values for ensuring democratisation (Grossmann, 2006: 5-6). To summarize, 
the key mechanism of EU democratisation is to meet the Copenhagen Criteria and the 
adoption of EU legal templates in national legislation. 
However, although EU political conditionality is considerably successful in democratising 
neighbouring countries, there have been some arguments about its limitations. For instance, 
Ivanov (2004: 6), who investigated EU enlargement in the Central and Eastern European 
countries, argued that the establishment of solid legal frameworks and institutions is necessary 
but not sufficient, which suggests the EU focuses too much on formal institutional and 
legislative reforms in potential candidate countries. As a result, some issues which involve 
changes in human behaviour, such as corruption and minority protection in these countries, 
84 
 
have not been tackled properly (Pridham, 2002: 960). Another criticism is in relation to the 
EU’s democratic deficit, which pertains to ‘pointing to the modest authority of the European 
Parliament vis-à-vis the secretive Council and the unelected Commission’ (Ivanov, 2004: 6). 
That is, these technocratic bodies have been accused of ‘drafting policy in an arcane jargon, 
secluded from public scrutiny’ that increasingly confines democratically elected national 
parliaments and hence, restricts their ability to act in their electorates’ interests (ibid). 
To validate the claim that EU democratisation strategies have been far more successful than 
any other approach, one important question that needs addressing is: how effective is EU 
democratisation? And if it has been, what conditions determined this? In this regard, the 
literature suggests that EU accession conditionality has been a crucial factor for 
democratisation of the European neighbourhood and in fact, the effectiveness of EU political 
conditionality is thought to be a consequence of a credible and attractive membership 
perspective (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008: 189, 207). However, the effects of EU 
democratisation strategies vary in relation to the stage of democracy that a candidate country 
has achieved so far, in that they are lowest in autocratic countries and those that have already 
reached a high level of democratisation and highest in those that are in a transition period or 
embarking upon one (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008: 207-211). Similarly, Grossman (2006: 
7-8) opined that EU democratisation works slower in those countries with less democratic 
ambition and historically close relations with Russia as they lack sufficient democratic reforms, 
being thus unable to  understand the EU accession process. He concluded that the process of 
EU democratisation ‘only works if countries believe that one day they will be able to join the 
EU. EU approaches are significantly less effective where membership is not possible or not 
realistic’. In line with this, Jora (2006: 17), when investigating the EU accession of Romania, 
concluded that the ‘EU obtained maximum leverage power after the accession date has been 
within a reachable horizon’.  
From the other direction, the next question is in relation to how democracy benefits EU 
governance or what has the EU gained from the democratic character of its members. In this 
regard, it is essential to understand that the original design of the EU’s political structures and 
decision-making mechanisms were based on a technocratic and functionalist approach 
(Micossi, 2008: 8), established in the context of Western democracy. Therefore, the 
democratic character of founding member states as well as there being active participatory 
citizens, have, on the whole, kept the EU functioning smoothly. Secondly, according to Lord & 
Magnette (2004) and Micossi (2008), the EU is a distinctive polity with its powers diffused into 
institutional bodies, each of which has its own legitimacy that has recently spread out to cover 
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many aspects of the common union’s policies. This highlights the significance of democracy 
and affirms that there has been growing demand for it at the regional level. 
In addition, Majone (1998: 12) argued that the 1992 Maastricht Treaty clearly identifies the 
significance of the democratic characters of the member states to the legitimacy of the EU by 
stating that ‘the integration process derives its legitimation from the democratic character of 
the member states… Thus, the entire process is guided and controlled by sovereign democratic 
states’. In other words, the democratic characters of EU member states would help to improve 
the democratic character of the union as a whole. Moreover, according to Van Deth (2008: 
242-243), ‘bodies engaged in the promotion of active and participatory citizenship’ and ‘civic 
participation’ as well as other collective actors from various levels are involved in making EU 
decision making ‘more open, transparent and participatory’.  
Under analysis, it is apparent that the democratisation strategies of the EU are distinctive and, 
as mentioned by a number of scholars, have been outstandingly more effective than the 
methods of any other international actors. Regarding this, all means, activities and objectives 
of the EU’s democratisation policy are clearly stated in the Treaties and Charters, which gives 
the union legitimacy and a solid judicial support for encountering difficulties when 
implementing its strategies. It is also clear that, from historical evidence, democracy is 
respected not only within the EU’s borders, but also extends to the context of external 
relations, in particular in relation to the common foreign and security policy as well as in the 
development and cooperation with third countries (Baracani, 2004: 8). Further, the EU 
recognizes democracy as a fundamental and common principle to be acknowledged and 
respected by the member states, but also embedded in the EU as a whole, thereby becoming a 
key fundamental ingredient for mobilising the community. 
Drawing on the classic democratic peace theory covered in the previous chapter, Europe is in 
need of democracy promotion because this seems to be the most realistic and sustainable way 
of reducing the likelihood of inter-state conflict and thus providing regional stability. That is, 
democratic mechanisms, such as elections, individual freedoms and public opinion as well as a 
peaceful reconciliation process underpin the EU’s rule-based polity, thus promoting 
collaboration regarding its respective institutions and preventing its members from 
aggressively confronting each other. As a consequence of its attempts to establish democracy, 
as the core principle of the union, it has made great strides towards achieving the political goal 
of building a peaceful community, having now enjoyed several decades of peace. Another 
matter of relevance to this democratizing project is in relation to the historical context of the 
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EU. Unlike other integrating regions, it emerged as a consequence of the Second World War 
and the subsequently divisions of East and West during the Cold War (Gowland et al., 2006: 
26). As Morlino has argued, more recent factors, such as the collapse of communism in Central 
and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the enlargement involving Eastern member states in 2004, 
which have poor democratic histories, are key reasons for explaining why the EU is very keen 
on democratisation. Moreover, the colonial history of many of the key member states and 
subsequent independence struggles firmly put the issue of democracy on the map. In sum, 
these events have led to the notion that it is somehow impossible to think of the EU without 
democracy. 
What is more, from the author’s point of view, democratisation as a part of political 
conditionality for EU accession could be construed as being somewhat ambiguous. This is 
because of the credibility and attractiveness of EU membership, particularly its massive 
financial assistance, has become a cost-benefit calculation, with countries having to weigh up 
their willingness to make adjustments as required by the EU, which involves sacrificing some 
degree of their sovereignty, if they are to reap the benefits. This entails advocating democratic 
reform and the adoption of EU legal templates into the national legislation. Hence, this kind of 
political transition is clearly different from a bottom-up democratic reform or other traditional 
means of democratisation which are, for example, largely influenced by economic 
development and civil powers. In this vein, US democratisation has emphasised the non-state 
components, such as civil society and party building, rather than government-to-government 
and legislation assistance, as it is ‘highly effective in working on bottom-up reform, capacity-
building, and supporting public demands for change’ (Grossmann, 2006: 6). This is clearly 
different from the EU approach for the union has introduced sets of rules and demands, which 
members or prospective members have to adopt. ‘As a result, reforming countries can partake 
in the whole experience of democratic countries and be “plugged in” to the ongoing European 
democratic political process’ (Grossmann, 2006: 8). Thus, regarding implementation, it is vital 
for the EU to ensure the willingness of all the involved domestic stakeholders, such as political 
parties, businesses, NGOs and the media, to accept what they can gain from adhering to the 
rules. 
Provocatively, Moravcsik (2006) provided a contrasting perspective in relation to the need for 
democratic legitimisation in the EU. In the main, he argued that the EU is a product of 
intergovernmental bargains with a satisfactory equilibrium, which is ‘pragmatically effective, 
normatively attractive and politically stable’ (Moravcsik, 2006: 221). However, he continued by 
stating that it does not need further democratic legitimisation because increasing participatory 
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opportunities in the union do not ‘generate a more desirable outcome in any respect, whether 
that be more representative, more popular, more accountable, or more effective policy’ 
(Moravcsik, 2006: 238-239). In the meantime, issues of democracy promotion in the EU have 
also been linked to collective identity by some scholars, such as Schmitter (2000), arguing that 
because the community has not been able to establish a common identity or sufficient shared 
values, democratic legitimacy is unforeseeable as these circumstances make it difficult to refer 
back to the EU’s legitimate authority. 
In the European case, then, while democratisation is often seen as having been 
straightforwardly key to the integration process, recent scholarship has emphasized the extent 
to which this may be less clear cut and more contingent upon other dynamics, whether in 
terms of elite settlement and leadership or in terms of regional identity.  In ASEAN, where the 
democratic record is less good and variations in the extent of democratisation among member 
states much higher, there is clear reason to question the centrality of democratisation to the 
integration process.  These recent critical contributions to the European experience, however, 
give us a useful starting point by drawing attention to the conceptual relationship between 
democracy and other key factors.  As we shall see, democracy does play an important role in 
ASEAN, but in a very different relationship to other key factors.  
4.3 Background of democratisation in ASEAN 
In the history of ASEAN, the issue of democracy is something that has never come onto the 
agenda. The association’s decision to accept the accession of the CLMV countries (Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) into the group reflects that the development gap, not only in 
economic and social terms, but also political, within the association has become wider and this 
could significantly affect the progress of regional integration. Moreover, ASEAN considers 
friendships among its members and a collaborative environment as being more important than 
consolidating democracy as a means to ensure peace and security in the region. However, it is 
important to note that, after the retreat of the colonial powers from the region, democracy 
was initially a driving factor for the formation and consolidation of ASEAN, as the five founding 
states declared themselves as anti-communists. Regarding this, Acharya (2003: 379) wrote that 
‘while the outward objective of ASEAN was to promote socio-economic development of its 
members, its core basis was the member’s common concern with regime survival in the face of 
domestic and external threats, especially communist subversion.’ In the past, there were 
several attempts to assert or promote democratic values over the association, but since its 
establishment in 1967, ASEAN has not laid down any plan to insert democratic values into its 
remit. The Bangkok Declaration of 1967 has only a short statement indicating that ASEAN shall 
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‘promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law’, 
while the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation only focuses on enhancing cooperation among 
members. The ASEAN Concord I signed in 1976 only superficially adds in the aspects of civil 
participation in the field of social development.  
Subsequently, the ASEAN Concord II in 2003 established the three-pillar structure, whereby 
some key political developments were introduced into the organisation. Moreover, this was 
considered to be the first time that ASEAN leaders made a commitment to democratisation in 
Southeast Asia. According to the proposal, it is understood that Indonesia officially proposed 
the democratic agenda at the ASEAN Senior Official Meeting, organized four months before 
the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, listing political development among the other four ASEAN 
Security Community’s (ASC) duties. The other four elements were ‘norms-setting, conflict 
prevention, approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building’ (Sukma, 2009: 
137). Understandably, this political initiative was strongly pushed forward by Indonesia, which 
viewed democracy as a new complex challenge of ASEAN in the 21st century and argued that 
‘security in the region could not be attained and guaranteed unless member states paid 
attention not only to security in a narrow sense but also to the imperative of political 
development.’ (ibid) Although not declaring it openly, Indonesia realized that antagonisms and 
mistrust still remained among ASEAN partners. Instead, it preferred to express its views on this 
sensitive issue to other ASEAN members in an indirect and less controversial form. In this 
regard, democratisation is not a very recent development in Indonesia, for after the fall of 
Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, it undertook this path and to some degree achieved its 
transition to democracy. As expected, other member states were sceptical about Indonesia’s 
agenda, seeing it as something that could be potentially harmful to the association’s golden 
principles of non-interference, respect for national sovereignty and consensus-based decision 
making. In the end, the reference to political development proposed by Indonesia was 
removed before the formal approval of ASEAN Concord II, leaving only four elements to be 
listed as modalities for the ASC. 
However, this unsuccessful first attempt to introduce a democratic agenda did not stop 
Indonesia from pursuing this policy and subsequently it was successful in persuading other 
member states to reinsert its idea of political development. This is because the 
aforementioned four elements in the ASEAN Concord II did not clearly identify the concrete 
actions that would need to be taken to achieve the desired goals. In the meantime, Indonesia 
took the view that the four elements stated in the ASEAN Concord II were compatible with 
democracy, being also ways to establish long-term peace and avoid conflicts, and managed to 
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persuade other member states to reinsert the notion of political development in the proposals 
put forward by the ASC in the 2004 Vientiane Action Plan (Sukma, 2009: 139). This was done 
by using careful understatement and hence was less controversial than expected. For instance, 
the document did not mention that any key ingredient of democracy, such as holding a general 
election, freedom of expression or the political participation of citizens, should be adopted by 
member countries. According to the document, the ASC opined that democracy was one of the 
goals of the ASEAN Community in the following way: 
“The ASEAN Security Community (ASC) embodies ASEAN’s aspirations to achieve peace, 
stability, democracy and prosperity in the region where ASEAN Member Countries live 
at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and 
harmonious environment.”6  
From the statement it can be seen that although democracy is listed broadly as one of the 
goals to achieve, it does seem to imply that ASEAN does not care about domestic political 
conditions or that national sovereignty will be disregarded. That is, democracy is considered as 
an international environment or sphere that can help reinforce the other norms of association. 
Furthermore, it includes the promotion of human rights, the participation of NGOs and 
combating corruption among the list of strategies for political development. On the whole, 
although the statements in the VAP are still relatively ambiguous, it is a critical point for 
democratisation in ASEAN as it provides an initial legal framework for the organisation to drive 
forward. 
The future of democratisation in ASEAN seems to be even brighter in the Charter era, which 
began with the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur held in 2005, where the leaders agreed to 
draft an ASEAN Charter as a legal framework for the association. It was subsequently signed 
and adopted at the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore. Here, according to the official Charter, 
the democratisation effort in ASEAN was stepped up by mandating democracy and human 
rights as one of the main purposes of the political development of the organisation (Article 1 
No.7): 
“To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to 
promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the 
rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN.”          
                                                          
6
 See 2004 Vientiane Action Programme 2004-2010, page 5. 
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Nevertheless, although democracy and human rights have become a regional aspiration, the 
revealed Charter is not genuinely a substantive mechanism in the quest for democracy within 
ASEAN. Regarding this, Sukma (2009: 141) argued that ‘the Charter does not explain how these 
goals might be pursued, or what, if anything, will happen to members that do not pursue 
them.’ In other words, this highlights one of the most commonly expressed criticisms of ASEAN 
that it is “a talk shop”. That is, many see the association as only about paperwork and 
rhetorical commitments, with there being no genuine motivation among the leaders to bring 
these statements into effective implementation. As can be seen in Article 20 relating to the 
case of a serious breach or non-compliance, this has been left open-ended, for it states that 
‘the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision.’ 7  In sum, practical 
commitment to democracy across the region is only paid lip service by most of its members. 
4.4 Different shades of democracy and enduring authoritarianism in 
Southeast Asia 
Discussion about democratisation in ASEAN may have to take the dynamics between domestic 
and regional features seriously into consideration. Arguably, political diversity within 
Southeast Asia is one of the most vibrant issues of debate and also it is regarded as being 
among the most obvious obstacles to the development of ASEAN. As asserted by Mauzy (1997: 
210), the concept of democracy is always controversial because it relates to the idea of how 
power is distributed as well as the limits of political authority. This is particularly the case in 
contexts where the ideas of Western democracy are not universally accepted, such as in 
ASEAN. In general, liberal democracy, including its ingredients, such as human rights, freedom 
of the press and political pluralism, are not indigenous to Southeast Asia, for they not seem to 
correspond with its historical context. That is, the Southeast Asia today has been profoundly 
affected by its historical and cultural legacies, particularly from the colonial period. Mauzy 
(ibid) contends that the democratic and human rights stance from the West has deeply revived 
bitterness about colonization and past conflicts in Southeast Asia. Consequently, due to the 
historical legacies of colonial rule, democracy is widely accepted only at the superficial level 
and most political leaders in Southeast Asia hold authoritarianism as a core value, believing 
that it is as an appropriate and applicable form of governance. One scholar has claimed that 
governments tend to authenticate their legitimacy and democratic credentials only by 
ensuring that elections are held on a regular basis (Rahim, 2000: 30). In sum, it is convinced 
                                                          
7
 See the ASEAN Charter, Article 20 (4) 
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that democracy in South East Asia has not been genuinely adopted and in essence is defined 
differently from the way it is in the West. 
In general, according to Carlson and Turner  (2009: 377), the political regimes in Southeast Asia 
cover a wide spectrum ranging from electoral democracy through to various hybrid 
democratic-authoritarian systems and on to full-scale authoritarianism. On the one hand, the 
socialist countries have been facing difficulties about how to maintain their authoritarian rule 
when confronted with the pressure of the global trend towards democracy. On the other 
hand, the democratic countries have been experiencing internal difficulties, such as 
corruption, transparency, political patronage, instability and bad governance that have 
considerably weakened their regimes. Moreover, in relation to the historical context, Mauzy 
(1997: 210) argued that there is still suspicion among Southeast Asian countries towards 
Western nations, with their believing that the latter have a hidden agenda of attempting to 
maintain hegemony and hence, slow down Asian prosperity and competitiveness. This has led 
me to the conclusion that most Southeast Asian countries reject Western-style liberal 
democracy, with their leaders strongly believing in the virtue of their own ideology, ability and 
cultural values. As a consequence, a form of developmental regime driven by capitalism and 
authoritarianism, so-called ‘Asian values’, was established aiming to replace those weak new 
democracies and economically lagging authoritarian regimes. (Thompson, 2004: 1084) This is 
widely considered to be one of the most recognized claims made among ASEAN leaders, which 
deviates the meaning of democracy in Western discourses by contending that governments 
should be based on their own cultural particularity. As a result, it has become increasingly 
popular to resist Western liberal democracy, Indonesia’s Suharto, Malaysia’s Mahathir and 





Table 4.1: Classification of political regimes in Southeast Asia, 2001, 2006 and 2012 
Year   Liberal           Electoral      Ambiguous    Competitive     Hegemonic        Politically-closed  
   democracy     democracy                     authoritarian              electoral             authoritarian 
                                                                                                                                                authoritarian 
 
2001         -          Philippines (2.5)   Indonesia (3.5)     Malaysia (5)     Singapore (5)         Vietnam (6.5) 
           Thailand (2.5)                Cambodia (5.5)      Laos (6.5) 
            Myanmar (7) 
 
2006         -          Indonesia (2.5)      Malaysia (4)     Singapore (4.5)      Thailand (5.5) 
           Philippines (3)                            Cambodia (5.5)      Vietnam (6) 
             Laos (6.5) 
             Myanmar (7) 
 
2012         -                Indonesia (2.5)      Thailand (4)     Malaysia (4)            Singapore (4.0)      Vietnam (6) 
          Philippines (3)                        Cambodia (5.5)       Laos (6.5) 
            Myanmar (6.5) 
 
Notes: The number represents the Freedom House freedom rating for civil liberty and political rights, which ranges 
from 1 to 7, where 1 is the most free and 7 is the least. 
Source: Carlson and Turner (2009: 381) and Diamond (2002: 26)          
In essence, economic development was prioritised and instrumentalised as a path towards 
prosperity as well as political and social stability in Southeast Asia. In other words, there is a 
widely held view that democracy should be considered an unaffordable luxury and that 
substantial economic development has to be the main priority. (Thompson, 2004: 1083) The 
impressive economic performance during the 1980s and early 1990s appears to support this 
view in that it occurred in most cases without democratic progress and  this was seen as 
justification for the approach by the leaders. Moreover, even though the 1997 severe financial 
crisis wiped out Suharto’s regime in Indonesia, it had little impact on Malaysia and Singapore, 
as their regimes were able survive the crisis and continued to exist. Regarding this, Thompson 
(2004: 1085) has provided an important explanation, whereby, particularly in Malaysia and 
Singapore, the co-existence of high living standards and illiberal politics have proved 
exceptions to ‘the rule that democracy follows economic ripeness’, for their high-income levels 
and the large middle classes have not led to this outcome. Or in this researcher’s words, in 
these countries at this time economic prosperity and capitalist development seem to be the 
main parameters that the middle classes use to judge the regimes, which is consistent with the 
observed realization by leaders that if people’s stomachs are filled, their mouths will shut. 
However, according to Table 4.1, the situation has changed during the last two decades as 
there has been an improvement in Malaysia, and more impressively in Indonesia. Regarding 
these developments, Thompson (2001: 161) pointed out that nowadays the Malay middle 
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classes have been politicized and the political agenda has transformed as Western democracy 
has become an important issue in Malaysian politics. Although authoritarianism has remained 
and there has not been significant constitutional reform, the political system has increasingly 
become more competitive and participatory in recent years. In the same manner, Indonesia 
has successfully undergone a democratic transition, becoming the only country in Southeast 
Asia rated by Freedom House as “politically free” (Freedom House, 2012). The opportunity 
given to citizens to exercise their political rights in relatively free and fair elections, the active 
roles of civil society and independent watchdogs accompanied by the emergence of relatively 
independent and vibrant press play an important role in gathering and sustaining momentum 
for political development in Indonesia. By contrast, Thailand was an electoral democracy and 
then was relegated to being included in the group of politically closed authoritarian systems 
due to the 2006 military coup, even if some of its political features, such as media freedom and 
freedom of expression, did not concur with those of the group of authoritarian regimes. 
Moreover, although a new constitution has been installed to restore the political conditions 
and the country is now being ruled by civilian governments, Thailand has never returned to the 
previous position in 2001 as its political development is now in a deteriorating trend, 
restrained by widespread corruption, worsening media censorship, fraud and bribery as well as 
self-serving behaviour. In addition, according to the table, there has not been a significant 
change among the rest of the countries in Southeast Asia. This is perhaps due to the remaining 
severe restrictions on political expression and the support of the status quo from the general 
population owing to successful socioeconomic performance.              
Moving on to more detailed background information, after the conquest over Dutch 
imperialism, Indonesia proclaimed its independence in the late 1940s. The decade after 
gaining independence was full of political orientations influenced by the sense of being part of 
a national revolution. Abdullah (2009: 251) characterized the newly independent Indonesia as 
‘a new nation-state on a trajectory towards democracy, press freedom, a new constitution, 
and emerging citizenship’. Despite the fact that the provisional constitution provided the 
foundation for citizenship and ensured some fundamental democratic features, such as human 
rights, freedom of thought and expression and rule of law, Elson (2008: 193) has pointed out 
that the process of establishing these values was aborted by President Soekarno and his army 
chief, Nasution. That is, due to its weakness and instability accompanied by the subsequent 
beginning of the Cold War, President Soekarno decided to reinstate authoritarianism, with a 
system of so-called ‘guided democracy’. Subsequently, over the following three decades of 
Suharto’s presidency, political parties, social movements and political participation were, by 
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and large, destroyed. As explained by Lane (2006), this resulted in the complete absence of 
mass participation in Indonesian politics for the next two decades. Then, mass resistance to 
the regime started to transform the country in the late 1980s driven by several social groups, 
such as NGOs, labour unions, student organizations, social movements and Muslim 
intellectuals, which also were combined with the encouraging global trend towards 
democracy. Nevertheless, as described by Feith (1991: 63-100), this force continued to be 
restrained by the strength of military and the authoritarian state, the economic dependence 
upon authoritarianism, the religious and class cleavages in society, the continuing external 
support for the authoritarian regime and the lack of leadership among the opposition parties. 
Currently, although there have been multiparty elections at all political levels, which are 
conducted properly and considered to be relatively free and fair, Indonesia still has not 
achieved full democratic consolidation. Some scholars have argued that some of the 
inadequacies are ‘the continued influence of the military and the alleged pursuit of personal 
rather than universalistic ends by politicians’ (Carlson and Turner, 2009: 382). In other words, 
politicians and legislators who have been newly empowered by democracy prefer to 
accommodate top bureaucrats and business tycoons with whom they collude to produce 
skewed policy outputs. (Robison and Hadiz, 2004: 185-252).  Extending this view, Case (2009: 
257) has given an interesting insight explaining that the configuration of elites in Indonesia has 
been readjusted and grown wider and more varied and, ‘as collusion deepens, democracy’s 
quality is diminished, of course, by the patronage that elites so vigorously pursue and the 
reverse domains that they tenaciously defend.’        
Thailand is the only country in the region that was not colonized by the Western powers and 
also managed to escape Japanese rule during the WWII. As a consequence, this is perhaps why 
a positive attitude towards the protection of freedom as well as political and human rights can 
be recognized more easily, compared to other countries in the region. (Paul, 2010: 101) 
Moreover, the democratisation experiences in Thailand have been more indigenous, rather 
than being influenced by the Western colonial officials. Although the country experienced 
some military coups in the past, there have been ongoing attempts to advance democracy and 
demands for a fair and more open society over the years. The introduction of a new 
constitution in 1997 did install new rules and several promising mechanisms to tackle money 
politics, ensure government transparency and to fight corruption in the political system, 
including the introduction of special courts and judicial agencies. Following the years of 
financial turmoil in the late 1990s, there was an ambitious politician, who by 2000 was the 
country’s richest business tycoon. Thaksin Shinawatra, who later was accused of buying a 
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number of MPs from other opposition parties, ‘financed his rise in politics to become Prime 
Minister in 2001 (Paul, 2010: 103). Due to his popularity among the poor as well as his populist 
policies designed for attracting grassroots support, he won a second general election and 
stayed in office until 2006. During his terms in office, he was accused of corruption and 
concealing his assets as well as, with a majority in the parliament, managing to pass legislation 
that seemed to benefit his family and relative’s businesses. He also paralysed many checks and 
balances mechanisms, such as the anti-corruption bodies, and limited freedom of that section 
of the press that was critical of his government. According to Paul (2010: 105), Thaksin was 
portrayed as a person who wished to transform the country into a corporate state with his 
political party run as a business acting on behalf of the Thai people as the shareholders. Owing 
to widespread corruption scandals and his abuse of executive power, his government was 
removed from office in September 2006 by a coup. The coup was bloodless and probably the 
most peaceful one in history. After a year of the administration by a civilian government, a 
general election was held in the late 2007 under a new constitution. The result was not the 
intended outcome as the pro-Thaksin Peoples Power Party (PPP) won the most seats and 
formed a coalition government. Since then, most of the time Thai politics has been dominated 
by this pro-Thaksin party, whose leaders are considered as a proxy for Thaksin Shinawatra, and 
there have been several conflicts between pro-Thaksin (Red Shirts) and anti-Thaksin (Yellow 
shirts) supporters. The future of democratisation in Thailand is very uncertain as deep divisions 
among the people have emerged all over the country. Money politics, corruption, self-
benefiting as well as problems of freedom of the press and human rights are still ongoing 
problems. Rahim (2000: 28) wrote that constitutions and laws are written so as to make it 
more cumbersome for politicians and bureaucrats to abuse state power for private gain. The 
practice of politicians buying votes is common in Thailand, particularly in rural areas, occurring 
at every level of elections and democratic forces have been able to little to improve this 
chronic problem.        
The Philippines was a former colony of Spain between 16th and 18th Centuries. At the end of 
the 18th century, as a consequence of the Spanish-American War in Cuba, the land was sold to 
the US who retained its power over the land until 1946. After gaining independence, the two 
countries both maintained close political and commercial ties up to the present day. Paul 
(2010: 83) has explained that in Philippines democracy is considered as ‘a façade for oligarchic 
rule’, which continues to be a major mechanism for plundering public resources that 
contributes to the wealth of the leaders. These corrupt leaders have strengthened their 
powers amongst their families through marriage and business interests, such that it has helped 
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to maintain their hegemonic powers for generations. (ibid) The two decades of President 
Fernando Marcos’ administration deprived the country of vast quantities of wealth and public 
resources. Nowadays, his extended family owns, both directly and indirectly, the country’s 
largest corporations in several sectors, such as: telecommunications, airlines, electricity, beer, 
newspapers and television, banks and real estate. Notably, Franco (2004: 97-137) described 
the regime as an ‘elite democracy’ as its political system full of the elite’s corruption scandals 
and abuses of executive power. On the whole, similar to Thailand, a major obstacle to the 
democratisation process has been the persistent corruption of the ruling elites, which has 
made it unstable and resulted in many coup attempts aimed at ousting corrupt leaders.           
Malaysia is a former British colony. As a result of WWII, the British had been bankrupted and 
had to relinquish the control over their colonies. The Federation of Malaya gained its 
independence from them in 1957 and this was followed by independence for Sarawak and 
North Borneo in 1963 when the British incorporated Singapore and the Borneo states, because 
of fear of communist and independent movements in the region as well as the need to protect 
its commercial assets. (Paul, 2010: 65) However, over the subsequent decades of independent 
Malaysia, the politics of race played a significant role in the establishment of authoritarianism 
in society. In particular, during Mahathir’s era as president, he strengthened pro-Malay policies 
and tightened his grip on power by suppressing any opponents of the regime (Bertrand, 2013: 
101). The state and its core institutions are still controlled by his ruling political party, the 
United Malay National Organization (UMNO). Moreover, political activities are restricted and 
suppression of dissent is acted out on: politicians, academics, journalists, judges, lawyers and 
other opponents. All kinds of media are tightly censored and controlled, being used as tools for 
promulgation of the regime’s values. Similar to other regional partners, corruption is common 
and vote-buying widespread as well as the electoral rules being shaped for ensuring favourable 
outcomes. Interestingly, Case (2009: 261) commented that Malaysia has lacked a 
determinative force for fuller civil liberties and electoral competitiveness due to the division of 
its mass population over ethnicity and religion. More recently, although there has been no 
significant political change in the level of control exercised by the regime, there have been an 
increasing number of demonstrations and deliberations on various reform issues. The 
opposition parties have clearly become stronger and been able to make greater advancement, 
which is evident by the results of the general elections since 2008, the year when the 
opposition coalition denied the ruling parties a two-thirds majority for the first time since 
1969. This result and the greater prevalence of civil society activity have brought with them 
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considerable implications for the future of Malaysia’s politics, with the prospect for 
democratisation challenging the dominant-party situation.  
Singapore is well known for its concealed authoritarian stature. As a British colony, the island 
was the main naval base in Southeast Asia and a major trading port of status. It gained 
independence from the British together with Malaysia in 1962 as a result of a merger 
referendum, which also resulted in it becoming a part of the latter. Two years later, Singapore 
gained independence from the Federation of Malaya. According to Paul (2010: 92), during the 
transition period the British conveyed the politics of the People’s Action Party (PAP) into the 
trusted hands of Lee Kuan Yew and proceeded to eliminate the opposition in order to create 
and maintain a one-party system. Lee Kuan Yew was the Prime Minister of Singapore for 30 
years from 1959 onwards and he still has a significant role in the government. After his 
successor, Goh Chok Tong, stepped down from the prime ministership in 2004, Lee Hsien 
Loong, Lee Kuan Yew’s eldest child, took over the position, thus becoming the third prime 
minister. In general, all the key positions in administration, finance, academia, the military, 
security and business that are necessary to retain and renew the party’s mandate are occupied 
by the PAP and Lee’s family. Political expression and freedom of the press are severely 
restricted, with many websites being prohibited or censored by the government. In fact, the 
government’s opponents can face criminal charges and prosecution for quite minor matters. 
Economic development has been essential for the sustainability of the government and the 
low tax rate on personal income has secured the position of the rich in the hierarchy, while 
leaving the poor facing a rising cost of living. Socially, there is racial discrimination in society as 
the Chinese are considered a superior race to the Malays and Indians. Furthermore, it has 
been reported that the Singaporean political leaders are among the world’s highest paid. 
According to the Economist (2010), the salary of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong is five times 
that of the US’s Barack Obama and ten times that of the UK’s David Cameron. Under these 
conditions, there has been only very narrow space for Singaporeans and for civil society to 
‘expand into and become a significant force’ (Bertrand, 2013: 120). 
Cambodia is another country that has clearly displayed continual repressiveness and 
authoritarianism. The country remained relatively peaceful until the year of its gaining 
independence from the French in 1954, when its, communist party, known as the Khmer 
Rouge, increasingly challenged to control the country, eventually occupying the driving seat in 
Cambodia’s political system. (Paul, 2010: 37) However, the Khmer Rouge killed millions of their 
fellow countrymen and then started encroaching on Vietnam’s territory, which led to a full 
scale invasion by the latter. Pressure from the international community led to a troop removal 
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from Cambodia in 1989, but by then the Khmer Rouge had lost power. The subsequent UN 
operation of rehabilitation and reconstruction aimed at establishing peace and democracy in 
Cambodia was not very successful in preventing domestic conflicts. Hun Sen, who had been 
the Prime Minister of the Vietnamese-controlled government, continued to dominate a large 
number of key institutions. The following elections even strengthened his control and, as 
stated by McCargo (2005: 100), became ‘political theatre’ designed to give his party legitimacy 
and a mandate. Similar to other Southeast Asian regimes, the main source of Hun Sen’s 
political power came from the control of the state’s agencies of repression, such as the: 
military, police and judiciary. (Paul, 2010: 41) Over the two decades of his administration, 
power was distributed around his family networks, which now control a range of public 
resources and have close ties with powerful magnates. Corruption is perhaps the most serious 
problem, becoming a feature that defines authoritarianism in Cambodia. On the whole, the 
nation’s politics embody the progressively increased control of the ruling party, the decline of 
the opposition party’s strength, severe deficits in the rule of law and the weak role of the 
nationally elected assembly. (Carlson and Turner, 2009: 382) Consequently, as highlighted by 
McCargo (2005: 110), there can be no liberalization of Cambodian politics until the CPP’s 
formidable network of power and patronage unravels, which is unlikely to happen while Hun 
Sen is still on the scene.  
Vietnam and Laos are under the control of a Communist government, being thus among the 
world’s few remaining single-party socialist states. After the French retreated from Vietnam, 
the country became involved in the Cold War with the partition between the North, controlled 
by communist forces, and the South, backed by the US. Due to the close tie of their communist 
parties, both Vietnam and Laos became fully involved in the conflicts. The war ended in 1975 
with the victory of North Vietnam over a weakened South Vietnamese army as a result of 
America refusing to give any more support to its forces in Indochina in 1973. In the following 
years, South Vietnam was reunified with the North under communist rule. Then, hostilities 
continued when, as pointed out above, Vietnam began a military invasion to occupy Cambodia 
in order to remove the Khmer Rouge regime. Due to massive pressure from international 
community and the disengagement of the Soviet Union who had been the most important 
sponsor for the war, Vietnam decided to withdraw its troops from Cambodia after the 10 years 
of occupation and started to reengage with the world. As a consequence of the war, much of 
its economy, infrastructure and environment had been destroyed and it had to rely on its own 
resources, because there was no sort of compensation, unlike in Germany and Japan after the 
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WWII, from the US or international community (Paul, 2010: 120) and in fact, the lattermost 
discouraged anyone from supporting the country.  
Similarly, Laos was also heavily destroyed. According to Basher (1988: 9), it is one of the most 
bombed countries on earth, for between 1965 and 1973 more bombs were dropped on it than 
on Japan and Germany during the whole of World War II. Under the control of the ruling 
communist government, the army is involved in many sectors of the economy and every 
organization including civil society groups (Paul, 2010: 122). All print and broadcasting media 
as well as the internet are strictly controlled by the government, although this is clearly less so 
in the case of Laos due to the government’s limited technical ability and the fact that it has no 
intention to interfere with foreign media, with people being free to access international 
programmes via satellite or cable television. Unsurprisingly, political expression and all kinds of 
freedoms related to democracy are almost absent, making it difficult for opposition groups to 
form alliances. In case of Vietnam, the communist party adopted a neoliberal economic policy 
and started to liberalize the economy. Its post-war economic performance has been 
impressive in that significant progress in poverty reduction and improvements in living 
standards has been clearly seen. However, such economic progress has had no effect on the 
political liberalization in Vietnam. In the case of Laos, the ruling party is changing its ideology, 
moving away from the Marxist-Leninist base towards authoritarianism using Buddhism to 
legitimise party rule, gain support from the population and to construct nationalism (Paul, 
2010: 60). On the whole, the major concern of democratization in Vietnam and Laos is not so 
much about the introduction of democracy, but rather how long the party can maintain 
communist rule as well as how to isolate its authoritarianism from the increasingly liberalized 
economy. Political change in Laos will continue to be shaped by its core neighbouring countries 
as its government has close ties with China and Vietnam, due to the common political 
ideology, while its citizens are more affiliated with Thailand, owing to language, religion and 
cultural similarities.       
Myanmar is a unique and interesting case. The country was colonized by the British during the 
eighteenth century and this brought many changes. Similar to Laos, Buddhism is a key 
construct of the nationalism that helped in forming resistance forces against British rule (Paul, 
2010: 75). Myanmar gained independence in 1948 and it has been continually ruled by a 
military dictatorship since 1962 when a military coup overthrew the democratic regime and 
took control of the country. The regime completely isolated Myanmar from the outside world. 
Foreign firms were nationalized, missionaries and aid organizations were asked to leave and 
only very few citizens were given permission to travel abroad, while foreigners were allowed 
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to stay for just one and later, six days (Bertrand, 2013: 196). The government gained full 
control over access to information and prevented its citizens from having any outside news or 
contact (Steinberg, 1999: 33-58). However, in the late 1980s, a new junta regime abolished the 
old system imposed by the previous military government and began to take advantage of 
global capitalism by attracting foreign investment from outside as a new way of renewing its 
legitimacy. The money earned from the selling of the country’s resources to foreign firms 
funded ‘the growth of military power and purchase of modern weaponry’ (Paul, 2010: 18). 
Somewhat disingenuously, between 2008 and 2011, the government attempted to introduce a 
process of political reform by launching a new constitution with a civilian government, but 
whilst ensuring that military dominance was preserved. The reform led to the alleviation of 
sanctions from the Western countries, resumption of international aid and new economic 
opportunities. As concluded by Bertrand (2013: 208), ‘a return to civilian rule and managed 
elections allowed the regime to emulate effective formulas used by other authoritarian and 
semi-authoritarian regimes in the region, while at least temporarily keeping its own pace 
toward reform’.            
4.5 Evaluating the roles of ASEAN in democracy promotion 
 Given the three decades of ASEAN not explicitly committing itself to democracy at the 
regional level, this section probes the intricacies of political development in Southeast Asia, 
and also the ineffectuality of the organization in achieving the goal of integration. To this 
researcher, democracy seems to be a sensitive and untouchable issue for ASEAN in which any 
change is securely prevented by the organization’s golden rule of non-interference. Moreover, 
the view is taken here that the recent enlargement of the organization to allow non-
democratic countries (Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999)) into 
the group has prolonged ASEAN having no, or only a weak, intention to assert democratic 
values. That is, the preference regarding the establishment of peace and security of members 
is to achieve this through a cooperative and accommodating manner, rather than by 
democracy. At the same time, the evidence presented in the previous section affirms that the 
political regimes in ASEAN countries are not sufficiently consolidated and are still very much 
authoritarian. In other words, there are several countries firmly remaining under authoritarian 
rule and even in some of the democratic ones, the phenomenon is commonly accepted only at 
its face value. Moreover, this researcher concurs with the view that most of the authoritarian 
governments claim that they are politically legitimate based on the fact that elections are held 
on a regular basis, despite there being no regard for the ability of opposition parties to 
compete freely and fairly (Rahim, 2000: 30). Indeed, political and social conditions in ASEAN 
101 
 
countries are still not conducive for democracy to prosper. In general, as a result of the 
enlargement, political diversity has been much greater and become a major obstacle that has 
undermined the organisation’s unity and its ability in responding to challenges. 
In the discussion of the prospects for democratisation, the theoretical aspects have shed light 
on why democracy promotion seems implausible for ASEAN. Indeed, although democracy is 
considered as a crucial element in the European integration, it is apparent that this has not 
been justified in other regional integration schemes and in fact, has rarely been considered in 
the literature outside the EU context. In Chapter 3, it was reported that Schimmelfennig and 
Scholz (2010) pointed out that the influences of democracy can penetrate through 
transnational relations and cross-border exchanges, particularly between non-state actors. 
Due to the fact that regional integration is very likely to increase the interactions between 
members, therefore in practice could provide a useful platform for democratisation 
contestation to be played out. Nevertheless, in this researcher’s opinion this may not be the 
case for ASEAN as the organization is highly top-down and elite-centric in such a way that 
political and civil liberties are still seriously limited. Also, its decision-making is managed 
through close interpersonal contacts among the top leaders and does not involve civil society 
or public opinion (Acharya, 2003: 379). As a consequence, transnational activities between 
non-state actors and also the spillover effects that emerge as a result of an exchange of ideas 
and information are seriously lacking. Therefore, as long as these domestic illiberal conditions 
continue, any attempt towards democracy promotion will not materialize, for as Acharya 
(2003: 381) put it, democratisation is seen as a threat that can potentially undermine ‘the 
legitimacy of ASEAN elite-centred regionalism’.      
Democratic peace theory can also demonstrate some other interesting insights about the 
pursuit of democratisation in ASEAN. As discussed in Chapter 3, the rationale behind 
democratisation is built on the fact that the progress of integration could be eased and 
accelerated when member countries share the same or at least similar norms or ideologies. 
Under the democratic peace theory lens, it is held that democratic states are unlikely to cause 
conflict and can resolve disputes among themselves peacefully, because the effects of 
democracy will efficaciously come into play when encountering like-minded states. In relation 
to the political diversity in ASEAN, as mentioned previously, although some states have made 
efforts to establish democratic regimes, by and large, the association remains an autocratic 
club retaining authoritarian rule as the dominant type of governance. Consequently, Kant’s 
effects of democracy are very unlikely to produce a desirable outcome when placed in the 
context of ASEAN. By contrast, as discussed in Chapter 4, because in case of the EU candidate 
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countries have to meet the political condition of guaranteeing of democracy as stated in the 
Copenhagen Criteria, the positive outcome of peace and security, as predicted by Kant, is a 
reality. Furthermore, I discovered that the insights of intergovernmentalism can also provide a 
critical explanation. As suggested under this optic, the more diverse is the association in terms 
of national interests and ideological perspectives, the more difficult for the actors to reach a 
consensus. In terms of ASEAN, diversity manifests itself in the varying perspectives on 
democracy, which thus are impeding the progress of integration and the principle of non-
interference is a further barrier to the democratisation process.                        
Empirically, I will first begin by considering the essence of democracy itself. As described in the 
previous section, most of ASEAN’s citizens reside in authoritarian and repressive 
environments, where civil society and political freedom are largely limited. In this respect, 
Welzel (2009: 88) pointed out that ‘It is self-evident that democratisation is not an automatism 
that guides itself without agents. Instead, it is the outcome of intentional collective actions, 
involving strategies of power elites, campaigns of social movement activists, and mass 
participation’. Therefore, it is contended here that in order for bottom-up democratisation to 
function and thrive, favourable political and social conditions need to be in place, that can help 
in the fostering of progressive collective actions. The principal forces that can bring about this 
transformation are domestic, including institutions of non-governmental actors and civil 
society, which thus should be left unrestrained by the government. Moreover, according to 
Rahim (2000: 30), a system of checks and balances, the rule of law and principles of 
transparency and accountability need to be institutionalised and safeguarded. Referring back 
to the previous section, it has been seen that all states of ASEAN have been struggling to deal 
with these issues, particularly in the more intense authoritarian regimes where these problems 
have been completely ignored. Hence, it can be inferred that, with the principle of non-
interference, these sorts of things seem to be out of the reach of ASEAN’s mandate. In any 
case, ASEAN does not offer sufficient channels to its members for the participation of civil 
society and for addressing the need to align democratic values at the regional level.  
The second point to be made of an empirical nature is about the context and the original 
design of the organization. In Chapter 4, it was elicited that the design of the EU’s structures is 
based on a technocratic and functionalist approach, with its ideology being derived from the 
concept of Western democracy. That is, democracy is viewed as the force that facilitates and 
reinforces the functioning of the organization. Unlike the EU, according to one scholar, ASEAN 
is ‘designed to protect the rights of the member states, particularly their sovereignty’ and 
structured based on ‘a strong concern for state sovereignty, and narrow self-interests among 
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member states’ (Cockerham, 2010: 166, 168). Moreover, it is fully based on 
intergovernmentalism and lacks a supranational force to support and implement its decisions, 
with there being no sign that the latter structure is going to become a reality any time soon. 
An interview with the former Secretary General of ASEAN provided notable insights about the 
nature of Asian values and the incompatible context for a supranational power broker to be 
installed. He stated: 
‘It depends on the meaning of democratisation. If you say that democratisation means 
we should have Western liberal democratic ideal, I think we are still quite far away. If 
you think democratisation involves open government, transparent system, the 
accountability of authorities, freedom for the people who make choices and the rule of 
law, I think democratisation will be very important for ASEAN.’8  
In addition, a similar statement given by a Singaporean scholar also reflects that democracy is 
explained differently in the context of ASEAN:  
‘In ASEAN, democracy has historically been swept under the democratic carpet… If you 
look at the charter and official documents, the word ‘democracy’ is treated as 
orthodoxy. ASEAN only fulfils the aspects of economic, social and cultural rights which 
seem to be a positive fit to ASEAN.’9  
Therefore, along with Cockerham’s (2010: 184) conclusion made after his investigation of 
ASEAN agreements, here it is posited that the norms, traditional practices and preferences for 
state sovereignty will continue to be unfavourable to supranationalism and thus greatly limit 
the influence that it can have on democratisation and human rights in ASEAN. In other words, 
as asserted by Sukma (2009: 142), in this context this means ‘the democratisation of any 
member state can be accomplished only on that state’s own initiative’. 
The third issue for discussion is the high level of political diversity between member states that 
is proving to be a major obstacle for democratisation in ASEAN. As discussed previously, the 
political regimes in ASEAN span a wide spectrum ranging from electoral democracy to full-scale 
authoritarianism, with no genuine liberal democracy having emerged as yet. This was 
recognized by Paul (2010: 197) who stated that ‘Southeast Asian democratic culture is weak 
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and most political regimes are authoritarian and incompatible with each other’, which 
coincides with the viewpoint of one IR scholar:  
‘There are so many differences within each ASEAN national political system… So, if you 
take this kind of seemingly pro-civil and political right agenda (for example from 
Philippines’s standard) and you try to test it across the rest of ASEAN. You are not 
going to see political stability last after being implemented.’10  
Some other academics have also highlighted the adversity derived from the diverse regimes in 
ASEAN. For example, Sukma (2009: 143) illustrates this: 
‘In 2007, while Indonesia and the Philippines struggled to consolidate their 
fledgling democracies, Myanmar and Thailand were under military rule, 
although the junta in Bangkok had promised to restore democracy by the end of 
that year. Meanwhile, Malaysia and Singapore continued to offer successful 
models of soft authoritarianism. Vietnam and Laos were still basically Leninist 
states. Cambodia, despite talk of reform, was still an experiment in one-man 
rule.’   
Moreover, at interview, a senior director from Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed 
that one major problem for democratisation in ASEAN is the gap between member states in 
which significant differences can be seen in almost every aspect.11 When such political 
diversity and differences between regimes are acknowledged, then according to the nature of 
authoritarianism, non-democratic members are unlikely to accept any democratic reform 
proposed by more liberal members, which could potentially result in polarisation and 
subversion of the association’s unity.   
Fourth and finally, there is the question of the quality of democracy and political conditions in 
ASEAN member states. Regarding the few democratic members the quality of democracy still 
remains very problematic. This was commented by one scholar who wrote ‘democracy in the 
ASEAN countries is still nascent and fragile, it is hard for them to stand on solid ground as 
successful exemplars of that political choice’ (Sukma, 2009: 144). Indeed, there are so many 
entrenched problems, such as corruption, money and self-interest politics, social inequalities, 
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lack of accountability and transparency, electoral manipulation, executive abuses and weak 
political institutions continuing to weaken and undermine democracy. These can be seen 
commonly in the cases of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. One further major problem 
is patrimonialism, or alternatively known as the patron-client relationship, which is regarded as 
an important feature of Southeast Asian politics. Scott (1972: 92) defined patrimonialism as: 
‘an exchange relationship between roles … involving a largely instrumental 
friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his 
own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a 
person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general 
support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.’  
In the cases of Malaysia and Singapore, where the rule is under the dominance of a powerful 
single political party, as mentioned previously, civil liberty and freedom are restricted by 
repressive institutional and legal mechanisms that allow detention without trial and it is 
unlikely that civil society in these countries will develop to become a significant force in 
foreseeable future. This is supported by a Singaporean scholar, who said: 
‘It is not enough that all the remaining communist countries in ASEAN become 
democratic. The rest should also practise inner democratisation in term of advancing 
civil and political rights.’12  
On the whole, I am convinced that the prospects for democratisation remain out of ASEAN’s 
reach because of the incompletion and unevenness of the democratisation process, the 
inferior political conditions and the fact that several members still remain under authoritarian 
rules.  
Arguably, the essence of democracy (for example in relation to political freedom, participation 
of non-government actors and civil society and the principles of transparency and 
accountability) does not seem to fit in with the political environment, framework and norms in 
ASEAN. As Busse (1999: 56) proffered in his work, ‘democratisation is likely to weaken some 
features of the ASEAN Way and increase efforts to make politics more transparent and 
accountable’. The association itself does not have mandates and enforcing mechanisms and, 
without these instruments, I do not foresee how democracy can grow and prosper well once it 
has been put into action. Furthermore, although under democratic peace theory it is 
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contended that democracy can reduce the likelihood of war, unwillingly enforcing it onto 
ASEAN is likely to arouse suspicions and tensions among member states, which could 
consequently result in the undermining of the association’s unity and integration process. 
Similarly, Sukma (2009: 136) explained that on the one hand democracy is one way to attain 
and maintain security, whilst on the other hand, if it is imposed intrusively, it could also trigger 
tensions among members, which could be harmful to regional security. At the same time, the 
cardinal principle of non-interference, along with respect for state sovereignty, consensus-
building, consultation, non-binding rules and informal decision-making, have been created as 
the ‘by-products of the efforts of ASEAN leaders to deflect criticisms for their undemocratic 
practices.’ (Nem Singh, 2008: 144) As for ASEAN, I posit that democratisation within such 
confines, that lack opportunities for members to take on the role of critical friend regarding 
other states domestic affairs, is unlikely to make much progress and the integration is likely to 
stall.  
Nevertheless, the promotion of democracy has nowadays become an important international 
norm for guaranteeing freedom, fundamental rights and good governance around the world. 
Regarding which, the following was expressed by the Permanent Representative of Thailand to 
ASEAN: 
‘ASEAN has to walk along with other international communities. In order to maintain 
the cooperation, it is necessary that ASEAN members be encouraged to stay on the 
path of democracy’.13  
Another scholar opined:   
‘Of course, increasingly you (ASEAN) do not want to be recognized as a collection of 
undemocratic countries. It is not good field-image.’14  
Certainly, I think it is going to be too troublesome for ASEAN to resist such international 
pressure and to say no to a commitment to democracy. For instance, this can be seen in the 
case of EU-ASEAN free trade negotiation where failing to make a commitment to democracy 
has become a major obstacle to international relations and economic development.15       
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Notwithstanding the discordance between ASEAN and democracy, the fact cannot be denied 
that democracy is crucial for regional cooperation. Just looking at what has been examined 
previously in the case of the European Union, where regionalism was pioneered and has 
succeeded, democracy has played a key role in helping the union to achieve the goals of 
building a peaceful community and bringing prosperity. It has also effectively helped to 
legitimize the EU polity and empowering its administrative functions. Possibly as a result of this 
success, several of my interviewees raised the matter of democratisation in ASEAN. For 
instance, a scholar from RSIS commented that:  
‘The immediate benefit (of democratisation in ASEAN) would be that you can start 
addressing governance issues such as corruption, human rights and fighting against 
domestic and international crimes. It provides you with a broader approach towards 
security and governance.’16  
A Filipino scholar made the following points:  
‘It (democracy) will give a new stage of political integration… If you are democratic 
state, there are such norms that you observe. And if you are not able to have the 
system that allows for the observance of this norm, then it will be difficult to advance 
many of these goals’.17 
And some reflection from a Permanent Representative to ASEAN was that:  
‘Democratisation is useful because the development of ASEAN demands the 
participation from all involved parties and stakeholders. In turn, democracy will 
facilitate the involvement of more actors and the role of public opinion.’18 
Notably, Ambassador Ong Keng Yong who served as the Secretary-General of ASEAN from 
2003 to 2007 provided an additional perspective to this issue by giving the example of the 
Myanmar case:  
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‘It (democracy) is a good thing…because when Myanmar was under military 
dictatorship, it was difficult to socialize ourselves with the European activities and 
cooperation due to the strong pressure in Europe against such a form of government in 
Myanmar. Now the government in Myanmar has changed its form of governance. 
ASEAN fellow members feel that it has presented more economic opportunities and 
more credibility now for ASEAN to engage with other regional bodies’.19  
These corroborative accounts firmly uphold the importance of democracy to the development 
of ASEAN integration. 
4.6 Discussion and conclusion 
As stated in this chapter, the EU polity symbolises ‘security, consumer prosperity, company 
wealth, prestige and a clear break with the Soviets’ (Grossmann, 2006: 1). Guaranteeing of 
democracy, also human rights, the rule of law and protection of minorities, is respectfully 
promoted as a fundamental norm of the union and is a prerequisite for EU accession. This sort 
of political conditionality has been widely considered as one of the most effective strategies 
for democracy promotion. Therefore, this in a way ascertains that democracy is an essential 
composition of EU polity and has been historically and empirically embedded in its political 
system as well as its affiliated institutions. Furthermore, it plays a vital role in the legitimacy of 
the EU and empowers its administrative functions. However, in term of generalisation, it could 
be argued that the EU’s individuality, and idea of democracy, has been shaped by its historical, 
intellectual and geographical contexts. Nevertheless, although democracy is viewed as a 
crucial element for the EU and it is perceived that every country who wishes to join the union 
needs to be democratised to a satisfactory level, it does not imply that other integrating 
regions have to look at the EU as a model to pursue. This is because the concept of democracy 
is somewhat specific to a region. Each region has different historical and cultural 
characteristics and has grown up from different regional contexts. Indeed, the democratisation 
strategies designed by and used in the EU may function properly under specific conditions and 
may not function in different settings. 
For ASEAN, holding back liberal democracy seems to be a critical issue that has determined the 
continuation of the association, for it is a sensitive issue avoided by its political leaders who do 
not like hearing about it. According to this investigation, explicit commitments to democracy 
promotion so far have not been witnessed in ASEAN. However, evidence has been found that 
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democracy is crucial for the development of ASEAN integration in the long run, particularly in 
helping to improve its international image and credibility as well as allowing for the 
participation of all involved parties. Nevertheless, due to the vast political diversity and the 
remaining authoritarian forces in the region, imposing democracy onto the association is 
unfeasible because it goes against its chief tenets of non-interference, respect for national 
sovereignty and consensus-based decision making. Therefore, the delivery of democracy is a 
key consideration for ASEAN which can be divided into three key aspects. First, as argued 
previously, ASEAN as an organization can do little to promote democracy owing to the lack of 
any mandate as well as there being no intention and commitment by the political leaders. As 
long as the association remains constrained by the principle of non-interference, any top-down 
democratisation approach is highly unlikely to occur. Based on the belief that sustainable 
democracy should come from within, I posit that ASEAN should make best use of its existing 
powers and mechanisms to facilitate and encourage bottom-up democratic reform. For 
instance, according to Acharya (2003: 388), this can be achieved by moving towards a more 
participatory community, strengthening identity so as to make people feel attached and 
wanting to get involved in ASEAN as well as being more responsive to the demands of the civil 
society. This would help ASEAN to legitimize its activities, resulting in its fortunes being less 
determined by the personal preferences of leaders and more by the rule of law. Although such 
a strategy will face with many challenges, if these can be addressed, this will deliver a long-
term contribution to democratisation and hence deeper regional cooperation across Southeast 
Asia.  
Second, democratisation in ASEAN will need to be carried out little by little as an incremental 
process. Regarding this, Paul (2010: 188) stated that democratisation in ASEAN is unlikely to 
happen in the near future, because it requires the active participation of citizens in the process 
as well as the emergence of shared political culture among people, which guarantees the 
protection of their political and civil rights. This perspective has also been strongly supported 
by an Indonesian scholar, who has contended that democracy should be a long run goal with 
democratic values being introduced into the region as an incremental process (Sukma, 2009: 
136). That is, according to this author, each state should undertake this at its own pace driven 
by its own political will and thus, should be a bottom-up, not a top-down process (ibid). In 
addition to backing the incremental process of ASEAN democratisation, a scholar from RSIS 
notably depicted ASEAN as follows:  
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‘ASEAN is like a train that has ten different carriages and the links between carriages 
are not strong yet. So, if you move too fast, those links will break apart’.20  
Last, this researcher is in accordance with view that the rule of non-intervention should 
remain, because it importantly keeps ASEAN ongoing, but that it should be rigorously 
redefined or reinterpreted in a way that make it less rigid, in particular allowing member states 
to discuss issues and problems in a transparent way, without fear of negative responses. For 
ASEAN, democracy will neither play a peace-making role nor be a driver of regional integration 
as long as the current interpretation of the principle of non-interference continues to allow for 
the complete shielding of the national sovereignty of member states. If this remains the case, 
then peace and regional cooperation in the region will keep relying on the relationships 
between the countries’ leaders and their willingness to coordinate and accommodate 
regionally. That is, ASEAN’s fortunes will continue to be determined by the elites, suspicions 
between countries will  remain and civil and political rights will only be granted in countries 
where certain levels of freedom are permitted, which would result in the prospects for 
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5 IDENTITY IN ASEAN 
5.1 Introduction 
In the past few decades, collective identity at the regional level has gained attention from 
scholars and the public as a way to boost support for regional integration. It has been 
increasingly demanding since the EU recently started to experience scepticism and various 
internal problems. As elicited in Chapter 3, constructivists argue that identity is socially and 
historically constructed through socializing and systemic interaction at the regional level and, 
in turn, identity helps to shape states’ actions and interests. Also, as explained in Chapter 4, 
identity is crucial for the development of European integration and plays a key role in the 
participation of citizens. However, the case of the EU demonstrates sophisticated relationships 
and conflicts between regional and national identities as well as showing some sorts of ties 
between collective identity and economic benefits. In the context of ASEAN, the popular 
notion of ‘elite organisation’ implies that the existence of identity can be found mainly only at 
the state level in which such common values are shared only among elites, diplomats and 
technocrats. The data contained in this chapter demonstrates that the principles of ASEAN way 
as the revered norms of the association have greatly shaped the means of multilateralism and 
how its states have interacted with one another. At the citizen level, there seems to be a very 
limited sense of collective identity among ordinary citizens, which is perhaps because ASEAN 
does not influence their daily lives and has never been away from elitist arrangements. So, 
people do not realize the benefits of this regional grouping and see no need to participate in 
its activities. This is where ASEAN currently has great deficits and it is probably why it has not 
been able to move forward to achieve deeper integration. 
This chapter begins with the European perspectives on identity and then provides an overview 
of how Southeast Asia has been transformed from a competing field of colonial powers into an 
independent and definable region and the role of ASEAN in its construction. Then, it moves on 
to the main findings of this chapter that seek to examine and explain the existence of 
collective identity as well as the determining factors that are involved in identity formation, 
both at the state and citizen levels. The final section provides further discussion, a summary of 
important findings and suggestions for solutions to the problems.    
5.2 European perspectives 
The issue of European identity has been an ongoing discussion in Europe, particularly during 
the past two decades. Since the 1990s, there have been several major debates about the EU, 
such as the functionality of its institutions, its common policies, the calling for more EU 
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involvement, migration and border controls, the legitimacy of EU institutions and institutional 
reform. However, Mayer and Palmowski (2004: 574) pointed out that the issue of a common 
identity has become one of the most striking issues that the EU is facing today as it presents 
the disconnection between ‘the accelerated drive for integration and the manifest absence of 
a popular European will’. Furthermore, they continued to argue that the issue of European 
identity was actually accentuated by the constitutional convention and thus it demands a 
greater extent of scholars’ attention (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 575). Assuredly, apart from 
the tasks to promote democracy in the region and to create a solid institutional structure, 
attracting Europeans’ attention on crucial issues, increasing its reputation and credibility in 
European’s eyes as well as promoting European common values are other key accountability 
issues for the EU. 
Regarding identity in academic discourse, the main problem seems to be the contradiction 
between its nature and the terms in the public and academic debate, for example, in the 
propaganda discourse, it does not really exist (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 576). However, 
many sociologists have discovered that identities play an important role and have thus been a 
persistent concern of the sociological discipline right from the outset, particularly the social 
identities rooted in the sense of community and society (Macdonald, 1990: 7-11). In general, 
identities are defined as meanings or values which are understood as being the distinctiveness 
of an object or a person. A sense of belonging can be socially constructed through 
communication, interaction, cultural myths and common experiences. Furthermore, identities 
require recognition and acceptance both from among members and from outsiders in which 
similarities are constantly constructed depending on the size and nature of the group (Mayer 
and Palmowski, 2004: 577). Thus, it should be noted that the nature of groups or boundaries is 
highly substantive for the formation and articulation of identities due to the involvement of 
the processes of inclusion and exclusion.  
A consideration of multiple identities, such as in a multi-tier international organization like the 
EU, provides some interesting insights. Regarding which, Schlenka (2007: 9) depicted identities 
as with the Russian Matruska dolls, whereby they should be conceived of as one inside the 
next. She explained that ‘An individual commits oneself to one dominant group identity and 
subordinates other identities in a hierarchical manner to this one… the more abstract the 
dominant identity is the more it can nest other identities’. She concluded that this model of 
identity is institutionalized in the concept of European citizenship, that is, all citizenship of EU 
members should be considered spontaneously synonymous with being a European citizen. In 
addition, it has been contended that identities sometimes can be overlapping. In this case, 
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Brewer (2001: 122) illustrated that the shared in-group identity will be either enlarged to 
include all involved members or include only those who have the overlapping memberships in 
common, while if the multiple identities are not in conflict with each other, they will be limited 
by the time and attention that individuals can contribute to different groups. In most cases, 
multiple identities in a large pluralistic community can result in both increased stability and 
increasing factionalism of the group, thus relying on their careful management (Brewer, 2001: 
123). 
What about some common perceptions regarding the antagonism between national and 
European identities? According to the literature, it is no longer surprising that individuals can 
possess multiple identities as people can feel being a part of both Europe and their respective 
nations at the same time. On the one hand, several studies such as those of Usherwood (2002) 
and Carey (2002), confirmed that national identity can have a significant negative impact on 
the promotion of regional identity. Whilst another group of scholars, including Herrmann, 
Risse-Kappen and Brewer (2004), found evidence that national identity and European identity 
can work in tandem; both can be strong at the same time and they reinforce each other. This 
situation can be found in several pro-European countries where people strongly identify 
themselves with their nations as well as with Europe, such as: Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium. On the whole, a conclusive statement about the relationship between multiple 
identities is that, firstly, various identities can be nested in a single collective identity if there is 
not too much contradiction and, secondly, ‘the European polity does not require a demos that 
replaces a national with a European identity, but one in which national and European identities 
coexist and complement each other’ (Schlenker, 2007: 32-33).           
In relation to identity in the context of EU and how it contributes to the development of a 
European identity, a number of EU initiatives have been created since the enforcement of the 
Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 in order to make progress and achieve this goal of the integration 
project. Significant steps in this direction that have been witnessed are the introduction of a 
single currency, the EU constitution and cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs. 
Moreover, a large number of promotional messages and projects have been launched to 
improve people’s perception of EU institutions and their responsibilities. These aimed to 
remove people’s nationalist sentiments and convince them that the EU is tied by some sense 
of common agreements, understanding and recognition based on shared historical and 
cultural features (Valentini, 2005: 197). However, the situations in Denmark, Sweden and the 
UK, for example, after the introduction of the single currency, revealed that they totally 
opposed the idea. Indeed, the EU’s reputation in these countries is very low, compared to 
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other member states, because people are largely sceptical towards its development, not 
wishing to participate further in the integration scheme. These represent clear cases of how 
the economic situation and strong national identity can combine to overcome the integrating 
force and thus ‘where image, identity and reputation do not correspond positively to each 
other’ (ibid).  
 
Figure 5.1: Turnout in European elections by country, 2009 
Source: (European Movement, 2009) 
Moreover, one significant factor that confirms the declining trend in European identity is the 
low rate of participation in the recent parliamentary elections. The turnout rate of European 
elections is regularly used as an indicator of the popularity or image of the EU in the eyes of its 
citizens. According to Figure 5.1, the turnout in the European elections of 2009 varied greatly 
from the highest (90.8%) in Luxembourg to the lowest (19.6%) in Slovakia, with an average of 
43% of EU citizens turning out to vote. Firstly, it should be noted that voting in the two highest 
rate countries (Luxembourg and Belgium) is compulsory and failing to do so can result in a fine. 
So, in essence the Maltese should be considered as having highest participatory rate. Notably, 
the turnout was very low in the six former communist countries (Slovenia, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia), which suggests their lack of engagement with the 





Figure 5.2: Aggregate turnout in European elections, 1979 – 2009  
Source: (Eurosocialist, 2009) 
Furthermore, Figure 5.2 demonstrates the turnout rate over the last seven European elections 
and clearly this has gradually declined from about 62% in 1979 to 43% in 2009, while the union 
has grown larger from 9 to 27 member states. These figures really challenge the democratic 
legitimacy that the EU’s elites have been trying to promote amongst its citizens. What is more, 
the Special Eurobarometer 320 (2009: 27) reported that of those who did not turn out to vote,  
‘lack of trust or dissatisfaction with politics’ was the most frequently given reason for 
abstention (28%), while ‘lack of interest in politics and 'voting does not change anything' came 
second quite a long way behind (17%). In sum, these data indicate that the EU policy makers 
still have a lot more to do regarding the electoral process and, perhaps more importantly, the 
creation of a European identity, which has credibility in the eyes of the vast majority of 
European citizens. 
Apart from the turnout rate, the Eurobarometer, a favourite source for EU researchers, 
published a variety of reports regarding European identity and the sense of belonging to the 
community. In general, according to the Special Eurobarometer 346 (2011: 95), 53% of 
Europeans felt they belonged to the EU, while it was reported by the Standard Eurobarometer 
75 (2011: 51) that 62% of the Europeans think of themselves as citizens of the EU,  with this 
sentiment being particularly strong in: Luxembourg, Slovakia, Finland, Germany, Malta, Poland 
and Ireland. Furthermore, the survey continued by asking respondents about the most 
important elements that they felt gave them a European identity. 36% and 32% agreed that 
the euro and democratic values were the most important element of European identity, 
respectively, followed by geography (22%), common culture (22%) and common history (17%), 
and only 3% of the participants did not recognize any feature relating to a European identity 
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(Special Eurobarometer 346, 2011: 96). In general, in terms of a sense of belonging to the 
community, the data indicate that the majority of EU citizens feel attached to the union and 
can recognize, to some degree, their EU identity. However, a relatively large number of EU 
citizens continued to distrust the EU, thus failing to give their support to its operations. Clearly, 
a major task that still remains for the EU and its policy makers is creating a positive image that 
will convince sceptics that it has their interests at heart.        
As can be seen, the survey data confirm that both national and European identities continue to 
coexist in EU polity, but how important are these different identities to the EU and should it be 
creating or promoting such differences? It has been argued that a solid sense of identity can 
benefit the EU in various ways. Firstly, the EU commissioners are aware that the absence of 
emotional attachment to the union as well as the blurred European geographical borders have 
been undermining the legitimacy of the EU and so they have been working hard to promote 
European identity and public awareness (Weiler, 1999: 329). That is, a massive amount of 
money has been spent on investing in constructing European values and social cohesion. The 
well-known slogans of ‘Unity in Diversity’ and ‘Ever Closer Union’ have become the important 
goals of the EU, for as it is stated in the Treaty of Rome the goal is to ‘lay the foundations for 
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ (Shore, 2004: 33). Valentini (2005: 11) 
contended that unification among members would guarantee them an equal distribution of 
common benefits that are not provided at the national level, which are related to the creation 
of a larger or greater community, such as: peace, economic prosperity and social protection.     
Next, there is the matter of the notion that democracy will fully work at the European level 
only when a collective common values exist. In this respect, Sánchez-Cuenca (2000: 166) 
argued that in agreeing to make collective decisions at the European level if individuals do not 
recognize themselves as members of the community, ‘then democratic rule appears to 
become an imposition, a non-consented procedure for those who do not consider themselves 
part of the collectivity’. Similarly, ‘the creation of a supranational democracy is only possible 
when citizens from different member states share a sense of being involved in a common 
project and forming part of a single community’ (Valentini, 2005: 12). Thus, identity and 
citizens’ support for the union is a precondition for EU legitimacy and the functioning of 
democracy at supranational level. Finally, it should be noted that there is a considerable gap in 
the degree of enthusiasm for the EU between the political elites and mass publics, for a 
substantial number surveys have exhibited far less enthusiasm among the latter than the 
former. Although these data collections were not aimed at evaluating European identity, as 
long as the public continues to be lukewarm about the EU, this implies that the EU elites will 
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still face difficulties claiming legitimacy and consent for their policy programmes (Risse, 2001: 
6). 
Similar to democracy as discussed in the previous chapter, it emerges that supranational 
democracy is directly related to identity, because sufficient levels of collective values play a 
vital role in ensuring the EU’s legitimacy. That is, as long as people do not recognize 
themselves as Europeans and do not feel genuinely attached to the supranational polity, it is 
difficult for democracy at the supranational level to be realized. As Schmitter (2000: 45) has 
argued, common identity or shared values could assist the EU, by guiding institutional and 
political action so as to achieve democratic legitimacy of the union. That is, democratisation 
attempts without the promotion of a collective identity and raising people’s motivation in 
support for EU projects would prove fruitless. Furthermore, such efforts would be even more 
effective if accompanied by increasing political participation of individuals as well as openness 
and transparency involving more actors and particularly, those who have been excluded 
(Schmitter, 2000: 29).  
In turning from the European experience to the Southeast Asian experience, we can again 
observe at the outset that the conditions for identity dynamics in ASEAN are radically different 
from those in Europe.  As we will see below, ASEAN is often seen as having a much weaker 
regional identity than Europe.  Firstly, Europe has a much longer history as a self-identified 
region – even if not instutionalised until relatively recently.  Secondly, the level of ethnic, and 
religious diversity in ASEAN is much higher than in Europe.  Yet, while Southeast Asia has 
experienced episodes of violence and conflict over its history from pre-colonial days until the 
modern era, it has never seen the kind of region-wide conflict that engulfed Europe twice in 
the twentieth century.  Moreover, the shared experience of colonialism for much of the region 
could plausibly form the basis of collective identity, as it indisputably has in Indonesia. Hence, 
there is no a priori reason to discount the possibility of identity playing an important role in 
ASEAN integration. 
5.3 Background of identity in ASEAN: Southeast Asia as a region 
Southeast Asia has a relatively short history which has been punctuated by a sustained period 
of conflict. After the end of colonisation period, newly-independent states that had been 
plagued by a long-standing grievance against colonial rule began to build up their nations and 
strove to manage to remain non-aligned from the influences of competing external powers. At 
that time the recognition of Southeast Asia as a definable region was not widespread. 
Regarding this, as Roberts (2011: 378) explained, ‘the construction of Southeast Asia can also 
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be considered to be a recent phenomenon because, prior to independence from colonialism, 
there was no concept of a region or regional identity’. The vast diversity of the region with 
people from a rich variety of backgrounds somehow demonstrates the absence of cultural 
homogeneity in Southeast Asia. This can be seen, for example, in the context of language and 
ethnicity. Fuller (2000: 307) pointed out that while the population of Southeast Asia accounts 
for only 9% of the world’s population, Southeast Asian people speak about 17% of its 
languages. For instance, Indonesia alone has about 250 languages for a population inhabiting 
6000 islands (Roberts, 2011: 370). Moreover, geographically, Southeast Asia is divided into two 
dissimilar sub-regions, mainland and maritime, regarding which there is no homogeneity in 
terms of culture, ethnicity and religion in each sub-region or even in a single country. One key 
consequence of this diversity can be seen in the fact that most scholars identify themselves as 
either national or subnational specialists, which as Roberts (2011: 370) has argued is as a result 
of the wide cultural span. 
On the other hand, a number of scholars have contended that the origin of Southeast Asia 
cannot only be traced by the recognition of an independent region, but also owing to cultural 
similarities, patterns of interstate relations, interactions and interdependence (Acharya, 2000: 
164). Despite geographical features, such as a tropical climate and some common agricultural 
products, such as rice, these countries also share some cultural traits, such as animism and 
they blend animistic beliefs and practices with their local religions. This was, for example, 
explained by Phillips (2009: 59), who pointed out that animism is strong in Southeast Asia, 
particularly in those countries where the beliefs in spirits influence ‘the thinking that people 
have about nature, ancestors, illness and community’. Moreover, the political culture in 
Southeast Asia is also an important concern and has had a significant impact on regional 
identity. Blondel and Inoguchi (2006: 94-96) wrote that geography, colonisation and the 
emphasis on superiority of ‘Asian values’ are the factors affecting the socio-political 
characteristics of Southeast Asia.  
In addition, Goh (2003: 114-115) wrote about the characteristics of Southeast Asia’s politics as 
being critical factors, arguing that, to a large extent, the political culture found is ‘personalistic, 
informal and non-contractual’. Moreover, after gaining independence from decolonization, 
Southeast Asia’s polity has been transformed into being ever more bureaucratic. Despite the 
existence and functioning of political institutions, the states were, by and large, ruled by small 
elite circles operating on the basis of patronage networks, which resulted in their political 
culture being highly private and informal (Busse, 1999: 48). Such cultural practices could be 
seen at the regional level where most of the past conflicts were resolved through means of 
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personal contacts and lobbying between political leaders.  Furthermore, as presented in the 
previous chapter, political culture in Southeast Asian countries has been characterised by 
many entrenched problems, such as money and self-interest politics, patrimonialism, 
corruption as well as lack of accountability and transparency. After taking everything into 
account, despite some commentators’ views, it is relatively clear that Southeast Asian 
countries do share some degrees of common values and practices. However, with no obvious 
region-wide identity as can be found in the Middle East, Western Europe and Latin America, 
the differences clearly outweigh the similarities, thus supporting the contention that Southeast 
Asia is considered as one of the most diverse regions on earth (Weatherbee and Emmers, 
2005: 11). I would argue that this identifies the key problem that ASEAN is currently facing in 
trying to establish cooperation and a regional community, for there is very little common 
ground in terms of identity amongst the nations of the region. 
Then, how has ASEAN worked with the diverse populations to form a regional identity? With 
the exception of Timor-Leste, it has been admitted that the current membership of ASEAN fits 
with what has become generally accepted as Southeast Asia, although the nature of its 
evolution remains contested (Roberts, 2011: 367). Minh (2011: 27) explained that Southeast 
Asia has developed regional patterns and characteristics through its international relations and 
interactions, which have helped to forge its regional identity. In line with this, it is contended 
here that ASEAN has played an important role in constructing and shaping region-building, 
thus contributing to the definition of what constitutes Southeast Asia today, in particular, in 
making it appear distinct to external perceptions. Furthermore, the notion of work in progress 
is backed by Acharya (2005: 104) who took the view that the international politics of Southeast 
Asia prior to 1997 showed apparent evidence of ‘identity-in-the-making’, rather than ‘identity 
in being’. While there were not many differences between South Asia and Southeast Asia, he 
explained that the attempt to make the latter recognized as a region began when delegates 
from Southeast Asia rejected attaching themselves too closely with the Indian and Chinese 
regional frameworks at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi. Subsequently, 
according to the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN’s founding document carries a sign of identity 
building, as can be seen in the following:  
“Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, 
freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good 
understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation among the countries 
of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture” 
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      Bangkok Declaration, 1967 
After its foundation, although the Bangkok Declaration stated that ASEAN ‘is open for 
participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned 
aims, principles and purposes’, its members turned down a number of membership requests 
from countries, such as Sri Lanka, India and Australia, based on the grounds that they lacked 
certain features that could be attributed to Southeast Asia. Consequently, in almost every 
subsequent important document, identity building was always listed as one of the main 
purposes of ASEAN. For instance, according to Article 1 of the ASEAN Charter, one of the 
purposes is ‘to promote an ASEAN identity through fostering of greater awareness of the 
diverse culture and heritage of the region’. Similarly, as stated in the ASEAN Vision 2020 
presented at the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, one of the important statements is written 
as ‘we envision the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an ASEAN community conscious of its 
ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional identity’. 
However, this seems to be an incomplete task because it does not indicate what is considered 
as this common regional identity and how it will be achieved. 
5.4 ASEAN as a collective identity 
The literature on regional integration tends to focus more on political and economic aspects of 
interactions among member states within this process, and less on the social issues relating to 
the ideational force that ties citizens from diverse historical and cultural background into a 
wider regional entity, or the politics of identity formation. A review of the literature reveals 
that there is the lack of a well-established study of regional identity that explains its 
importance and impact, as well as providing answers to questions relating to such matters as 
the disharmony between national and regional identity. As referenced in Chapter 3, Brewer 
explained that identity is constructed by ‘the opposing forces of two universal human motives: 
the need for inclusion and assimilation and the need for differentiation from others’ (Brewer, 
1999: 188). Nonetheless, in the context of regional integration, identity is understood as a 
creation of meaning and regional integration process is viewed as a socializing structure that 
shapes actors’ identity and interests. In association with Wendt (1999: 231) and Copeland 
(2000: 190), constructivists argue that the regional integration process helps states to gain 
meaning and identity by defining ‘who they are, their goals and the roles they believe they 
should play’. Thus, states that have been already defined themselves and have gained identity 
through domestic and cultural contexts will be redefined or constrained again when they go 
out to interact at the regional level through systemic international interaction. In summary, as 
enlightened by constructivist perspectives, this researcher is convinced that identity plays a 
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crucial role in providing an explanation for state actions, including regarding individuals who 
act on behalf of the state, and the foundations of state interests, whereby a sense of belonging 
can be socially constructed through communication, interaction, cultural myths and common 
experiences.                               
Furthermore, according to Mayer and Palmowski (2004: 577), as outlined in Chapter 4, identity 
building requires recognition and acceptance both from among members as well as from 
outsiders. That is, due to the highly involved processes of inclusion and exclusion, the 
boundaries and nature of groups are very important for the formation and articulation of 
identity. With respect to the competing roles of national and regional identity, EU literatures 
and empirical data have revealed that these can coexist and be strong in that people can feel 
being a part of both Europe and their respective nations, which is a condition found in several 
pro-European countries. Regarding this, the EU has been trying hard to promote and improve 
people’s perception of the union by launching promotional messages and projects aimed at 
convincing the masses that member states are tied by some sense of: common agreement, 
understanding and recognition. As a result, although a relatively large number of citizens still 
distrust and do not support the integration scheme, as the data in Chapter 4 has shown, a 
majority of EU citizens, to some degree, feel attached to the union and can recognize some EU 
aspects of identity, such as the euro and democratic values. In sum, as elicited in Chapter 4, 
identity has emerged as being a crucial factor in the development of European integration, 
because it provides a platform for its policies and activities as well as also giving its citizens 
participatory motivation, a sense of unity and a notion of brotherhood, albeit some do not 
want to have a community identity. 
In the context of ASEAN, empirically, for this research it was found that a majority of 
discussions on norms refer to the elements of the ‘ASEAN Way’ as reflecting its identity. For 
example, one interviewee stated that: 
“Well, it is not unique to ASEAN, but I think the ten Southeast Asian countries share 
some core principles. Those are the principles that you find in the UN Charter as well, 
non-interference, non-use of force and respect for national sovereignty”21 
Also, a Filipino scholar who used to work as a Director at the ASEAN Secretariat office in 
Jakarta point out: 
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“There is a notion of ASEAN if you are looking at the official level, all these gestures 
about the ASEAN Way… insistence on observance of ASEAN practices would be an 
indication that there is in fact already that ‘We Feeling’ within ASEAN”22 
In fact, the ASEAN Way is a set of fundamental principles adopted among member states as a 
means of diplomacy and multilateralism. Acharya (2001: 63) defined it as ‘a process of regional 
interactions and cooperation based on discreteness, informality, consensus building and non-
confrontational bargaining styles’. That is, these principles are respect for national sovereignty, 
non-interference in internal affairs, settlement of disputes in a peaceful manner and 
renunciation of the threat or use of force. Solidum (1981: 136) emphasized that the most 
important of these values was perhaps the use of ‘very low-key diplomacy (which) avoids 
fanfare before an agreement is reached’. This sort of manner is used to avoid interstate 
conflicts and disunity and is thus seen as a crucial element that keeps the association thriving, 
for it has been instrumental in helping ASEAN to become, as Beeson (2008: 16) put it, ‘the 
most enduring organization of its sort to have emerged from the developing world’. 
Nevertheless, regarding its perceived norms and identity, I discovered that the ASEAN Way is 
largely recognized only among the elites and technocrats. This can be seen in the work of Goh 
(2003: 115) for example, who wrote about the time when ASEAN held the pre-APEC Business 
Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1998. The US Vice President Al Gore criticised Malaysia’s policies 
for the dismissal and subsequent incarceration of that country’s Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar 
Ibrahim. However, ASEAN members considered his message to be unsympathetic and uncaring 
as well as an aggressive imposition of American democratic values on the politics of one of its 
own. Subsequently, ASEAN diplomats gathered to stress their adherence to the ASEAN Way as 
a cardinal doctrine of their political identity. This example shows that collective identity does 
exist as common values will be expressed or come out when this faith was challenged by 
others, although it has not been proved so far that this sort of expression could happen 
beyond the elite and technocrat levels. 
In detailed analysis of ASEAN’s collective identity for this work, different layers emerged, such 
that it was considered insightful to divide the discussion into two levels, namely the: state and 
citizen levels. This was due to the considerable differences in the development of collective 
identity discovered between the two levels, which were not apparent in the case of the EU. 
That is, ASEAN is widely recognized as an elitist organisation which lacks involvement or 
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participation from civilian sectors. As a consequence, there is a substantial gap in identity 
building between the groups of political leaders, deputies and technocrats, and those from the 
grassroots organisations as well as ordinary citizens. At the state level, it was observed that the 
concept of identity consistent with a constructivist stance, because this is able to provide 
insights into the formation of identity in ASEAN and the actions of states. Regarding this, in 
one of his prominent works, Wendt (1994: 389-390) made some important observations about 
the formation of collective identity among a group of states, claiming that through increased 
interdependence and transnational convergence of domestic values, a collective identity is 
formed at the international level. Extending this, Adler (2006: 102) pointed out that 
interaction, communication and socialization are salient for the emergence of new 
intersubjective knowledge in the form of new rules, social structures or new processes. In the 
context of ASEAN, Busse (1999: 45) opined that collective identity implies that states identify 
themselves and their interests with each other which may lead to the development of a feeling 
of community. In research it has been elicited that although the development path of ASEAN 
has recently been slowed, the primary concern of ASEAN integration is still always peace and 
security. This can be seen, for instance, in the statements laid down in the Bangkok Declaration 
and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, wherein it is indicated that a strict behavioural norm 
of ASEAN is the avoidance of conflict. However, tension could arise anytime and this is why its 
members continue to spend substantial sums on improving and upgrading their armed forces. 
Thus showing that antagonism among ASEAN countries is something deep inside that has 
never gone away. In spite of this, since the establishment of the grouping there has been no 
large-scale war, or planning for such an event, against a fellow member. This is witnessed by 
the fact that Article 13 to 17 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation concerning a peaceful 
settlement of any arising disputes23 has never been invoked by the calling of a meeting of the 
High Council. That is, despite some emerging conflicts among members, most of them were 
resolved by low-key diplomacy and informal practices between political leaders. In this 
researcher’s view, this shows a positive evidence of the construction of norms and the 
existence of a collective identity owing to a heightened level of trust among members.      
Through dynamic international interaction over time, the degree of interdependence and 
convergence between ASEAN members has increased. As a consequence, ASEAN states, 
including individuals who represent or act on behalf of these, have begun to develop a feeling 
of togetherness and that they share a common fate. Recently, they have started to promote 
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these norms to the outside world and to express their shared values as a collective identity. 
This can be explained by Wendt’s (1994: 289) stance that ‘dependency, whether 
intersubjective or material, is a key determinant of the extent to which an actor’s identity is 
shaped by interaction’. It also coincides with the viewpoint of one interviewee who argued: 
“I see identity as something that evolves as we do things together as we work together. 
And then as this evolves it can have a positive feedback loop into the whole integration 
process. So, it is a loop thing… as soon as you build more common values, then you 
come to share more similar idea and values. Then, the level of trust will be increased 
and, with the increased trust, it is easier for the integration process to proceed.”24 
From a slightly different perspective but also underlining this line of reasoning, another 
interviewee said: 
“ASEAN Way is something created for an instrumental reason that is projected to the 
rest of the world… It is something they rely on. It is something they find useful. This is 
the way ASEAN works (no matter they feel that). There are so many things that ASEAN 
needs to cooperate about and if we start messing it up by moving away from the 
ASEAN way, commenting on internal affairs and interfering, that will break up ASEAN… 
So, we cannot afford to deviate from the ASEAN way.”25 
From this researcher’s perspective, if Wendt’s viewpoint is taken into consideration, the 
ASEAN way will increasingly be seen as the norms of the organisation that reflect a collective 
identity shared among its member countries and their political elites at the regional level. That 
is, it could be considered as being a by-product of the regional integration process, being 
formed and very much influenced by the political leaders’ experience, knowledge, beliefs and 
values. Moreover, it gives meaning to actions as well as shaping the group and individual 
state’s foreign policies. 
According to the current investigation, ASEAN’s response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 
1978 perhaps is a good case for reflecting the formation of collective identity as well as how 
the organisation’s norms were able to influence the policies of the member states. By way of 
explanation, in order to respond to the Vietnamese aggression, Busse (1999: 48-51) pointed 
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out that ASEAN had a few options to choose from. The first was to ignore the situation and 
stay neutral, which was deemed sensible by the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore who 
were not stakeholders in the conflict as the war had no direct impact on their security. The 
second choice was to form a military alliance against Vietnam, which would also have been 
beneficial to ASEAN, particularly in safeguarding the validity of its norms and providing 
additional security to a fellow member, namely, Thailand as a frontline state. In the end, the 
existence of the ASEAN norms directed the decision to adopt a third option. Seeing that the 
building up of a military alliance was too provocative and that the revered norms should be 
preserved, ASEAN decided to use its favoured style of diplomatic campaigning against 
Vietnam, through informal practice as well as personal communication between leaders. To 
some degree, this was productive because, on the one hand, it demonstrated the reiteration 
and validity of its norms, and on the other hand, it avoided the confrontation which could 
possibly have led to a widespread war. In sum, this case underlines the regional political 
culture and ASEAN’s adherence to procedural norms of the Association. 
In this context, it is also important to consider the South China Sea disputes as exemplars of 
ASEAN’s norms and collective identity. Investigation of this for this thesis, unearthed 
significant implications in relation to Thailand’s response to the South China Sea territorial 
dispute. Regarding this, Thailand having centuries-old extraordinary relations with China has 
been widely seen as a broker, between its ASEAN fellow members and China in this territorial 
conflict. Considering alone Thai national interests and individual bilateral relations with all the 
involved parties, the relationship, both economic and political, with China seems to be much 
more important than with the Philippines or Vietnam and hence it would be detrimental 
Thailand’s interests if were to sacrifice these valuable relations by allowing it neighbours’ 
conflict with China to escalate. However, Thailand responded to the situation quite 
uncommonly. It stood up along with other ASEAN fellow members against the Chinese 
occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995, a maritime feature claimed by the Philippines.26 Also, as a 
broker or mediator for the conflict, in general, Thailand has dealt with such situations quite 
neutrally, but constantly reiterating calls for a peaceful resolution, which as explained above is 
one of ASEAN’s norms, and unity amongst members. This can be seen in a speech given at the 
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45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2012 by the Thai Foreign Minister Surapong Tovichakchaikul. 
He noted that: 
“(ASEAN and China) should build trust and a win-win situation… (As the ASEAN 
Dialogue Coordinator for China) Thailand will try its best towards this end. We will push 
ahead with concrete implementation of the DOC, while ensuring the COC drafting 
process that is inclusive and comfortable for all sides. We must get it right from the 
start…. ASEAN should have a positive influence on regional and international issues; 
ASEAN needs to speak more with one voice. Our collective voice does matter 
internationally. Unity would enhance credibility and centrality in the regional 
architecture.”27  
Notably, Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, opined that the problem of the 
South China Sea disputes was a concern for all ASEAN countries as it could destabilise the 
region. He stated: 
“We must have an ASEAN outlook… on the matter. It is self-evident whenever ASEAN 
speaks with one voice we are able to maintain our centrality and ensure that we deliver 
results… The situation on the ground at sea is showing signs of concern for all of us. We 
have been following what has been transpiring. All those developments reinforce the 
need to get the COC concluded as soon as possible. (If there is no progress on the COC) 
the situation will become more destabilizing. (This is) not in our common interest.”28  
These kinds of statements manifest the emergence of togetherness, the elements of the 
ASEAN Way and the notion that its member states, to be more specific the political leaders 
and technocrats, are tied by: common principles, interests and values.     
In brief, it is contended that the ASEAN Way, inherently, has been playing a substantial role in 
shaping ideas, decisions and action at the state level. After members have recognized that they 
belong to the group, the feeling of togetherness and construction of identity have begun to be 
developed through the sharing of certain principles or values, or the sense that members feel 
they have something important in common. The case of the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict posed 
a threat to regional peace and security, which led to the demand for an instant response and 
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mutual commitment towards this by ASEAN. Similarly, the unresolved disputes of the South 
China Sea signal that these are going to pose a major security concern for a number of ASEAN 
members, regarding which, high expectations have been placed on ASEAN to come up with a 
viable solution. This links to the previous contention that collective identity and shared values 
will be explicitly declared when they are challenged by outsiders or when it is threatening the 
ultimate goal of association which is security. As the association could survive and overcome 
such challenges through a number of intra-regional challenges, the belief here is that at the 
state level such an emerging collective identity is strong enough to provide cement for the 
sake of regional peace and unity at least for the foreseeable future. One interview with a 
scholar raised some interesting points about the influence of norms in the region, particularly 
non-interference, when he said: 
“Before the era of democratisation, this was not an issue. They (Sukarno, Suharto, 
Mahathir and etc.) didn’t have to worry so much about public opinion. They didn’t have 
an election to win four years down the road. So, there was less need to play up national 
cards. With the process of democratisation, politics become messier and those 
elements started playing a more important role.  … It is against, making integration 
more difficult.”29 
This can be seen in the discussion of the previous chapter regarding the incompatibility 
between ASEAN and democracy. In connection with such a perspective, it is also proffered 
here that the vitality of ASEAN’s norms are actually one of the most significant forces that 
hinder the development of democracy in the region. 
Moving away from the elites and technocrats, collective identity at the citizen level is a 
different story. As mentioned earlier, constructing collective identity among the diverse ASEAN 
citizens seems to be a great challenge for the regional and national governing bodies, which 
will require substantial change by all the involved parties. The key questions are those of does 
collective identity exist at the citizen level in ASEAN? Also whether and if so, to what extent do 
people in the member countries feel attached to ASEAN? Unfortunately, only a few studies 
focusing on ASEAN awareness have been published to date. Perhaps, the most prominent 
work is that by Thompson and Thianthai (2008) under the title “Attitudes and Awareness 
toward ASEAN: Findings of a Ten Nation Survey”. They conducted a survey of university 
students from the ten member states in order to measure their awareness of and attitude 
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toward ASEAN, including their general knowledge about it as well as their orientation towards 
the grouping. However, this survey was aimed at targeting only a group of students from the 
top or national universities of each member state and consequently, was restricted to finding 
the views of the most highly educated members of the next generation of ASEAN citizens. 
The findings of this survey do generate some interesting implications for the future of ASEAN. 
On the whole, Thompson and Thianthai (2008: 63) concluded that ‘students across the region 
demonstrate a fairly high level of knowledge about the Association and have generally positive 
attitudes toward it. They go so far as to generally agree when asked if they consider 
themselves to be citizens of ASEAN’. According to the report, the most enthusiastic attitudes 
were found in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the least affluent and most recent member states, 
while the most sceptical ones were found among Myanmar’s students. Singapore students also 
expressed some scepticism, but the researchers concluded their attitudes could be categorized 
as ‘ambivalence’. The rest of the countries had generally positive attitudes. On the whole, over 
75% of the students recognized themselves to be citizens of ASEAN, while nearly 90% and 70%, 
respectively, felt that ASEAN membership was beneficial to their countries and to themselves. 
In this researcher’s view, although this research provides future implications for ASEAN, 
particularly the way to detach itself from being an elitist organization, the outcomes do not 
truly reflect general awareness of ASEAN at present. One reason for this is that this survey was 
funded by and conducted on behalf of the ASEAN Foundation30, an important institutional 
body of the Association in charge of promoting greater awareness and participation in ASEAN’s 
activities. More importantly, targeting only students from the national universities betrays the 
fact that they were only interested in measuring the attitudes of people who were young, 
highly-educated and well-financed, not just ordinary citizens of ASEAN. As such this research 
does not represent an accurate picture regarding the level of awareness of middle-class 
citizens, who are supposed to be the main driving force behind ASEAN. It should also be noted 
that in many of Southeast Asian countries access to good education is very much determined 
by economic circumstance. Therefore, most of those targeted students were likely to have 
come from elite or high-income families and, in relation to the social structure and culture of 
business and networking in Southeast Asia, likely to become elites, technocrats or upper-class 
citizens in the future. 
                                                          
30
 The functions of ASEAN Foundation are identified in Section 7.3 
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Perhaps, the findings from my interviews can give better insights and reflections on the 
existence of collective identity among ASEAN citizens. Addressing the first question about the 
existence of collective identity at the individual level, in contrast with the results of the above 
survey, there were quite a substantial number of participants in this study who agreed that 
collective identity in ASEAN does not exist at the citizen level. For instance, these following 
statements are some of the reflections recorded on this matter: 
“I must admit that I am a little bit more sceptical at that (citizen) level. That is where 
you do have a great deficit.”31 
“(About existing identity at the citizen level) As far as popular perception is concerned, I 
am afraid to say that there is nothing… There have been surveys across Southeast Asia 
recently asking people on the street, such as what do you feel about ASEAN? Do you 
know what ASEAN is? And a lot of people don’t know.”32 
“Nothing at all. It is only at a diplomatic or elite level. But if you go below that, then I 
would say no.”33 
“(About identity at citizen level) that is (clearly) less because ASEAN is well-known as a 
project of the elites… (For Identity) among students, journalists, woman groups, that is 
something that is in its very very early days”34  
“(That is) only among the elites and only scholars who work on ASEAN. I don’t think 
there is really identity at the ground level.”35 
Additionally, this was supported by an interview given by Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib 
Razak in the New Straits Times, which demonstrates the presence of detachment from ASEAN 
and the need to cultivate awareness about it among the youth. He stated: 
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“It is precisely this mindset that we need to change by increasing the younger 
generation’s interest in ASEAN and helping them see and understand their power and 
their potential.”36 
Finally, it also coincided with the result of communal surveys conducted by Christopher 
Roberts (2012: 173). In his analysis, he revealed that ‘while grassroots regionalization does 
appear to have contributed relatively high levels of regional knowledge and awareness, it has 
not yet generated a significant collective identity’, due to the remaining lack of trust in 
considering whether other ASEAN countries are ‘good neighbours’. Thus, it is concluded here 
that the evidence points to the fact that, at citizen level an ASEAN collective identity barely 
exists.         
The next question is about the emergence and the role of collective identity in constructing the 
regional community. As mentioned earlier, constructivists advise that collective identity is 
socially constructed through communication, interaction and common experiences among 
members and, in return, collective identity helps to create meaning and provide an 
explanation to state and individual actions as well as regarding the foundation of common 
interests. Therefore, for ordinary citizens, I would contend that identity helps people to 
distinguish themselves as a member of the group and thus construct a sense of belonging. This 
issue was clearly made by one of the respondents when asked about the accommodative 
culture in ASEAN who concluded that:  
“It is part of the process that brings us to distinguish ourselves as ASEAN.”37 
To be more specific about this concern, the viewpoint expressed by a Singaporean scholar 
perhaps best explains this concern: 
“It (identity) can foster unity and familiarity among people. Identity is not something 
that you arrive at. It is always influx. It is always being redefined. So, it is apparently a 
moving target. I think the important thing is the process through which people try to 
craft or construct common identity. The process means that we try to find a common 
ground, I try to understand you and you try to understand me… And the best way to 
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find a common ground is (through) common interests, (such as) concerns over survival 
and security.”38 
This statement advocates the constructivist explanation and the earlier position put forward 
by this researcher that identity is a by-product of the regional integration process. This implies 
that collective identity cannot be promoted right away, because it is highly dependent on the 
ongoing process for its construction. Although the issue of identity is relatively intuitive and 
very hard to quantify, all the interview respondents did agree, in general, that identity should 
play an important role in ASEAN integration. 
The last point for discussion is about how to create or promote collective identity among 
people and a number of respondents gave constructive insights into this matter. A Malaysian 
scholar posited:      
“If ASEAN starts maturing to its people and people can look to ASEAN as a way that… 
ASEAN can actually safeguard me or help us. Then, maybe that identity will grow… 
ASEAN should do things that benefit ordinary people and that people can see (or feel) 
that ASEAN is useful to them.”39 
Also, as observed by a former director who worked at the ASEAN Secretariat: 
“(the idea is that) Once you let people visit each other and they see neighbouring 
countries, then identity that (showing) we are in the same region, we are in the same 
ASEAN community will slowly emerge.”40 
This implies that collective identity will be constructed, as for the elite level, when there is 
sufficient interaction between people from different ASEAN nations. Moreover, some of the 
collected data stresses the role of education in constructing a regional identity, with, for 
instance in this regard, the former Secretary General of ASEAN commenting:            
“We should have more knowledge of one another… and the devotion to provide good 
education for our young people.”                  
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The viewpoint of the former Secretary General corresponds with work written by Michael E. 
Jones. He wrote about how ASEAN’s identity and a sense of belonging together can be 
constructed, by emphasising the role of education in the process as this has been found to be 
of key importance in the study of collective identity. In his own words:  
‘For the citizens of ASEAN to become truly regional, it will be necessary to know other 
cultures outside of their own community and country. Borders will be made “fluid” 
and citizens will be able to move much more freely in the region… The responsibilities 
to know others, how to be respectful of others, and how to empathize and 
communicate cross-culturally will require education as these, like democracy and 
politics, never come intuitively. A broader view of the world and how to engage in it 
will be crucial tools for ASEAN regional citizens.’ (Jones, 2004: 147-148)         
5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
The empirical study of European identity has generated several noteworthy insights. First, it is 
clear that individuals in EU polity can possess multiple identities, most evidently national and 
regional identities, and relationships between them remain unclear and sophisticated. One of 
revealing examples in this regard is the result showing that citizens of some countries not only 
greatly declare their national pride, but also identify themselves as Europeans (Risse, 2001: 7). 
Moreover, the evidence has confirmed that national and regional identities can coexist, but 
the consequences of this depend on the management of those identities at the supranational 
level as well as the nature of the community. Second, some of the literature has elicited that 
EU member states are tied together mainly by its attractive economic benefits. However, 
survey results in some countries, such as Portugal, Greece and Ireland, reveal that the idea 
that the more benefits countries gain from European integration the more they are likely to 
feel attached to Europe has been rejected (ibid). This outcome is perhaps influenced by other 
factors, such as history and culture, and hence may require further consideration. Third, 
people’s attitudes towards the EU vary to a great extent within member states and there 
seems to be a large number of EU citizens who distrust and do not support the overall project. 
This relates to concerns about such matters as the lack of information dissemination, bottom-
up communication, openness, transparency and lack of legitimacy. Finally, it would appear that 
European identity is crucial for the development of European integration. That is, it can 
mentally give the EU support and comfort for its policies and activities, whilst at the same time 
providing its citizens participatory motivation, sense of unity and a notion of brotherhood. A 
strong identity would drive EU citizens towards ‘a deeper political involvement and 
attachment’ and strengthen the future of European integration (Valentini, 2005: 1). 
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In case of ASEAN, collective identity is one of the most complicated issues in the study of 
regional integration, for it is intuitive, very subjective and involves multidimensional factors in 
the process of its construction. Southeast Asia has evolved from a region dominated by 
European colonial powers to one that has been attempting to shape its own destiny. Its 
diversity and the absence of cultural homogeneity make it difficult for Southeast Asia to be 
recognized as a definable region and underpin the fact that it has been encountering 
difficulties in constructing regional unity and identity. However, ASEAN appears to be the most 
important mechanism to tackle this problem by promoting the necessity of deepening the 
interdependence between member states. Using conventional patterns of international 
relations and interactions, it has helped in region-building, having now distinguished itself from 
the rest of the world, thus making it a distinct entity to external perceptions. With respect to 
this, this researcher concurs with the view that the regional integration is a process of identity 
building itself and thus fully supports Acharya’s (2005: 104) perspective that the construction 
of an ASEAN identity is ‘identity-in-the-making’, rather than ‘identity in being’. Regarding the 
study of collective identity in Southeast Asia, he also went further to purport ‘regionalism in 
Southeast Asia is not a slideshow to power politics, but a potentially transformative dynamic. 
Without taking cognizance of norms, identity and institutional-building, one would only gain a 
partial and distorted view of regional order in Southeast Asia’ (Acharya, 2005: 98). In the 
analysis of identity formation, constructivism solely emerges as a well-suited theoretical 
framework that can explain the formation of a collective identity at the regional level. 
Repeatedly, it has been made clear that identity helps states to gain meaning and define ‘who 
they are, their goals and the roles they believe they should play’ (Wendt, 1999: 231) and 
(Copeland, 2000: 190). Additionally, as appeared in the work of Acharya and Stubbs (2006: 
127), these constructivists have pointed out that ‘ideational forces, including norms and 
identity, are very much a part of the regional environment or “structure” that shapes 
Southeast Asia’s regional order’. From this it can be inferred that identity plays a crucial role in 
providing an explanation for state actions, including those of individuals who act on behalf of 
the state, and the foundations of state interests at the regional level. 
In the context of ASEAN, it has emerged in this research that a majority of discussion about 
norms and identity have revolved around the elements of the ASEAN Way. This set of crucial 
principles, proclaimed as an association’s form of multilateralism, acts as a mechanism for 
avoiding conflicts and disunity within the group and as such greatly determines the formation 
of identity at the state level. That is, it plays an important role in shaping ideas, decisions and 
action of states. As pointed out by constructivists, by the increased interdependence and the 
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convergence of shared values, i.e. ‘we-feelings’ or feelings of togetherness, are gradually 
formed through systemic international interaction, communication and socialization. It is 
claimed here that to some extent, through the dynamics of regional integration, collective 
identity will, more or less, occur automatically because it comes as a by-product of the regional 
integration process, which is very much influenced by political leaders’ experience, knowledge, 
beliefs and values. The cases of Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and the South China Sea 
disputes has convinced this researcher that ASEAN’s identity does exist among elites and 
technocrats, being strong enough to provide the cement for the sake of regional peace and 
unity. 
The formation of collective identity at the citizen level is a thought-provoking matter and 
demands a significant change by all the associated parties. According to the documents and 
interviews, the data demonstrated that collective identity only rarely exists at the citizen level, 
but that, as at the state level, citizen identity is socially constructed through communication, 
interaction and common experiences among people across the region. Thus, it is concluded 
that the collective identity and feeling of togetherness among ordinary people cannot be 
achieved overnight. That is, the forging of identity needs to take time and involve the proactive 
promotion of interaction as well as the sharing of common experiences. As mentioned by one 
respondent for this work, identity is a moving thing, in flux, always being redefined and highly 
dependent on the process. In the author’s view, a transnational system that facilitates and 
encourages the connectivity and movements of people and information needs to be created. 
Finally, the literature and findings discussed in this chapter clearly highlight the importance of 
collective identity in ASEAN integration and the need to transform the Association from an 
elite organization, into a people’s one. The remark of a former ASEAN technocrat clearly 
affirms this, when he states: 
“In the long run, you cannot build a regional community. You cannot push for regional 
objectives without support from (regional) people. They must know. They must 
recognize. They must support.”41                                
The opinion here is that it is not the citizen’s responsibility to be in touch and acquaint 
themselves with the Association, but rather, it is ASEAN’s responsibility to perform this task, by 
engaging with the citizens and bringing them on board. Furthermore, it is crucial to make them 





see, feel and experience how ASEAN can be beneficial to their routine lives. Finally, education, 
particularly in a way that empathizes and familiarizes people with the region, could prove to be 
a vital factor in determining the success and the continuation of ASEAN. As Acharya (2005: 
112) concluded in his work, ‘ASEAN’s success then as now depended on defending its norms, 








6 INSTITUTIONS IN ASEAN 
6.1 Introduction 
Despite regional integration having been introduced in Europe since the 1950s, in Southeast 
Asia it was not until the 1980s that it began to gain attention. The 1997 financial crisis 
highlighted the high degree of interdependence among ASEAN members and the urgent need 
for closer cooperation towards more intensive regional community building. To fulfil this 
ambition and match the speed of European integration, institutional development is accepted 
as being one of the most important driving factors. In fact, ASEAN has undergone significant 
transformation over recent decades by revamping its institutional structure in ways that can 
now support its administration and activities in such a way as to be able to invite comparisons 
with the European Union (Jetschke and Murray, 2011: 176). Such efforts can be found in the 
ASEAN Vision 2020 introduced in 1997, the 2003 Bali Summit and the 2004 Vientiane Action 
Programme. However, the ASEAN Charter adopted in 2008 would appear to be the most 
important document aimed at strengthening its institutional organs. That is, it has improved 
the organisation’s implementation and dispute-settlement mechanisms, consolidated its 
decision-making structure and provided the association with more rule-based conditions as 
well as more legally binding obligations. Regarding its institutional development, ASEAN has 
been facing difficulties, which have led to growing criticism. This has been mainly focused on 
the problems of deficiency, whereby ASEAN institutions have not been awarded a sufficient 
mandate or resources to perform its day to day business or to carry out effective policy 
implementation.  
New institutionalists claim that strong institutions are a prerequisite for constructing a regional 
community, for they act as the rules of the game and they link all actors and their action 
together. Moreover, they are important in shaping individual behaviours and perceptions, 
influencing policy outcomes, imposing constraints and can also reduce uncertainty within the 
group. Similarly, integration theories also highlight the importance of institutions in the 
process. Under neofunctionalism institutions are viewed as the backbone of the association 
where all political activities take place, while liberal intergovernmentalism underlines their role 
in facilitating and accelerating the integration process to achieve mutually desired outcomes, 
for example, by providing reliable information, monitoring compliance and linking across 
issues. Finally, under the constructivist lens regional integration is depicted as a social 
interaction, which includes international contexts by considering states and institutions as 
cognitive and correlative entities. This supports the perspective that international contexts are 
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vital for understanding institutions in the regional settings as they construct states’ identities 
and interests. In sum, these theories identify the key roles of institution and hold that to 
construct a successful regional community a certain form of institutional arrangements is 
required. 
In terms of institution, the case of ASEAN could make an insightful contribution to the study of 
regional integration. It contrasts the picture of European integration in that so far it has mainly 
bypassed the role of the institution, concentrating more on the influence of national states in 
the process. Consequently, examining the institution in the context of ASEAN and its impact on 
integration would shed new light on regional contexts in the developing world that do not 
have a tradition of strong institutions. This chapter will begin with the European perspectives 
on institutions. The second section provides the background to the path of institutional 
development in ASEAN. The following section presents in detail the current institutional 
structure of the organisation after being enhanced in 2007 by the ASEAN Charter. Then, the 
main discussion section provides evidence for evaluating the role of institutions in the 
development of ASEAN’s integration. Finally, the chapter is concluded by providing further 
discussion and a summary of the important findings as well as giving constructive suggestions 
for solutions to the problems identified.    
6.2 European perspectives 
Institutions have been at the heart of European integration since its establishment as the 
union has relied on a number of institutional agencies to keep it functioning. In fact, these 
institutional bodies set up the framework for cooperation between member states and have 
dedicated themselves to every aspect of European life. That is, they have played a vital role in 
initiating and setting the agenda, law-making, budgeting, policy implementing as well as 
monitoring procedures. The functions of EU institutions are prescribed in the treaties, agreed 
by the leaders of all the EU member states and ratified by their parliaments, which empower 
them and determine everything the EU does (europa.eu, 2012). Indeed, institutions represent 
the common interests of the EU as a whole and are viewed as the backbone of the union; 
places where member countries pool some of their sovereignty and confidence. 
In Chapter 3, one definition of institutions as put forward by new institutionalists is that they 
are ‘the rules of the game’ and as such ‘institutions matter’. Put simply, their role is to provide 
shared space for members to exercise their power and hence, according to new 
institutionalism, ‘political analysis is best conducted through a focus on institutions or, more 
specifically, when starting off with institutions’ (Lecours, 2005: 6). While sharing the notion of 
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‘institutions matter’, the three strands of new institutionalism (rational choice institutionalism, 
sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism) offer different approaches to 
thinking theoretically about them and their influences on action and outcomes. In particular, 
the sociological institutionalist definition proposed by March and Olsen (1989: 21) provides a 
significant departure, defining institutions more broadly in non-materialist terms to include 
conventional practices, such as norms, beliefs, culture and values. Consequently, it is crucial to 
understand institutions in the context of European integration, because they clearly structure 
the politics of the European Union. Taking new institutionalism’s perspectives into account, EU 
institutions do not just have the structure of authoritative units that offer common goods and 
services, for they are also mechanisms that shape the perceptions and action of all concerned 
parties in the way that favours the goals of regional integration. 
The structure of the EU is very unique and complex which is reflected in its institutional design. 
Its system of governance is like: 
“a contraption with many rough and fuzzy edges, consisting of a set of machines with 
roughly interacting parts designed by many hands, inspired by different ideas, 
frequently adapted and roughly tuned. The system comprises a network of 
interdependent institutions, none of which can function without reference to others” 
(Jones, 1996: 105-106).  
The most important constituent is that, in the absence of a constitution, everything 
implemented in the EU is arranged and based on a series of treaties, agreed upon by its 
member states. This includes EU institutions whose action, remit, procedures and objectives 
are set out. Apart from enabling small and large states to compete equally and reassuring all 
that their individual interests will be safeguarded, the existence of treaties is crucial as they 
provide solid legal support and a functioning platform for institutions.          
There are several treaties that streamline the institutional framework and thus provide the 
foundations for the EU. In a chronological order, the Paris Treaty in 1951 began the story of 
the EU by establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Subsequently, the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957 paved the way to what later became the EU by introducing two more important 
institutional bodies: the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic 
Community. In 1965, the signing of the Brussels Treaty merged the three organizations into a 
single unified body known as the European Community. Then in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty 
established the three-pillar structure of the union, changed the official title from the European 
Community to the European Union and kicked off the process of the Economic and Monetary 
139 
 
Union (EMU). The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the Treaty of Nice in 2001 amended the 
previous treaties to ensure that the institutional structures could meet the challenge of 
enlargement. Finally, the latest, the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, was passed with aim of clarifying 
the goals, structures and direction as well as gave a legal personality of the EU. 
In terms of institutional structure, the EU retains a solid appearance of legality and 
institutionalisation. Its institutional framework of the EU comprises seven main institutions, 
two intergovernmental bodies (the European Council and the Council of Ministers) and four 
supranational bodies (the Commission, the Parliament, the Court of Justice, the Court of 
Auditors and the European Central Bank). In short, ‘the Commission put forward the ideas, the 
European Parliament gave its opinion on the proposal, the Council of Ministers took the final 
decision and the Commission was responsible for putting the agreed policy into effect and 
monitoring its progress’ (Gowland et al., 2006: 325-326). Although the Court of Justice does 
not directly involve itself in the decision-making process, it is vital in the sense that it provides 
authoritative interpretation of the treaties and the powers of those institutions (ibid). Indeed, 
this embodies the fact that all EU institutions have a close interaction and cannot perform 
without the others’ involvement. 
   
Figure 6.1: The structure of EU decision making 
Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11710564 
In detail, the EU decision-making process begins with the exclusive right of the Commission 
proposing legislation and the budget, i.e. with a role of initiator or agenda setter. Any proposal 
is then passed to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament as the joint legislative 
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decision makers (Bache et al., 2011: 229). The latter is the single body that involves EU citizens 
whose representatives are voted for every five years by their national electorates, while the 
former comprises government ministers from EU member states who can have their say, 
subject to what is being discussed. Moreover, the European Parliament is responsible for 
supervising the commissioners and possesses the sole power to sack them, whereas the 
Council of Ministers is in charge of their appointment (BBC, 2010). Once legislation has been 
passed, the Court of Justice will ensure that there is a correct interpretation across all EU 
member states. The Court of Auditors monitors the budget in order to ensure that the money 
is spent properly. 
The stage of policy implementation can be prolonged, because quite often it involves the 
conflicting views between the member states and the various EU institutions (Lelieveldt and 
Princen, 2011: 272). After a legislative proposal has been agreed by all involved parties, the 
primary implementation will belong to the administrations of the member states. However, 
the Commission also has responsibility for implementing the decisions by working actively with 
the member states, monitoring the implementation of policies ‘with respect to a timely and 
correct transposition of legislation into national law, as well as with respect to a correct and 
complete practical application of policies’ (ibid). If it is found that a member state has failed to 
implement a decision, the Commission is required to begin an infringement procedure and the 
case may go to the European Court of Justice. However, in order to help member states to 
implement EU policies, the EU has also created a variety of regulatory agencies to provide 
proficient advice on policy implementation. 
There have been a number of significant modifications to the EU institutional framework 
owing to the passing of the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, including amendments to the previous 
treaties. Most importantly, there has been a considerable decrease in the power of the 
European Commission and the Council of Ministers, while by contrast the European Council 
and the European Parliament have been granted more power and significance. This has been 
evidenced in the debates in recent years where member states have played the key role, 
rather than the Commission (Mahony, 2010). In particular, the motor of European integration 
has been switched from the Commission to the European Council, which has been assigned the 
role of moving forward EU activities and defining its political goals. Also, an independent 
president has been appointed to the European Council in order to ‘act as a consensus-builder 
and umpire among these leaders’ (Broin, 2009). Moreover, the Parliament has been increased 
in size and has become an evenly empowered co-legislator with the Council of Ministers in 
almost all cases. Furthermore, a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
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Security Policy has been created for the purpose of making EU policy more coherent and to 
ensure that the union speaks with single voice. The EU legislative process has been made more 
directly democratic as EU citizens now have a channel to propose laws by submitting their 
proposals through the Commission. A new voting system has also been introduced for 
decisions among national governments on EU affairs by changing from the weighting of votes 
based on the size of population, to a one-vote-per-one-country system (ibid). Finally, the 
Lisbon Treaty abolished the three-pillar structure and the union is now a united single 
organization. 
 
Figure 6.2: Organizational chart of the EU after the Lisbon Treaty 
Source: http://www.eahp.eu/News/EU-Monitor/EAHP-presentation-of-the-EU-main-institutions 
After the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has experienced some significant changes to its 
institutional architecture and the treaty to some extent has tidied up the complexity of the EU 
structure. That is, it made the EU ‘more democratic and transparent, introduced simplified 
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working methods and voting rules, ensured our fundamental rights through a charter, and 
allow the EU to speak with one voice on global issues’ (European Commission Directorate-
General for Communication, 2007: 6). However, the main actors in EU decision-making process 
remain the same: the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, it is 
only the power balance that has shifted. Interest groups continue to exercise their influence on 
the agenda and the outcomes of the decision-making process (Bache et al., 2011: 252-253). 
Although some EU institutions such as the Commission are important at the implementation 
stage, national governments still remain a pivotal actor in accomplishing this task. 
The underlying content regarding the affairs of the institutions has widely become a research 
agenda in the study of European integration. Generally, the structure of EU institutions is 
designed for the purpose of reconciling the various interests of member states in order to seek 
mutual agreement. In the literature, institutionalists highlight that adequate, solid and efficient 
institutions are essential for development at every level: local, regional and global (Rodríguez-
Pose, 2010: 9). According to Putnam (2000: 325), they should be the ‘key enablers of 
innovation, mutual learning and productivity growth’ and smooth the path to the making and 
implementation of efficient development strategies across territories. Institutions facilitate the 
process of knowledge and innovation transfer within the region and enhance the development 
of economic activity by lowering uncertainty and information costs (North, 1990, Vázquez-
Barquero, 2002). Lack of solid and efficient institutions restrains economic activities by 
creating ‘high transaction costs, widespread rent seeking, inequality and a lack of trust’ 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, 2006: 14). This highlights the perspective of institutionalists that 
even the best strategy can be undermined by a poor institutional environment (Rodríguez-
Pose, 2010: 14). 
Much of the recent EU literature on institutions points out that the integration process is 
clearly linked to the politics within the existing institutional structure and hence, must not be 
overlooked  (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999: 440). Consequently, it advises that the European 
integration project is in need of institutionalisation, involving the creation of appropriate 
institutions if the scheme is to work. Not only the EU, but all current existing regional projects, 
to some degree, have established some sort of institutional elements to govern their regional 
communities. For example, the institutional structure of the African Union is similar to that of 
the EU, having a Commission, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice undertaking similar 
tasks. Akin to this, the UNASUL of Latin America has set up the South American Parliament, the 
Ministerial Councils and the Central Bank to assist the steps towards Latin American 
integration. Institutions are tasked with a ensuring a balance of influence among competing 
143 
 
interests in the regional integration process. Moreover, they supply rules for the game and 
assign a template for power exchange in the process as well as legitimising every EU process 
and action. Hence, for the EU, institutions not just matter, for they are the backbone of 
European integration, providing ‘the mainstay of effective collective governance for Europe’ 
(Rowe, 2012). 
As recognized, European integration is a mixture of two antagonistic concepts: 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Regarding the latter, the national governments 
are still the most influential actors and ultimate decision makers in the regional integration 
process. Therefore, as such, the EU is more similar to an intergovernmental organization than 
a federal state. However, it also exhibits some supranational elements, such as the common 
interests and the collective action of the union. According Haas’s notorious quote, regional 
integration is the process ‘whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new and 
larger centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national 
states’ (Haas, 1961: 366). This implies that institutions are the principal feature of 
supranationality in the regional integration process. For institutionalism, which focuses on the 
institutional structure of the EU, the question is that why do institutions take a more important 
role than concepts, such as ‘ideas, identities, processes, national interests, spillover effects, or 
other concepts that could or have been the starting point of the analysis?’ (Tsebelis, 1999: 2). 
In this regard, Tsebelis (ibid) explained that institutions determine the sequence of moves that 
define the game, in relation to the set of choices and information that each actor has at the 
moment, specifying the process in terms of what is permitted and what is not, as well as 
determining the choices of actors and the information they control. As a consequence, 
different institutional structures will produce different strategies for the actors, and different 
outcomes from their interactions (Tsebelis, 1999: 2-3). All in all, under this lens the main 
contention of intergovernmentalism, which that national governments solely determine the 
development of the EU, is rejected (Tsebelis, 1999: 7). 
6.3  The institutional development of ASEAN  
As explained in the previous chapter, Southeast Asia became a distinct region as a 
consequence of it being the theatre of operation in World War II and Europeanization, which 
specifically led to the development of ASEAN and its institutional structure. Accelerated by the 
Cold War, there was the motivation to develop ASEAN and its institutions so as to establish 
peace and security as well as cultivate the nation-building of the newly independent states 
against the external powers that attempted to dictate the regional order in Southeast Asia. 
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With surrounding uncertainty and the unstable political environment, in particular, the 
confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, it is perhaps unsurprising that the initial 
statement of purpose in the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 is ‘remarkably bland, open-ended 
and non-specific’ (Beeson, 2008: 19). More importantly, this implies that the association 
agreed to preserve and reinforce their fragile sovereignty, but not to pursue the deeply 
integrated regional structures as appeared in Western Europe. In the same manner, ASEAN in 
the context of institutions has moved in ways that fundamentally differ from those of the EU. 
For example, ASEAN’s Secretariat, as its central institutional body, was not established until 
the first leaders’ summit held in 1976 and is ‘small, poorly resourced and relatively powerless’ 
(Beeson, 2008: 20). It is housed in a small old building in Jakarta, being under-funded and 
under-staffed. This is in contrast to EU headquarters in Brussels where most powerful 
institutions of the EU are hosted with powerful mandates as well as plenty of financial and 
human resources. In general, discussed in the previous chapter, the logic and practices of 
ASEAN’s institutionalisation have been considerably shaped by the norms of the group, or the 
elements of ASEAN Way. That is, with the preserving of national sovereignty and the reliance 
on personal contacts of political elites to reach common agreements, the supreme decision-
making power is delegated to the meetings of political leaders, bypassing the ASEAN 
Secretariat and the Secretary General. That is, although it is they who are supposed to be the 
political spokespeople of the association, their lack of a clear mandate for imposing regulations 
and enforcing compliance on member states means that they have been largely ineffectual. 
From the outset, the development of ASEAN institutions was highly influenced by a set of ideas 
that were shaped by the regional cultural values and events that ‘preoccupied politicians, 
intellectuals and opinion leaders over many years’ (Stubbs, 2008: 455). Regarding this, the 
history, ideas and the distinctive traits of ASEAN Way have served to define an appropriate 
means of diplomacy and multilateralism, which could provide an explanation for the nature of 
institutionalisation within the region. In relation to history, it can be traced back to the timing 
of the formation of ASEAN in 1967. The end of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, 
the rise of nationalism resulting from colonial experiences, the gaining of independence by 
ASEAN members, the spread of communism and the Cold War that took a strong hold on the 
region were the key drivers that helped to ‘shape the ideational basis of the association and its 
initial trajectory’ (Stubbs, 2008: 456). Similarly, Narine (1998: 33) pointed out that there were 
interrelated objectives involved in the creation of ASEAN: ‘to alleviate intra-ASEAN tensions, to 
reduce the regional influence of external actors and to promote the socioeconomic 
development of its member states as a further hedge against Communist insurgency’. These 
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concerns continued to influence the association until the end of 1970s, when the member 
states started to prosper, mainly from increasing foreign direct investment, and gain more 
confidence, which resulted in several treaties and declarations as well as institutional 
initiatives. To some extent, this affirms the belief that the initial decision and intention to 
establish ASEAN were productive and hence had paid off. 
On the other hand, ASEAN is well-known for its informality as well as reluctance and 
discomfort towards the adoption of solid formal institutions and legally binding obligations. In 
terms of external cooperation, the association has demonstrated the extent of it being an ad 
hoc organization, as most of its institutional initiatives and development were responses to 
external forces and an uncertain regional environment, which could be put down to the 
variation in the nature of its members political regimes. For example, Narine (1998: 33-34) 
wrote that the reunification of Vietnam under Communist rule led to the signing of Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which was aimed at articulating ASEAN’s understanding of 
peaceful dispute settlement and respecting the sovereignty and independence of members. 
Consequently, Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia called for ASEAN’s immediate action and 
resolution to the conflict, which manifested itself as an extension of the organizational scope 
of the association. After the end of the conflict, the association significantly widened its 
organizational scope to include Vietnam and three other Indochina states (Laos, Myanmar and 
Cambodia) by the end of 1990s. It is widely thought that these countries joined the 
association, in part, because of the emphasis on respect for national sovereignty and equality 
among members.42 
In terms of being multiple and open regionalism, one important characteristic of ASEAN, and 
of its members, is the ‘openness to mutually beneficial linkages with outside powers’ 
(Severino, 2009: 18). First of all, it is worth noting that the roles of China and Japan and their 
increasing interests in Southeast Asia are considered critical for the institutional development 
of ASEAN. That is, good relations with both countries have emerged over the decades and 
been important for regional stability as well as ASEAN’s institutional-building in East Asia. For 
China, according to Tan and Khor (2006: 17), cooperating with ASEAN is an effective way of 
developing East Asia as a counter-weight to the US and the EU in terms of economic matters. 
China has also found that ASEAN’s norms of sovereignty, non-interference and equality of 
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nations correspond with its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.43 In the eyes of Japan, 
ASEAN is seen as a highly-valued partner for peace and prosperity in the region. From the 
other side, ASEAN has growing interests in Northeast Asia, seeing China and Japan as great 
economic opportunities for the region’s growth as well as the provision of networking 
channels. For this reason, during the years of financial crisis, ASEAN stepped up to 
institutionalise summit and ministerial meetings, with the inclusion of China, Japan and Korea, 
known as ASEAN+3 (Wunderlich, 2007: 28). Later, as envisioned by Malaysia, the grouping was 
extended to include Australia, New Zealand and India in 2005, being now known as the East 
Asia Summit or ASEAN+6. Furthermore, ASEAN is also tied in with a number of wider 
cooperative frameworks, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), where it has been playing an 
instrumental role. From these developments, it can be rightly assumed that ‘ASEAN’s goals and 
norms have permeated institutions well beyond Southeast Asia’, with the ASEAN Way having 
been strong enough to become the basis for ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 as well as how the ARF, 
APEC and ASEM members conduct negotiations (Stubbs, 2008: 464). This could be seen at the 
inaugural ASEM summit in Bangkok, where ASEAN championed the exclusion of human rights 
and democracy from the agenda and rather chose to focus on promoting economic 
cooperation between Europe and Asia.44 
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Figure 6.3: The network of ASEAN external relations 
 Similarly, the internal dynamics of ASEAN institutions has also been forged designed based on 
the principal values of the organisation. Accordingly, the avoidance of armed conflict, the non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states, the consensus-based decision making and 
the non-legally binding agreements give plenty of space for member states to exercise their 
rights and powers freely as well as to pursue their regional agendas. To some extent, this helps 
to create a scene of equality in that the smaller member states feel comfortable when dealing 
with larger partners. However, as a consequence of its members unwillingness to delegate 
powers to the institutional bodies, ASEAN lacks effective institutional mechanisms to support, 
pursue and deliver its objectives and policy initiatives as well as being unable to act against the 
will of a member state. With the absence of a strong central authority, policy delivery and 
forceful compliance mechanisms, ‘ASEAN continues to rely primarily on the collective will of its 
member states, their perceived national interests, and peer pressure to ensure compliance 
with its agreements and decisions’ (Asian Development Bank, 2010: 125). This situation has led 
to number of well-voiced criticisms. For instance, ASEAN is often referred to as “a talk shop”, 
“a toothless tiger” or “big on words but small on action”. An assessment of this assertion is 
made in the following sections by considering the history of ASEAN’s institutional mechanisms 






Figure 6.4: ASEAN's institutional organs after the implementation of the ASEAN Charter 
As can be seen in figure 6.4, the institutional structure of ASEAN is relatively complex and has 
wide horizontal configuration. As described in the ASEAN Charter45, the organisation has nine 
main institutional bodies as follows. The ASEAN Summit is the supreme institutional organ of 
ASEAN, taking the form of an annual meeting comprising the heads of member states and 
dialogue partners and is responsible for ‘taking decisions on key issues pertaining to the 
realisation of the objectives of ASEAN, important matters of interest to member states.’ The 
ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) attended by the Foreign Ministers of the member states 
who meet at least twice a year, is responsible for preparing the summit and coordinating ‘the 
implementation of agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit’ and with the ASEAN 
Community Councils is tasked with enhancing policy coherence, efficiency and cooperation 
across these institutions. The ASEAN Community Councils together comprise the Three Pillars 
of ASEAN Community Councils the: ASEAN Political-Security Community Council, ASEAN 
Economic Community Council, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council. The 
objectives of each pillar are to coordinate the work of the relevant sectors, ensure the 
implementation of the relevant decisions as well as to submit reports and recommendations to 
the summit. The ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies are in charge of implementing the 
agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit, strengthening cooperation in the field and 
submitting reports and recommendations to their respective Community Councils. 
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The Secretary General of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat form the organisation’s central 
administrative body. These staff work only for ASEAN and should not seek or receive 
instructions from any government or external party. The Secretary General is appointed by the 
ASEAN Summit for a non-renewable term of five-years and is assisted by four Deputy 
Secretaries-General who come from four different ASEAN member states. The Committee of 
Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR) is a new important body, formerly known as the 
Standing Committee, which consist Permanent Representatives to ASEAN who act as its 
ambassadors. They ‘support the work of the ASEAN Community Councils and ASEAN Sectoral 
Ministerial Bodies’ as well as being tasked to ‘liaise with the Secretary-General of ASEAN and 
the ASEAN Secretariat on all subjects relevant to its work and facilitate ASEAN cooperation 
with external partners.’ The ASEAN National Secretariats serve as ‘the national focal points, 
being the repository of information on all ASEAN matters at the national level, coordinating 
the implementation of ASEAN decisions at the national level.’ The ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), created to fulfil the objectives of promoting and 
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, operates ‘in accordance with the terms of 
reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.’ Finally, the ASEAN 
Foundation was established for ‘promoting greater awareness of the ASEAN identity, people-
to-people interaction, and close collaboration among the business sector, civil society, 
academia and other stakeholders in ASEAN.’ That is, it supports the Secretary-General of 
ASEAN and cooperates with the relevant institutions to promote ASEAN community building. 
Moreover, the Charter has paved the way for ASEAN to engage with other entities that 
support its purposes and principles, which can include organisations in the areas of business, 
academia, civil society and science and technology.     
Overall, The ASEAN Charter, introduced in 2007, was a significant step forward which was 
aimed at promoting institutional development and silencing growing criticism by providing 
ASEAN with more rules-based and legally binding foundations. Moreover, it had the goal of the 
creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as a single market and production base by 
2015. It has been attested that the Charter ‘improves the organization’s compliance 
mechanisms, streamlines its decision-making structure, and extends its dispute-settlement 
mechanism’ (Asian Development Bank, 2010: 124). The ASEAN Secretariat and the Secretary 
General can be construed as the core administrative mechanism of ASEAN’s institutions and is 
provided with its own financial resources and professional staff. However, although it has 
many responsibilities, it has very limited power. Before the restructuring of ASEAN institutions 
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in 1992, it served as a channel of information and was never meant to be an important body 
that would be able to command ASEAN activities and set agendas. Despite it having been 
accorded ministerial status and assigned to monitor and implement ASEAN policies after the 
Fourth ASEAN Summit in 1992, the Secretariat still has little input on policy initiatives, only 
operating in accordance with the directives issued by the ASEAN leaders and foreign ministers 
(Hernandez, 2007: 11). Even with the recent improvements in mandate and monitoring 
compliance given by the Charter, ASEAN is still a very top-down organisation, with the 
Secretariat still having to face many difficulties, as although they have to implement the policy 
of its leaders, they lack the resources, in terms of funding and qualified staff, to perform their 
function. Regarding this, Suryodiningrat (2009) has argued that ‘in practice, the secretary-
general remains an official prostrate to the member countries’. Thus it becomes apparent that 
ASEAN institutions will not have the power to effectively implement policy as long as there has 
not been a significant shift in the vision of the organisation’s leaders. In particular, the 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference, which have been rigidly upheld by its member 
states, need to be revisited.46  
6.4 Evaluating the role of institutions in ASEAN integration 
According to the literature, it is quite clear that strong institutions are crucial for 
regional community building and international politics at every level: local, regional and global 
(Rodríguez-Pose, 2010: 9). In Chapter 3, through the lens of new institutionalism it became 
apparent that, apart from being a central driving mechanism of a regional organisation, 
institutions are a prerequisite for constructing such a community. That is, they should be 
viewed as the rules of the game where all political behaviour is founded as well as performing 
the role of linking all the actors and their action together. Moreover, they play a vital role in 
shaping individual behaviours and perceptions, influencing policy outcome, imposing 
constraints and offering opportunities for action. In addition, they can reduce uncertainty and 
instability as well as ensuring the desired gains from cooperation and can ‘provide a system of 
incentives and punishments to encourage the desired behaviours’ (Williams, 2010: 2). Further, 
they provide space for members to exercise their power and influence. In parallel with the 
institutionalist accounts, integration theories have similar explanations about the role of 
institutions in the regional integration process. That is, as with new institutionalism, under 
neofunctionalism institutions are viewed as central units of the integration process where all 
political activities occur. Moreover, it is pointed out that supranational institutions inevitably 
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have to be established due to ‘the need to create arrangements that would allow reasonably 
efficient decision-making and effective enforcement despite the involvement of a large 
number of governments with differing interests’ (Pierson, 1996: 21). Such arrangements 
include mandatory frameworks and procedures for reconciliation of disputes, which will serve 
as the centre of the union through which members are expected to change their behaviours 
and expectations as well as delegating some of their resources and policy functions to the 
supranational agents.  
Correspondingly, liberal intergovernmentalists claim that institutions are mechanisms that can 
help facilitate regional integration by improving ‘the efficiency of bargaining between states’ 
(Moravcsik, 1993: 507). It is the natural order that states will always guard their sovereignty 
and national interests by resisting the transfer of their authority to central regional 
institutions. Under such circumstances, institutions could help facilitate the integration 
process, for example, by providing reliable information, monitoring compliance and linking 
across issues, such that mutual agreement is more likely. However, under the 
intergovernmentalist lens institutions are only perceived of serving as an information provider, 
confidence builder, transactional cost cutter and interest broker. Whilst constructivism 
extends the theoretical role of institutions by bringing the international context into the 
discussion, that is, states and institutions are seen as cognitive and correlative entities. 
Accordingly, through systemic international interaction, outcomes are shaped by institutions, 
which act as representatives of rules and norms of those international interactions (rule of the 
game). In other words, with this perspective institutions are tasked with securing and 
maintaining the norms as well as the constructed identities. In sum, this introduces the idea 
that the surrounding environments, external constraints and international contexts are vital 
for understanding institutions in the regional settings. Thus, according to Cini (2007: 131), 
institutions are ‘arenas for communication, deliberation, argumentation, persuasion and 
socialization’ among actors.  
In section 6.2 above, the role of the EU’s institutions in European integration has clearly 
accorded with most of the theoretical explanations in that they are at the heart of the 
integration process. That is, they play a key role in initiating and setting the agenda, law-
making, budgeting, coordinating, implementing policies as well as monitoring procedures. 
They are the backbone of the union and a place where member states pool some of their 
sovereignty, resources and confidence. All these functions are legally underpinned as 
prescribed in the EU Treaties and ratified not only at the central level but also by members’ 
parliaments, which thus provide robust legitimate power for its institutions to perform EU’s 
152 
 
activities. Further, the system comprises a mix of intergovernmental bodies and supranational 
one,47 which are independent from each other, but have close interaction, for ‘none of which 
can function without reference to others’ (Jones, 1996: 105-106). The European Parliament 
can ensure the involvement of the citizens as they have to vote for their representatives every 
five years. The European Court of Justice is a crucial body as it provides authoritative 
interpretation of the Treaties and the powers of EU institutions (Gowland et al., 2006: 325-
326). However, although EU institutions are solid, powerful and seen as a principal feature of 
European integration, to a certain extent, national governments still play a pivotal role in 
determining what policy is made. In sum, the evidence regarding the EU concurs with the view 
that the institutional configuration required in a regional integration project is determined by 
the ‘historical circumstances of the group of countries’ (Best, 2005: 43).  
In the context of ASEAN, its institutions have always been at the centre of any criticism about 
the association. Moreover, according to the collected research data, institutions have been a 
problematic area and given their importance as purported in regional integration theory, 
clearly require attention. ASEAN leaders have accepted that this is a key weakness and this is 
why there have been a number of attempts to strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat recently, 
which can be most explicitly seen in the ASEAN Charter. However, it is accepted that these 
efforts have been insufficient to make them a reality owing to several obstacles that continue 
to limit the role of its institutions. First of all, any study of ASEAN institutions would uncover 
that they fundamentally have to work within the context of intergovernmentalism, whereby 
the organisation prefers non-intrusive decision-making and has no intention of following a 
path of supranationalism. That is, it has been ‘deliberately designed for flexibility to allow 
national governments sufficient autonomy in deciding which sectors to liberalise deregulate or 
reform and at what speed’ (Nesadurai, 2012: 4). Perhaps as reflected by its name, the ASEAN 
Secretariat is never far away from being a glorified secretary who works in an office sorting out 
the daily paper work, making phone calls and arranging meetings for the organization. This 
perspective was backed by an Indonesian scholar from CSIS who depicted the ASEAN 
Secretariat as: 
“The ASEAN Secretariat is exactly like the name. It is a secretariat. It is for 
administrative issues only… documents, letters. It is not a decision-making body.”48 
                                                          
47
 Please refer to the organisational chart of the EU after the Lisbon Treaty in Section 4.4, Chapter 4   
48
 MUHIBAT, S. 2013. Interviewed by the author [in person] Jakarta, 23 March 2013. 
153 
 
The first matter to address is the role of the ASEAN Secretariat and its performance. As 
discussed in the previous section, the ASEAN Secretariat and the Secretary General of ASEAN, 
although having been enhanced by the Charter, still have a very limited role in policy-making 
and are not capable of acting against obstinate members. There is quite a significant amount 
of evidence to support this view. For example, Hund (2002: 118) contended that ‘the ASEAN 
Secretariat remains at the margins of ASEAN policy-making’ as it does not possess delegated 
powers for commanding individual member state compliance or devising common policies on 
its own initiative. Similarly, according to Capannelli and Tan (2012: 14), the ASEAN Secretariat’s 
remit has principally been to ‘furnish administrative support rather than been invested with 
powers of delegation… and did not aim to create regional bureaucracies promoting a more 
independent agenda for integration beyond the scope provided by intergovernmental 
cooperation structures’. During interview, a scholar from RSIS stated regarding this matter:  
“I think it (the role of the ASEAN Secretariat) is marginal. To me, the decision-making 
process in ASEAN is not at the Secretariat… It really looks at the key ministries… The 
Secretariat to me is predominantly a coordination actor.”49  
Another scholar from the same institution had a similar opinion: 
“The ASEAN Secretariat has got no teeth. So, they are only reacting.”50 
Interestingly, the opinion of a former Director of the ASEAN Secretariat clearly highlighted the 
importance of the central institutional body, when she shared that: 
“Who else in ASEAN can actually advance all this (democracy, identity, institution and 
leadership)? It should be the Secretariat together with the leaders ...who is supposed to 
do all these things.”51 
In addition, a recent review conducted by Desker (2008) found that during the preceding forty 
years only 30% of ASEAN agreements and initiatives were actually implemented, which points 
to the incapacity of the ASEAN Secretariat and concluded that it does need to be 
strengthened. In order to coordinate ASEAN activities, I am convinced that expansion in the 
size and strengthening of the mandate of the Secretariat is crucial and will in turn speed up the 
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process of ASEAN integration. However, one Indonesian scholar from CSIS expressed the view 
that ASEAN’s Secretariat has done a good job to serve the leaders and in promoting 
coordination among members. She said: 
“If you ask me how they are performing as a secretariat, they are performing really 
well. But other than that [shrugs]…”52 
Strengthening the ASEAN Secretariat prompts concerns about how this could be funded. In 
general, it is widely agreed that the Secretariat has inadequate financial and human resources 
to manage the association’s growing activities and to service the needs of deeper regional 
cooperation. Its operational budget of the ASEAN Secretariat mainly relies on equal annual 
contributions by the member states, thus reflecting the norm of equality across the 
organisation which stemmed from the belief that different contributions might lead to a 
hierarchy of powers. It has been pointed out that ASEAN’s system of equal contributions is 
unique among international organisations that its leaders have avoided any substantial 
increase and held back to the level of the poorest members’ capacity to pay (Severino, 2009: 
25). In other words, the budget is kept low enough for the poorest state to be able to pay 
without being too demanding on its resources. However, as a lone central institution, the 
Secretariat is overloaded with region-wide administrative and coordinative activities as well as 
research, analysis, technical support and monitoring tasks (Nesadurai, 2012: 16). Although 
ASEAN does not make its financial statement available for the public, Termsak 
Chalermpalanupap, a former Director for Research and Special Assistant to the Secretary-
General of ASEAN, wrote that ‘in the 2007-08 financial year, the Secretariat’s operating budget 
was US$ 9,050,000’ (Chalermpalanupap, 2009: 122). He also noted during interview: 
“Our budget this year (2012-2013) is only US$ 15.763 million and next year I heard 
there is only going to be a 3% increase. So, it is still a very small shoestring 
operation.”53  
If the 2012-2013 figures are taken into consideration, this means each member contributed 
US$ 1,576,300 and represents a very small proportion of their GDPs or annual national 
budgets. For instance, according to Bower (2010) and Poole (2011: 6-7), the total budget of the 
ASEAN Secretariat was reported to be around US$14.3 million (including funds from partner 
                                                          
52
 MUHIBAT, S. 2013. Interviewed by the author [in person] Jakarta, 23 March 2013. 
53
 CHALERMPALANUPAP, T. 2012. Interviewed by the author [in person] Singapore, 20 December 2012. 
155 
 
countries), which accounted for 0.0001% of Laos’s GDP and 0.000001% of that of Indonesia 
and amounts to about 0.137% of the EU’s annual administrative budget. Calculated in terms of 
per capita, ASEAN citizens spend less than $0.024 per person per year on supporting the 
servicing of the organisation.54 
ASEAN members, of course, contribute to the association in some other ways, for example, the 
offices of the National Secretariat are housed in members’ foreign ministries. In addition, some 
countries run special projects as well as hosting and attending meetings or events. 
Furthermore, ASEAN is also substantially funded by dialogue partners or external donors, 
mostly through specific projects or operations, such as capacity building, improving 
infrastructure and information technology. Interestingly, Bower (ibid) noted that the external 
contributions are well over 20 times the Secretariat budget. The former Secretary-General of 
ASEAN reinforced this point when he stated at interview: 
“We have many cooperation projects with different dialogue partner countries. These 
countries are developed nations. They are willing to give more resources to ASEAN. We 
always say ASEAN is an OPM organisation – Other People’s Money.”55      
However, relying on external resources could lead to unavoidable outside interference by the 
donors in the affairs of the association. Certainly, this is not sustainable in the long run and not 
sensible if ASEAN wants to present itself as a non-aligned and independent power on the 
international political stage. Another important concern is with regards to the lack of 
professional staff. According to the figures, in 2012 ASEAN employed roughly 300 people, 
including 65 managers and experts, 180 local staff and 55 persons from donor organizations 
(ibid). Although these figures do not include coordinating staff who work in member countries, 
they are minuscule compared to the EU, which has about 55,000 staff working under the 
umbrella of its institutions.56 Nevertheless, there are some detractors from the view that 
ASEAN is underfunded, who prefer to highlight the problem of staff shortages. For instance, 
the former Secretary General contradicted the previous arguments and pointed out that the 
main problem of the ASEAN Secretariat is not lacking budget, but rather the lack of well-
trained bureaucrats. He shared: 
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“It’s always being said there is not enough budget. But in the last few years, my 
understanding is that the budget is not spent… The problem is that we are lacking in 
capacity. We don’t have enough ASEAN-level bureaucrats working at the Secretariat to 
make sure that all the implementation is carried out.”57 
This view has been supported by Severino (2009: 25), who wrote ‘the problem is not only the 
availability of funds. It is also the difficulty of finding personnel who know ASEAN and the 
requirements and limits of regional, especially economic, cooperation and integration’. 
Similarly, this coincides with the viewpoint of Indonesia’s Permanent Representative to ASEAN. 
He made the following comment: 
“Do you know that every year the Secretariat also has to return the money from the 
contributions of the governments? There are some unspent budgets. (Why the budget 
is not spent?) Many reasons, improved efficiency, lack of staff… We have to 
differentiate between operational budget and activity budget. Operational budget 
based on the contribution of the governments and every year we have unspent budget. 
For activities, I think we need more. We don’t have enough.”58 
Also regarding the staff situation, one scholar shared his field experiences at the ASEAN 
Secretariat: 
“I was focusing a bit on ASEAN transnational crimes. I met two ladies at the Secretariat 
for an interview. There are only two people at the transnational crime unit. They have 
so many meetings a year and the only thing they do is to go from one meeting to 
another and “copy and paste” from one document to another. Absolutely no time left 
for implementation and coordination. Surprisingly, both ladies left after a while. They 
were completely disillusioned.”59              
As has been seen, despite the insufficiency of staff, the ASEAN Secretariat is also facing 
difficulties in efficiency and in attracting talented and capable people. Areethamsirikul (2010)  
pointed out that ‘the ASEAN headquarters needs to create a regional and international 
working atmosphere and to make "working at ASEAN" a prestigious assignment for ASEAN 
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peoples - akin to the perception of working at the United Nations, the World Trade 
Organisation, the World Bank, or the European Union.’ Thus, the budget is not the only 
important concern in this respect and I observe that as long as working for the Secretariat is 
not perceived as a well-paid and challenging career and cannot attract ambitious, capable and 
professional talent, it will be difficult for the Secretariat to grow into a more institutionalised 
organ, a powerful central administration and/or the backbone of the association. 
Finally, considering the sophisticated structure of the EU’s institutions, this raises the question 
whether ASEAN should follow suit. In other words, what should be improved for ASEAN in 
terms of institutional development? Although the theories imply that institutions play a vital 
role in the development of regional integration, the question is it appropriate to “copy and 
paste” one successful model to another context. In general, there are quite a variety of 
opinions and views on this issue. However, the majority of evidence suggests that rather than 
building a more comprehensive form of institution, ASEAN should focus on strengthening its 
existing institutional architecture, particularly the Secretariat and its Secretary General. 
Indeed, the ASEAN Secretariat is its only real live institutional organ, while the rest, consisting 
of summits, meetings, dialogues, committees, subcommittees and task forces, are periodic 
events with impermanent offices (Chalermpalanupap, 2009: 121). Regarding this matter, a 
scholar from RSIS asserted that:  
“I would strengthen the coordination role of the Secretariat. I would not reinvent the 
wheel. I would actually look at the Secretariat and say how can we make this more 
effective… for instance in terms of implementation of the decision-making process.”60  
Another scholar from RSIS also had a similar view on this issue:  
“I think the priority is to build up existing institutions rather than creating new ones. 
For example, Dr Surin (the current Secretary General) needs to be given the power and 
mandate to initiate policy discussion.”61 
The former Secretary General also insisted that ASEAN should focus on the existing 
institutions. He gave an example of one ASEAN institution:  
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“The ASEAN Foundation is located in Jakarta. It is not well-capitalized but can be 
developed into a more substantial body to promote, what we call, the ASEAN Socio-
cultural Pillar - identity, belonging can be done under the ASEAN Foundation’s 
osmosis.”62 
He also highlighted the difference in political culture between Southeast Asia and Europe: 
“In Europe, having a European court and a European parliament… it seems very easy to 
do because it has been part of some national cultures. In Southeast Asia, we still very 
jealously guard our sovereign quality.” 
However, a number of analysts believe that, in addition to strengthening and empowering the 
Secretariat, ASEAN should have some new institutional ideas in order to support the 
overloaded work of the ASEAN Secretariat and increase the Association’s efficiency and 
effectiveness. For instance, Wanandi (2006: 87) suggested that an ASEAN Consultative 
Assembly consisting of members of the different parliaments and representatives of civil 
society could be a fruitful enhancement to the decision-making process, which would make 
ASEAN more democratic and people-oriented. Moreover, Indonesia’s Permanent 
Representative to ASEAN supported the idea of having an entrenched sanction mechanism. He 
stated: 
“Something to do with sanction – enforcement and punishment mechanisms”63 
Further, one Malaysian scholar held the view that ASEAN also needs a research wing and a 
mechanism that links its institutions to non-state sectors and NGOs. She suggested: 
“One would definitely be a research wing… (Also) I think there is merit in creating some 
forms of institutional links to the non-state sectors, private actors and NGOs.”64  
Others support a certain degree of supranationalism. Regarding this, Hund (2002: 120) 
suggested that ASEAN ‘requires centrally managed policies and also more independent and 
preferably supranational institutions’. In addition, an Indonesian scholar from CSIS showed she 
agreed with this point of view when she stated: 
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“I support (supranationalism). Not in the way that is strong supranational. At least, it 
needs a body that is for decision-making. In ASEAN, everything is always consensus-
based and in a lot of cases, especially sensitive cases like territorial disputes, consensus 
gets us nowhere.”65   
This does not mean ASEAN should be heading towards a supranational form of integration as 
has appeared in Europe. In the foreseeable future, ASEAN still has to remain within the current 
intergovernmental cooperative framework as long as there has been no significant reform to 
its principal norms and certainly national governments would be reluctant to lose their 
country’s national rights and control. More realistically, in my view, it is the budget that is the 
first thing that needs to be tackled. Wanandi (2006: 87) proposed that ‘the system now, 
whereby every member pays the same amount, is no longer realistic. A new formula that is 
more tenable and could increase the budget adequately should be contemplated’. In my 
opinion, the system of absolute equal contribution should be reviewed in order to support the 
excessive tasks of ASEAN institutions, more specifically the ASEAN Secretariat. Despite limiting 
the funding to its lowest possible level, the current system does not help narrow development 
gaps between the members and does not reflect the notion of ‘a community of caring and 
sharing societies’66, something that the association has been trying to promote. However, I 
would contend that the members’ contributions should perhaps be based on either the 
possible gain in interest or a country’s ability to, that is, the EU’s GDP-based arrangement is 
one option that should be considered. For example, if each member contributed 1% of its 
annual GDP to ASEAN, it does not neglect the principle of equality, because all members are 
asked for 1%, so I think this is just a matter of positively rethinking the issue. This is in accord 
with Emmerson (2007: 438) who opined ‘this step (the GDP-based contribution) would free 
the Association’s budget from being limited to ten times what the poorest or least supportive 
member is willing to pay’. I am also convinced that this new formula would help ASEAN to 
offset the situation whereby there is a clear hierarchy of member’s power and influence. 
Moreover, I reckon that ASEAN should be provided with the means to generate its own 
revenue in order to ensure adequate resourcing and financial flexibility, for example, through 
some kind of taxation, import duties or licensing.    
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6.5 Discussion and conclusion 
As we have seen in this chapter, every process and action in the EU has to be legitimised by its 
established institutions. In order to build up a regional community elsewhere, the case of the 
EU suggests that it would not be a question of whether institutions matter, but rather a 
question of how to establish their suitable form, whilst taking into account the different 
institutional environment. That is, ‘The institutional arrangements of any regional integration 
scheme must be appropriate to – and indeed should grow out of – the specific historical 
circumstances of the group of countries’ (Best, 2005: 43). Similarly, Rodríguez-Pose (2010: 20) 
argued that ‘development strategies may need to be specifically tailored to the conditions of 
different regional institutional environments, thus requiring an in-depth understanding of local 
conditions and an assessment of the feasibility of different types of interventions under 
current institutional circumstances’. Therefore, there would appear to be no precise guidelines 
for making institutions in the regional integration process. Although measuring institutions, 
such as their space and variability, and defining the mix of the formal and informal are still 
problematic, what can be said is that the best regional policy is the one that ‘acknowledges 
institutional factors, their variability and limitations and attempts to address the potential 
shortcomings of institutions in a place-specific manner’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 2010: 20-21). 
Similar to the EU, the empirical data from the case of ASEAN demonstrates that having solid, 
sufficient and efficient forms of institutions is essential as a prerequisite for constructing a 
regional community. Theoretically, under new institutionalism the role of the institution is 
providing the rules of the game and linkages between actors and action. Moreover, 
neofunctionalists see institutions as being the central units of all political activities and the 
main mechanisms for decision-making and enforcement. Whilst liberal intergovernmentalists 
emphasise the role of the institution in brokering and facilitating the process of regional 
integration, such as providing reliable information, monitoring compliance and linking across 
issues. Under the lens of constructivism, an important perspective is added to the discussion, 
whereby institutions are viewed as cognitive and correlative entities that act as 
representatives of rules and norms. That is, they are created to maintain the norms and the 
constructed identities. As has been seen, although focusing on different perspectives, all these 
theories grant that institutions play a crucial role in the regional integration process. However, 
for understanding ASEAN integration, I would put more stress on the constructivist 
explanation, as it seems to provide a better framework to explain ASEAN institutions in that 
the institutional structure of the organisation can be viewed as a by-product as well as a 
representative of its norms and principal values. For according to Stubbs (2008: 455), ‘ideas 
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must be institutionalised in order to be converted into concrete action and have a long lasting 
impact’. I hold that the constructivist explanation regarding institutionalisation that 
surrounding environments, external constraints and international contexts are the key drivers, 
best fits with what has transpired within ASEAN. That is, the unique configuration of features 
for South East Asia has determined a markedly different institutional path than taken by the 
EU. 
Even though the case of the European Union decisively demonstrates the crucial role of 
institutions and the importance of supranationalism in the regional integration process, ASEAN 
has not chosen this path, preferring a non-intrusive manner and placing its faith in cooperating 
on the basis of intergovernmentalism. The ending of confrontation between Indonesia and 
Malaysia, the rise of nationalism as result of colonial experiences and the gaining 
independence of ASEAN members, the spread of communism, the wars that affected the 
region and the influence of external powers are the main factors that have shaped this 
ideational basis of the association. One simple explanation could be that ASEAN was 
established as an ad hoc resolution in order to meet regional expectations and in response to 
those perceived challenges. Although the system has responded well to these expectations, to 
great extent, its current regional architecture has proved insufficient to handle the growing 
roles and activities as well as to remain in tune with the regional and global trends. In sum, the 
theoretical explanations, the empirical evidence from the case of the EU and the different 
contexts of regional settings point to the need for a rethink regarding ASEAN’s institutional 
structure so as to make stronger and thus able to help the association meet the challenges of 
increased globalisation. 
On the practical level, I would divide the problems of ASEAN institutions into three major 
interrelated areas of deficiency. Firstly, its institutions, particularly the ASEAN Secretariat and 
the Secretary General, lack any mandate to ensure compliance or have the ability to initiate 
policies that can help fulfil ASEAN’s ambition. In general, the ASEAN Secretariat, as a lone 
central administrative body and the main driving force, has been only tasked with serving and 
provide administrating support for the national governments without any delegation of power 
to it. That is, it has not been the intention to build up regional bureaucracies that could 
promote an independent agenda for integration beyond the scope of intergovernmental 
cooperation structures (Capannelli and Tan, 2012: 14). Instead, supreme power has been 
wholly retained at the national government level and ASEAN institutions remain at the margins 
of policy-making. Secondly, the ASEAN Secretariat is currently experiencing financial hardship. 
This concern has been expressed in much of the literature and by almost all of the interview 
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respondents. This is essentially due to the system of equal member contributions, which has 
been maintained as low as possible in order to accommodate the less-developed nations. 
Finally, there is strong evidence that ASEAN is understaffed, both in terms of quality and 
quantity. Moreover, it cannot attract talented and capable people because they do not see 
“working at the ASEAN Secretariat” as a well-paid and challenging career. These three 
concerns are clearly interrelated and are mainstream criticisms of the ASEAN Secretariat that 
need to be resolved.      
A general conclusion would be that ASEAN institutions should be strengthened and provided 
with a mandate and sufficient financial and human resources to support its administration and 
activities. Also, the current contribution system should be substantially revised, because it is 
not realistic and applicable to the growing activities of the Association. Regarding this matter, I 
propose that in order to increase financial flexibility the ASEAN Secretariat should seek other 
sources of income, rather than solely rely on member contributions and external donors. This 
could take the form of, for example, import duties, a percentage of tax levied by each member 
country or even fines from companies that breach ASEAN regulations. In my view, the 
institutional structure of ASEAN met the task, by and large, of serving the national 
governments and upholding the association’s norms and therefore there is no need to 
replicate the EU’s integration experience by a complete overhaul with the imposition of 
completely new institutional initiatives. As most of the contributors to the empirical research 
have opined, ASEAN should focus on strengthening its existing institutions by giving them 
more mandate, more money and more professional staff. However, some of the suggestions 
about an institutional invention are worth considering to address deficiencies in the 
organisation, such as establishing a research wing and a mechanism that can get non-state 
actors involved in the process of regional governance. Furthermore, in line with Wah (1998: 
165), it is noted that long-term institutional reform cannot be achieved without the 
reconsideration of the relationships with the wider institutional structure of ASEAN that the 
Secretariat is nested within, particularly with the Coordinating Council, the Ministerial Bodies, 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives and the national governments.         
Above all, I am convinced that ASEAN decision-makers are aware of the institutional 
weaknesses in ASEAN and want to address. This is evidenced by ASEAN leaders introducing the 
ASEAN Charter, which was seen as an important step forward for institutional reform as it 
strengthened its implementation and dispute-settlement mechanisms as well as consolidating 
its decision-making structure. However, although the ASEAN Charter did improve the power of 
ASEAN institutions and provided the Association with a juridical foundation, it seems to have 
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codified traditional norms and practices as well as reinforcing the idea of non-intervention 
(Narine, 2008: 425). Therefore, in the post-Charter era I doubt that ASEAN will become a more 
effective organisation and the all the institutional problems discussed will be properly tackled 
any time soon. In essence, it would appear to me that all the complications arise from the fact 
that ASEAN integration does not involve like-minded states in that the members do not have 
similar political ideologies and values. Furthermore, this political dissimilarity is safeguarded by 
the association’s norms and the consensus-based decision making, which continue to limit the 
role of its institutions, thus allowing member countries to enjoy cooperation and exercise 
power without fear of their sovereignty being at stake. This situation has resulted in deadlock, 
which has prevented the Association from making any considerable progress and so it ‘remains 
robustly intergovernmental, with little delegation since it relies on “offshoots” rather than 
independent agencies to implement policy’ (Capannelli and Tan, 2012: 14). However, granting 
mandates and pouring resources into the central institution will not fully resolve the problems, 
because would still lack some of the most important ingredients for deeper cooperation. That 
is, in order to maximum benefits from constructing a regional community, this would need 
centralised policies, some degrees of supranationalism as well as the national governments’ 




7 LEADERSHIP IN ASEAN 
7.1 Introduction 
Political leadership is one of the most imperative issues in political science. In general, it is 
admitted that leadership is a key mechanism in any kind of grouping or organizations and plays 
a decisive role in steering them towards success. In particular, in regional community building 
efforts where countries have to operate in the international public sphere, the lack of or 
indecisive leadership can spell trouble, or even the end of an organization. However, the role 
of political leadership in ASEAN has received little attention in the literature, even less than the 
scant scholarship on this matter relating to the EU. As stated previously in Chapter 3, 
intergovernmentalism provides a constructive platform for the discussion, viewing leadership 
in the regional integration process as a common phenomenon that has emerged from the 
difference in the tenure of power and resources among rational actors. It also emphasizes the 
predominance of the most influential actors in the process. In addition, Young’s well known 
three modes of leadership form the backbone of the discussion as they can provide a 
supportive framework for conducting the analysis. In chapter 4, the EU’s experiences provided 
two contrasting insights. On the one hand, leadership is seen as a powerful driver that 
accelerates and facilitates the negotiation and decision-making process, thus helping to 
achieve mutually desired outcomes. As such, it acts as an important factor for facilitating the 
achievement of the union. On the other hand, leadership can deter the integration process, 
because the conflicts of interest and the uneven distribution of benefits among members 
result in uncertainty and scepticism. The main aim of this chapter is to investigate the role of 
leadership in the context of ASEAN, where it is expected that this plays out somewhat 
differently than in relation to the EU, owing to South East Asia’s distinct characteristics that 
have been discussed in previous chapters.  
The demands for active regional leadership have recently been high on the agenda. This has 
been attributed to European countries appearing to be incompetent owing the lack of an 
identifiable leadership and also, in the South East Asian context, the insufficient presence of 
leadership in ASEAN being widely claimed to be a key obstruction to the progress of 
integration. Repeatedly, Beach and Mazzucelli (2007: 19) have stated that the success of 
leadership depends on whether the type supplied is suitable for the demands created by the 
regional context. In other words, it is necessary to probe the underpinning features of a 
particular region in order to decide upon the most appropriate leadership form. Regarding 
this, due to the historical colonial experience and the vast diversity among members, the 
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leadership process involved in integrating Southeast Asia has been complex, somewhat 
ambiguous and as a result, is still an unresolved issue. Although it is clearly identified in the 
Charter and other legislative documents that ASEAN is grounded on the basis of equality 
regarding which the chairmanship, as a formal leadership is alphabetically rotated, various 
forms of political leadership, such as issue-based and that driven by individual charisma can be 
seen in the system. More recently, the rising regional power and more benevolent role of 
Indonesia in Southeast Asia appear to hold up the idea of a hegemonic leadership. 
Understandably, this could be problematic because it challenges ASEAN’s official motto of 
manifesting non-interference and equality among members. In the meantime, this seems to 
concur with the European manner of Franco-German leadership, as identified in Chapter 4, 
based on intergovernmentalist arguments and Young’s concept of structural power indicating 
that power is derived from the possession of material resources and it is going to be the most 
powerful countries who are in a better position to take the lead and get more out of the union.   
This chapter begins with the European perspectives on leadership and an historical overview 
that helps in understanding the context of leadership in ASEAN and thus leads the way to 
constructing an analysis. The following section address the historical nature of ASEAN’s 
leadership, with particular consideration of the notion put forward by many scholars and 
political activists that it is in fact leaderless. The next section sets out to examine various 
patterns of leadership that have emerged in the organisation since its inception, by drawing on 
the related the literature and data collected from interviews. This will lead on to a discussion 
regarding the most practically feasible form of leadership for ASEAN based on the structural 
and ideational reality. Finally, there is a summary of the important findings gained from this 
chapter.                 
7.2 European perspectives 
In the EU, the story about leadership in essence involves two countries as they have continued 
to take a leading role in shaping the development of the European Union, namely, France and 
Germany. Their influence is widely accepted as having been the predominant driving force in 
the union since its creation in 1958, whilst the UK has not been so heavily involved due to its 
sceptical attitudes towards European integration. That is, Franco-German co-operation has 
been essential for shaping the union’s major decisions and thus making progress in the 
integration process (Webber, 1999). As a consequence, two antagonistic stances regarding the 
regional integration process have emerged. On the one hand, there are those who accept that 
such leadership is a crucial driver for integrating the region. On the other hand, some member 
states, object to the EU’s fortunes being under the control of the Franco-German dominion, 
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and these two polarised positions have often resulted in gridlock that has deterred progress 
and development of the union. In this regard, it is interesting to see what the Franco-German 
relationship suggests about leadership in regional integration process and what can we learn 
from the European experience. 
It is considered useful here to try to provide a precise definition regarding the nature and 
scope of leadership. However, according to Blondel (1987: 15), political leadership is hard to 
define substantially due to its reliance on the specific institutional, cultural and historical 
contexts. Indeed, the issue of political leadership in regional integration has been one of the 
most complex and ill-theorised issues. In this research context, leadership might simply be 
understood as ability to lead or steer a group, thereby accompanying them to a destination 
and is frequently concerned with influencing goal-setting and motivation. Moreover, Beach 
(2007: 6) asserted that leadership is about exercising influence over other actors and he 
broadly defined it as ‘any action by one actor to guide or direct the behaviour of other actors 
toward a certain collective goal’. However, in the EU context the definition given by 
Lübkemeier (2007: 7) is perhaps more appropriate: ‘leadership in the EU is provided by actors 
who are willing and capable, acting as co-leaders, to prompt other actors to contribute to the 
achievement of collective goals’. This definition assures that egoistic actions, such as forming a 
group to challenge and benefit from integration, would not be characterized as leadership 
because it has to include sense of natural capability as well. 
Historically, the story of the relationship between France and Germany before the 
establishment of the European Union is characterized by ‘a long-lasting antagonism feeding on 
rivalry for territory and hegemony on the European continent, as well as humiliated national 
sentiments and revenge discourses’  (Germond and Türk, 2008: 1). That is, the two countries 
were actually deep-rooted enemies before finally becoming close partners as currently 
recognized by the international community. The period from 1789 to 1919 saw several 
extensive wars brought about because of the intense antagonism between France and 
Germany. These conflicts and antagonistic sentiments were unambiguously driven by 
nationalism that, in France, took the form of a missionary and expansive character after the 
French Revolution of 1789 and, in Germany, actions to discharge the bond of French 
domination over the territories, known as the German Wars of Liberation (Germond and Türk, 
2008). In general, the formation of nationalism was constructed through a conflictive and 
interactive process in which negative images and perceptions of the other served to reinforce 
national sentiments and strengthen national identity (ibid). 
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These hostile feelings lasted, to varying degrees, until the signing of Elysée Treaty by the 
President of France and the Chancellor of Germany in 1963, as the treaty emphasized the seal 
on reconciliation between the two countries and declared the ending of rivalry between them. 
‘The two men had introduced a fundamentally new element into the politics and psychology of 
their peoples’ (Lappenküper, 2008: 154). The treaty contains several agreements to cooperate 
in foreign policy, economic, security and education, thus becoming the foundation for long-
term intense cooperation and bilateral interaction between the two states. In particular, it led 
to the forging of close institutionalised constructive relations through the setting up regular 
ministerial consultations and regular meetings between the two governments. Since the 
enforcement of treaty, France and Germany have retained close ties, hence becoming a key to 
furthering European integration.  
 
Figure 7.1: Regularized bilateral Franco-German intergovernmentalism 




To portray the Franco-German relationship since the Elysée treaty, the literature illustrates 
that the bilateral relationship between France and Germany is ultimate, intensive and 
relatively institutionalized. One important indicator is the number of meetings between the 
President of France and the Chancellor of Germany, regarding which Boyer (Boyer, 1996: 243) 
pointed out that during the period between 1982 and 1992 ‘there were allegedly 115’. Apart 
from heads of state meetings, there are also meetings and consultations on a regular basis 
between ministers. This extraordinary relationship has been commented upon by several 
scholars. Middlemas (1995: 323) argued that the close relationship between France and 
Germany has become a ‘matter of routine involvement of administrators’, whilst De 
Schoutheete (1990: 109) has portrayed it as the ‘closest possible of bilateral alliances’ and 
Klaiber (1998: 38) claimed that ‘no two other countries in the world have developed such close 
co-operation’. Further, Leblond (1997: 130) stated that it is ‘impossible’ to separate the two 
countries within the partnership from EU affairs. Lastly, EU integration is, if nothing else, about 
France and Germany (Cole, 2001).  
To summarise, the Post-Elysée era witnessed a close and trustful relationship and regular 
political links between France and Germany, transforming past confrontations into 
cooperation in the everyday lives of their people. Although the initial aim of treaty was to 
harmonize security and defence matters between the two countries, it was later extended and 
deepened to include economic, political, social and cultural dimensions. In addition, the treaty 
has come to be viewed by some as a catalyst for the construction of European unification 
through which both countries have continued to be the driving force behind European 
integration for over 40 years. However, the important question is did the treaty directly 
promote the development of regional integration? With respect to this, Cole (2001: 12) argued 
that it was a direct challenge to the supranational leadership of the EU. In particular, the two 
countries drew attention to the NATO alliance and the role of the US in Europe, rather than 
pursuing regional integration, which resulted in the process being halted for over two decades. 
However, sceptics have argued that the pact was not simply aimed at forging a close bilateral 
relationship, but also at influencing the future of the European policies of other members and 
to counter fears that each of these two countries would attempt to impose their own policy 
preferences on the rest of the union (Deutsche Welle, 2012). As a result of its economic, 
military and diplomatic preeminence, there was no other realistic candidate for leadership in 
the EU and hence the Franco-German partnership remained at the core of the European 
integration project for several more decades. 
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In fact, despite these being the only European countries tied by a treaty-based alliance, the 
bilateral relationship between France and Germany has been relatively informal and 
continually inconsistent. This is because it has been highly dependent on the personal relations 
between political leaders, both formal and informal, via institutional structures and policy 
networks, which can vary according to the type of issue and the level of interaction (Cole, 
2001: 47). That is, the key to the success has been the reliance upon its flexible and informal 
engagements rather than on its degree of institutionalisation. Moreover, informal 
understanding between France and Germany has been reinforced by their routine contact and 
the decades of working together (Cole, 2001: 54). For this reason, the Franco-German 
relationship is often viewed as a precondition for policy operation in European arena, whereby 
French and German leaders strive to reach agreement wherever possible, as they have 
consistently shared a common interest in developing the project of European integration.                   
To be more specific, what is the role of Franco-German entente in developing the European 
community and how does this relationship contribute to leadership in the EU? As written in his 
book, Cole (2001: 60-61) depicted how the relationship between France and Germany in the 
EU can be categorized into two major dimensions. First, they have always considered it as a 
primary concern, with its matters always being seen to be at the heart of their cooperation. 
Second, the two countries have often been behind important European initiatives, in 
particular, those geared towards integration. Indeed, France and Germany normally seek 
support from each other before starting new projects and the historical evidence suggests that 
this initial conciliation has to some significant extent avoided negotiation difficulties in the 
bargaining process. On the other hand, the progress of European integration has been stalled 
whenever these two countries have been in disharmony. The goal of reaching consensus as 
much as possible can be seen in some of policies adopted in the 1990s where Germany went 
against its own preferences, for example there was German intervention to prevent the franc 
from attack by international capital (Andrews, 1993) and negotiations with the US in the GATT 
meeting so as to prevent French isolation (Webber, 1998). 
The nature of France and Germany’s relationship as well as their leadership role appears to 
support Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist perspective. That is, the close cooperation 
between France and Germany has helped facilitate the regional integration process by 
overcoming some difficulties in multi-party negotiations, for example, in reaching mutual 
agreements and on agenda-setting. This has been the case throughout the entire history of 
European integration, with the two countries playing a leading role in ensuring the success of 
many EU initiatives. The Schuman Plan of 1950, the European Monetary System of 1978-1979, 
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the Single European Act of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 can be seen as some 
obvious examples of this, in which the roles of supranational and non-governmental actors 
were overshadowed and underplayed (Cole, 2001: 61-62). In addition, the evidence from the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties suggests that France and Germany were important players 
in the drive towards further European integration. Nonetheless, the European community also 
experienced some setbacks regarding initiatives put forward by the Franco-German leadership 
because these were actually detrimental to its progress, such as the failure to agree upon the 
terms of the European Defence Community (EDC), the Gaullist boycott of the EU institutions 
during 1965–66 and some membership entries, particularly, that of Britain in the 1960s. 
The issue of enlargement in the EU is also of interest as it represents an arena of Franco-
German disharmony. In the eyes of France, a compact union is preferred and they view a wider 
European community as a threat to their national interests. In contrast, Germany supports 
enlargement which it views in terms of European reconciliation, based on a perceived historic 
responsibility to enhance its role in Europe (Cole, 2001: 77). The most notable case was De 
Gaulle’s vetoes of British entry which was supported by other EEC members, but not Germany 
and this also manifested itself in the later southern, northern and eastern enlargements where 
France initially as saw these as threatening to its economy. However, these disputes were 
subsequently resolved by the brokering management of Franco-German cooperation and the 
close personal relationship between their leaders (Schild, 1994). In fact, after the German 
unification, French attitudes towards enlargement shifted to being in favour of it, while 
preserving ‘its influence as a leading EC state and safeguard its privileged relationship with 
Germany’ (Cole, 2001: 78). Germany, on the other hand, has had no concerns about the 
matter of national interests and instead has focused on promoting regional stability. In sum, 
‘the enlargement of the EU raised ever more pressing questions of flexible forms of integration 
and of Franco-German influence in an enlarged Community’ (Cole, 2001: 79). 
Regarding the literature on Euroscepticism, it is apparent that the majority of such attitudes 
pertain to the issues of the negative effects on domestic economies and loss of national 
sovereignty. Moreover, with the Franco-German cooperation in place, ‘the EU does not appear 
as a common enterprise with shared interests and values; rather, it is a battlefield of 
competing national interests all trying to make the best out of it’ (Kananen, 2009) and it is 
surely going to be the most powerful countries who are in better position to get more out of it. 
When countries decide to join the EU, it means they are willing to renounce the long-
established concept of national sovereignty in order to exchange this for some foreseeable 
benefits. However, they still wish to remain an independent country in Europe and not a state 
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within a Franco-German superstate. Although it is too idealistic to hope that all benefits in the 
EU can be distributed evenly, at least they expect to be treated respectably and fairly as a 
member who has a level right to secure its national interests. The lack a strategy for dealing 
with conflicts of interest or a situation in which benefits are distributed unevenly has been 
seen as one of the major weaknesses of the EU (Kananen, 2009).    
The negotiations in the EU have been described as a series of Franco-German compromises, 
with the UK acting as a deterrent (Moravcsik, 1998, Pedersen, 1998). Evidently, when either 
France or Germany disagrees with something any initiatives are likely to have little chance of 
success or even being implemented. From the beginning, the European community was set up 
to operate through the formation of supranational institutions and these are supposed to 
serve as a key player in the decision making and legislation processes. However, it has 
developed in a two-man affair that has been undermining the sense of supranationalism in the 
EU by forging ‘an alliance within the alliance’ (Cole, 2001: 12) which has left the extant 
supranational institutions, for example, the European Commission, being often overlooked or 
malfunctioning, with the main exceptions to this being trade and economic matters. 
Consequently, in the case of the EU, leadership would appear to disaccord with the 
supranational concept and its institutional bodies. Regarding this, it has been argued that 
supranational institutions should be defended against attacks by those seeking to limit their 
roles (Grant, 2012: 87). 
7.3 Background to leadership in ASEAN 
Like other regional groupings, security is always the most important concern. For ASEAN, the 
end of confrontation and the normalization of relations with regional partners was the 
precursor to the formation of this regional organization. Before its establishment in 1967, 
Indonesia had an aggressive regime, the so called Konfrontasi, towards the British-supported 
foundation of Malaysia. Sukarno, who was the President at the time, was very ambitious to 
threaten the newly independent Malaysia, wishing to present Indonesian primacy (Antolik, 
1990: 19). However, war between the two nations was too costly and fruitless, for Malaysia 
had previously been Indonesia’s most important trading partner and hence this conflagration 
was seriously economically damaging for both sides. Despite failing to gain international 
support, President Sukarno still pursued his hostile policy against Malaysia and finally, due to 
economic as well as domestic and international pressure, this led to the transition to a new 
order. More specifically, Sukarno’s regime was wiped out by severe domestic unrest, including 
military coups, kidnappings, demonstrations and several massacres. He was stripped of his 
executive powers, which were transferred to Suharto. Although the situation was politically 
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unstable, after Suharto took charge, the new regime was now on its way to ‘rapprochement 
with Malaysia by means of silence on contentious issues’ (Antolik, 1990: 20). 
The emergence of Singapore as a new city state is another important matter for consideration. 
After gaining independence from the British, it was combined with Malaysia as a result of the 
referendum in 1962. However, a few years later, the merging process had not run smoothly, 
with there having been several riots, as well as conflict and disagreements between the two 
governments. The most important issues were Malay suspicions of the Chinese ethnic group 
and Singapore’s economic potentiality. In August 1965, the Malaysian parliament reached a 
consensus to kick Singapore out of its territory. To Indonesian eyes, particularly among 
Sukarno’s royalists, Singapore’s separation from Malaysia was considered as the breaking up of 
the nation (Antolik, 1990: 20). On the other hand, Singapore viewed the rapprochement 
between Malaysia and Indonesia as a promising Malay coalition and began to use a ‘Singapore-
centric’ policy that pertained to it relying on its independence, sovereignty and ability (Antolik, 
1990: 35). All in all, the period after the departure of President Sukarno saw the improvement 
of the relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia as the two neighbouring states realized 
that normalizing their relationships would ensure peace and stability, whilst Singapore 
remained isolated, self-reliant and had good relations with the developed world.    
Consequently, Malaysia still had to deal with the Indonesia’s strong aggression and desire to 
exercise its influence as well as its attempts to remove Western interference from the region. 
This is what Fifield (1976: 13) called its ‘sense of entitlement’, which was driven by Indonesia’s 
success on the revolutionary front (they had fought for their independence, with it not having 
been granted peacefully as with others); sizes of land, economy and population, geographical 
location as well as their leading role in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, Malaysia confidently 
managed to deal with the eager neighbour fairly well, even during the Konfrontasi, as its 
population acted with accord in support of the nation’s interests. Perhaps, Malaysia trusted in 
the sincerity of Indonesia because the new regime was engaged in challenging domestic unrest 
(Antolik, 1990: 24). Meanwhile, the incoming President of Indonesia learned a lot from the 
conflicts and completely shifted from confrontation to a more cooperative and consultative 
manner. He abandoned Sukarno’s aggressive foreign policy and established his New Order 
government in order to restore regional relations (Ganesan, 2004: 117). Indo-Malay relations 
registered a significant improvement when President Suharto showed good faith by helping to 
re-establish normality when ‘Malaysia appeared to be on the brink of civil war’ (Antolik, 1990: 
29). During the first few decades of his presidency, ‘Suharto defined Indonesian interests in 
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ways largely congruent with both the West and his Southeast Asian neighbours, enabling 
Indonesia to achieve its foreign policy goals largely through diplomasi’ (Bresnan, 2005: 250).          
The intensity of the relationships among Southeast Asian countries was stepped up in August 
1967 when Indonesia took the lead by proposing the establishment of ASEAN, with: Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Although the organization was aimed at promoting 
cooperation in the economic and social areas, in fact, it was widely understood to be driven by 
the desired goal of nonaggression and conflict resolution through a consultation process. In 
this sense, ASEAN would provide Indonesia, and the rest of the group, space and a favourable 
environment for the growth of economies and nation building. Moreover, ASEAN has many 
crucial functions that it employs to serve its member countries. In particular, it performs under 
the principle of equality among members, non-interference and consensus-based decision 
making. This last feature prevents any single member from having a predominant influence on 
the organization or pursuing its own interests against the others (Anwar, 1997: 33). 
Nevertheless, member states can provide assistance during times of domestic difficulties by 
sharing information, cooperating with external powers or mediating with minority groups in 
the country concerned (Antolik, 1990: 157). 
With a prime focus on leadership perspectives, the pre-1997 period, to some extent, sees 
Indonesia’s position of leadership in ASEAN as benevolent influence particularly in relation to 
politics and security. However, since the ending of the East Timor conflict and the severe 
financial crisis in 1997, the largest country in ASEAN has lost its standing and international 
credibility as it has experienced severe internal political and economic difficulties. While 
suffering from domestic problems and attempting to re-stabilize the economy, Indonesia has 
not appeared to be interested in assuming overall leadership in ASEAN anymore. 
Consequently, since then there has been a leadership vacuum in ASEAN and if its presence is 
perceived as a driver of integration, then the empty position needs to be filled. According to 
Anwar (1997: 29), leadership in ASEAN has become ‘functional rather than general’ referring to 
the idea that members can take a leading and initiative position on a particular issue of 
immediate interest to themselves.  
On the whole, we could say that ASEAN is relatively successful in peace keeping and the 
diplomatic coordination of policy among its members as well as with third parties. However, by 
its nature, it is a relatively fragile and sensitive organization, due to the vast diversity among 
members and, to a certain degree, the inadequacy of leadership. Consequently, because of its 
superficial collaborative arrangement, tensions among member countries can arise easily and 
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quickly. Moreover, the insufficient and inconsistent presence of leadership has led to collective 
action problems, whereby it has been more difficult to drive the association towards jointly 
agreed goals. Another thing that should be taken into account is that the maintenance of 
regional cohesion and the preservation of regional unity are priorities which have always stood 
above other considerations, even at the expense of being less dynamic or efficient (Anwar, 
1997: 28). Since the late 1990s, as pointed out above, the position of leadership in ASEAN has 
vanished due to the domestic turbulence in Indonesia. Although since then it has attempted to 
regain this role, its efforts have been restricted by various circumstances, such as ongoing 
economic malaise and interference from external powers. With this lack of strong regional 
leadership, ASEAN would appear to have been weakened and hence, progress to towards 
further integration has been stalled. Regarding future development, while other member 
states take turns to play an important role, the core of ASEAN will continue to be Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore and hence the degree of stability in their relationships will determine 
the political future of the association (Ahmad and Ghoshal, 1999: 763). More importantly, the 
organization is unlikely to move forward without the active involvement of its largest member 
state, namely Indonesia, playing a constructive role in regional development (Emmers, 2005: 
661).  
7.4 Is ASEAN leaderless? 
Southeast Asia has suffered from leadership deficiency for decades. The absence of regional 
leadership and the domestic weaknesses of member states has been often linked to the 
emergence of external interference with a variety of conflicting ideologies, which has been 
problematic for ASEAN. In particular, in this respect, it strongly emphasised that since 
Indonesia began its departure in foreign policy in the late 1990s as a result of the resignation 
of President Suharto, the leadership of the organisation has been somewhat rudderless. 
Regarding this, Severino (2004: 182) writes that ‘when that country (Indonesia) was debilitated 
by its economic crisis and political turmoil in the late 1990s, media and academic 
commentators were quick to proclaim that ASEAN had lost its leader.’ Ganesan (2004: 121) 
holds that the supremacy of Suharto in ASEAN clearly stabilized the regional environment and 
hence the willingness of member states to allow Indonesia the status of ‘the first among 
equals’ within ASEAN and the fall of Suharto’s regime represented its abnegation regarding the 
leadership role. Leading Anwar (2006: 60) to write that ‘the absence of an Indonesian posture 
leaves a vacuum that cannot be easily filled by other members’. Similarly, Smith (1999: 245) 
notes that ‘it is no longer accurate to describe Indonesia as the leader of ASEAN. This 
responsibility has been abdicated, but there is no obvious successor’. Ahmad and Ghoshal 
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(1999: 775) point out how the post-Suharto transition became a concern for the countries of 
Southeast Asia, which had high stakes in the stability of Indonesia and of the region. Although 
after recovering from this disastrous time Indonesia was able to achieve some brokering tasks, 
including the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam and the territorial disputes between Thailand 
and Cambodia as well some members’ conflict with China over the South China Sea, Ganesan 
(2004: 121) argues that such regional leadership as during Suharto’s era no longer exists 
because the latter’s attempts to resolve disputes have been somewhat half-hearted. 
On the other side, Indonesia had learnt some important lessons from the past experiences. 
Consequently, when the country was recovering from the crisis, the government refrained 
from asserting its influence over the union, because it was well aware of the cynical feelings 
among other ASEAN partners that their taking an assertive role could spur antagonism, 
resulting in them being accused of attempting to dominate the association. This is important, 
for this key reason for the absence of leadership and the recent inactive role of Indonesia in 
ASEAN. Anwar (1994: 115-116) adds that one of the major reasons why Indonesia could not 
fully exercise leadership over the region was that its leaders were aware of increasing doubt 
and suspicion of the country’s dominance, particularly among smaller sensitive members, 
which they believed could lead to the undermining of the low-profile policy in ASEAN.  The 
following statement by Indonesia’s Permanent Representative to ASEAN, clearly questions the 
assumption that his country should automatically lead: 
“It is not fair for me to say that this (leadership) is Indonesia. This is what people say 
but we never have that officially. It is only people who label us as a leader.”67  
However, he later slightly changed his position regarding leadership in ASEAN when he said: 
“This is not about something that we are happy about or not, this is something that 
can maintain the unity and sense of caring and sharing in ASEAN.”  
Owing to its awareness of suspicions of its intentions among its neighbours, Indonesia has 
viewed keeping its low-profile image within ASEAN as necessary for the continuing unity. That 
is, ‘Voluntary restraint in Indonesia’s role in ASEAN was designed to allay any lingering 
suspicions towards Indonesia’ (Anwar, 1994: 289). However, this does not mean an 
opportunity to lead ASEAN will be given to others, because Indonesia would not allow other 
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countries taking a too dominant role either. A Malaysian scholar made an interesting point 
here:  
“Indonesia is like an elephant in the room, even it is not leading, you cannot do 
anything if Indonesia disagrees.”68   
Then, the follow-up question is whether there are other challenging candidates for leadership 
in ASEAN? And the simple answer to this question is ‘Yes’, Malaysia. For Malaysia, the 
commitment to ASEAN has been considered the first concern of its foreign policy, especially in 
the era of Prime Minister Dr Mahathir (1981-2003). Such a priority is conceivably emerged 
from the belief in the political viability of ASEAN and that the spirit of the association has been 
playing an important role in assisting Malaysia to maintain good relations with key 
neighbouring countries (Ping, 1982: 517). As pointed out above, the country participated in the 
association right from the beginning and has been involved in the initiation of several 
important ASEAN projects. One of the most influential interventions was its strong support for 
the expansion of the organization, whereby it played an active role in promoting ASEAN 
membership, which resulted in it eventually incorporating all ten countries of the region. As 
the second richest nation by per capita income, it would be a substitute for leadership in 
economic cooperation, given Indonesia’s much less impressive economic performance. In 
terms of the political perspective, some analysts have argued that political stability in Malaysia 
accompanied by its experiences in handling foreign affairs have put it in a good position to lead 
ASEAN (Chan, 2012).  
At the same time, Singapore, a developed nation that notably has strengths in all areas of the 
economy, could be listed as another candidate for the regional leader. During the first phase, 
its decision to join ASEAN was seen as a means to survive as a newly independent state 
amongst pressure from neighbouring countries and against the scenario of domestic divided 
ethnic groups. Shee Poon Kim (1997: 69) argued that ‘if Singapore did not join ASEAN and ran 
against the regional tide, the prospects of Singapore surviving as an independent state would 
be bleak’. Moreover, due to its limited land and natural resources, the country’s motivation to 
join ASEAN seems to be only regarding the economic rationale of gaining access to large 
markets and rich natural resources. As a consequence, Singapore has always been an active 
supporter of economic cooperation among ASEAN countries. However, due to the slow 
economic progress in the first few decades of the association’s existence and weaknesses in 
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the region’s economic structure (such as  industrial capacity and purchasing power), Singapore 
did not fully have faith in ASEAN’s economic viability and thus largely bypassed these countries 
so as to tie its economy to that of the major developed industrial world (Kim, 1997: 74). 
Regarding this, Antolik (1990: 35) wrote ‘though a member of ASEAN, Singapore did not place 
great confidence in the pledge of nonaggression, nor did it have realistic expectations or 
desires about the group’s economic and cultural goals’. 
Both Malaysia and Singapore have a reasonable degree of regional competence and have play 
important roles in shaping ASEAN. Nonetheless, with regards to Young’s concepts of 
leadership as presented in Chapter 3, the regional influences of Malaysia and Singapore are 
not based on the structural type of leadership in which power is derived from the possession 
of material resources. Rather, this falls into the entrepreneurial or ideational form in which the 
influences come from an individual (such as Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir and 
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew) who leads by making use of negotiating skills to 
influence the manner of association and by devising mutually-accepted deals that bring 
benefits for all. This was supported by a scholar from RSIS when he said:  
“Singapore could be a possible leader because of its wealth, very good infrastructure 
and English proficiency. But of course, that would be completely unacceptable to many 
others for a variety of reasons.”69  
Interestingly, an Indonesian scholar shared her view from the perspective of national interests:  
“Singapore and Malaysia have conflicting interests with other members. That is why 
this makes it difficult for them to be accepted as a leader.”70 
Furthermore, evidence has been provided showing that ASEAN’s cooperation has taken the 
form of intergovernmentalism where member states reject the delegation of their powers. 
According to Smith (2004), in such an environment power is normally defined in material terms 
and the most powerful actor, in this respect, normally has the most influence over the group’s 
decisions. In this regard, I propose that the influences of Malaysia and Singapore on ASEAN 
would not conform to the context of intergovernmentalism. For, in their case, their regional 
influence has only shone when a strong charismatic leader has come to power, while 
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Indonesia’s leadership role in the region has significantly declined since the end of 1990s as a 
result of the collapse of Suharto’s regime, severe economic turmoil as well as the policy of a 
low-key posture. Similarly, Paul (2010: 196) argues that ‘Singapore and Malaysia which are at 
the centre of the regional organization and communication hub, are too weak economically 
and adversarial in their cultural and political relations to constitute a core to hold and expand 
the regionalisation process.’ 
Furthermore, as Severino (2004: 182) contends, ‘ASEAN’s aversion to any one member’s 
dominance springs from its insistence on the equality of all members’. As a consequence, the 
association has always managed to avoid the unilateral dominance of a single country or a 
group of member states, leaving it without an overt leadership (Mohamed Pero, 2011: 5). I 
would comment that this is probably due to the remaining antagonism among member states 
and the association’s principles of having: equal rights, equal say and equal contributions. 
However, it could be argued that ASEAN has not been literally leaderless, for all the time, there 
has been the shadow of Indonesia’s influence in the region, or as quoted in Anwar’s work 
(2006: 66) its ‘leading from behind’. As explained above, Indonesia realizes very well that it 
cannot assert its power over the association overtly, because this would cause tensions among 
members that would threaten the cooperative and accommodating environment. Several of 
the research participants remarked upon the unclear picture of Indonesia’s leadership. For 
example, a Filipino scholar said:  
“There are some certain countries that, at a certain point in time, take the lead but 
Indonesia is always a part of the picture. It is always with the concurrence of 
Indonesia”71  
Similarly, a scholar from RSIS said: 
“Leadership in ASEAN is informal. This is why you cannot see it in terms of a physical 
embodiment.”72  
In addition, another scholar from RSIS added that Indonesia’s leadership is not obvious 
because: 
“It is not ongoing and long-term, leading to a very clear end goal.”73 
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Indonesia would fit the profile of Young’s structural leadership as it enthusiastically continues 
to bring ‘the sense of entitlement’ into play in the institutional bargaining and transforming it 
into the form of bargaining leverage. So, the conclusion can be drawn that the conditions and 
visibility of leadership in ASEAN are determined by Indonesia’s foreign policy in relation to 
whether or when to lead, to react or whether to maintain its low-key profile. Due to the 
ongoing suspicions, anxiety, uncertainty and the strong nationalist sentiments among member 
states, Indonesia has not been fully able to assume a unilateral leadership role so as to protect 
regional unity, members’ willingness to continue accommodation and, the most important, the 
association’s survival. According to Antolik (1990: 163-164): 
‘The past suggests, however, that ASEAN success depends on Indonesia’s (i.e. Suharto) 
low-key leadership style and broad vision that regional stability is a national interest. If 
a new leader (Indonesia) seeks to play a global role and neglects cultivation of regional 
relations, if he seeks to expand for reasons of prestige or to solve an insurgency, if he 
decides to ride the wave of fundamentalist Islam and liberate coreligionists, then it is 
likely the ASEAN process would disintegrate’     
Moreover, it is apparent that leadership in ASEAN very much adheres to the personal stature 
of an individual in that power is likely to be exercised regionally when a charismatic or 
insightful leader who values the vitality of cooperation at regional level is in power. According 
to a former Secretary General of ASEAN:  
“The leaderlessness in ASEAN depends on the personality involved, if you have a 
charismatic leader, people will go along.”74  
Such a circumstance can be seen in the administrations of Indonesia’s Suharto, Malaysia’s 
Mahathir and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and this point will be developed further in the next 
section. In summary, the lack of leadership in ASEAN in recent times can be attributed to 
Indonesia’s non-assertive and indirect approach to the role. However, although it has been 
refusing to exert its influence, there is no doubt that it has always been regarded as ‘the first 
among equals’. However, the shadow of Indonesia’s history of confrontation with its 
neighbours in the past has troubled ASEAN and hence it is perhaps not surprising that its 
exercise of leadership has become somewhat enigmatic. 
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7.5 Existing forms of leadership 
Another matter for consideration is that regarding existing forms of leadership in ASEAN. 
Despite the Indonesia’s intermittent unilateral form of leadership in ASEAN, the data illustrate 
some other interesting insights regarding previous existing patterns of leadership in ASEAN. As 
appeared in Chapter 3, it is worth noting that, in any regional grouping, most informative 
discourses regarding leadership refer to the formal term of leadership, which is usually the 
presidency or chairmanship of the union. Technically, a rotating presidency or chairmanship 
has the conventional ability to influence decision making and is considered as the most 
undisputed leadership arrangement as well as by far the best manner to manage an 
association. However, the intergovernmentalist perspective heralds that more attention tends 
to be on the informal forms of leadership exercised by a region’s superpowers or the most 
influential countries who possess the ability to coerce or persuade others. In Chapter 4, the 
EU’s experiences suggest that it is leadership of this nature that actually steers the 
organization and, more importantly, increases the probability of success. (Cole, 2001: 47) 
Similar to the EU, the current context of ASEAN’s formal leadership refers to the rotating 
chairmanship, which proceeds in alphabetical order. Informal leadership is in the hands 
Indonesia and, to some extent, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, which are the most 
influential member states capable of taking initiatives that they are then able to persuade 
others to support. This section focuses on the various types of informal leadership in ASEAN, as 
the result of a synthesis of the data collected from the documentation and the interviews. 
Despite the apparent intermittent unilateral leadership of Indonesia, the literature and the 
interview data reveals that in ASEAN informal leadership can be categorized into three 
additional different patterns. The first is described in a number of works by Severino (2004) 
and Anwar (2006) as well as being identified by some of the interviewees. Sectorial leadership 
or what is sometimes called issue-based leadership or termed ‘functional rather than general 
leadership’ by Anwar (2006), refers to that exhibited through areas or sectors of competence 
that a country has, which puts it in a better position to take the lead at a particular time. 
Regarding which, Indonesia is widely considered to be at the forefront of security and political 
matters, whereas Singapore and Thailand, and to some extent Malaysia, are more prominent 
in areas of economic development, while the Philippines is more keen on promoting socio-
cultural cooperation. One classic example of this form of leadership in the case when Vietnam 
invaded Cambodia in 1970s, when ASEAN tried to achieve an effective resolution to the 
conflict by demanding an immediate withdrawal (Sundararaman, 1997). This time, as a 
frontline country with high stakes in the conflict, ASEAN’s official standpoint was led by the 
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Thais, who galvanised support from their regional fellow members. An Indonesian scholar 
expressed the view that sectorial leadership does exist, being exercised through the 
constructing of ASEAN pillars, which are sponsored by particular member countries. 75 
Furthermore, the view of a Malaysian scholar appeared to support the idea of sectorial 
leadership as an effective measure:  
“Sectorial leadership is important. It is good and suitable for ASEAN.”76  
Secondly, some scholars write about cooperative leadership or what is sometimes called 
coalition leadership. Basically, it is that formed by a group of countries who share a common 
vision and wish to play a strategic role in the region. For instance, Kassim (2005: 301) pointed 
out that owing to the three countries sharing more similarities than with other ASEAN 
partners, if Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were able to consolidate their domestic politics 
as well as forging solid cooperation among their leaders, ‘the basis of a stronger ASEAN could 
be put in place given that the three countries, individually and collectively, play a strategic role 
in the region’. Interestingly, a scholar from RSIS raised this form of leadership: 
“I honestly believe that there is no single country that can fulfil that (leadership) role… 
Another model would be a coalition model where you have two or three prime 
ministers or heads of state who feel that we need to push ASEAN forward and we have 
a common vision.”77  
At the end of the interview, he added that coalition leadership is the most effective form of 
leadership for ASEAN to pursue. This is similar to the view of the director of EU Centre: 
“I do not agree with a single leader. There should be a coalition leader. If ASEAN wants 
to be effective, it should be built on each other’s strength having different countries or 
faces doing different things depending on what they are good at.”78  
The last category is periodical leadership, where the role is attached to individuality or 
personal ability, as mentioned in the previous section. Antolik (1990: 165) contended that ‘all 
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ASEAN states are subject to the emergence of new leaders who may have priorities or less 
appreciation of ASEAN procedures’. A Malaysian scholar said:  
“It (leadership in ASEAN) seems to be periodical and it depends on which leaders come 
in and how they see the benefits that ASEAN can have.”79  
However, this pattern of leadership is heavily reliant on strong characters, regard and 
confidence given by others as well as a supportive domestic environment in the country. In 
relation to this form of leadership, the concept of ‘Asian values’, a popular debate in Southeast 
Asia during the last few decades, as raised in Chapter 3, also sheds light on the conventionality 
of leadership in ASEAN, particularly in relation to individuality and strong characters of 
leadership. As such, the debates over ‘Asian values’ highlight the considerable differences 
between the Western and Eastern concepts of key political components and give an 
explanation for the unique pattern of institutions and political ideologies derived from cultures 
and histories in East and Southeast Asia. The popular discourses are heavily centred on the 
core leaders of ASEAN, namely Indonesia’s President Suharto, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, three notable leaders who 
have played a significant role in the development path of ASEAN. Thompson (2004: 1085) 
contended that the Asian values discourse in Malaysia and Singapore was to ‘justify 
authoritarianism after economic development to help co-opt their large middle classes’. That 
is, this was not promoted in support of rapid economic growth, but ‘rather, it justified 
authoritarianism after developmental goals had been substantially achieved’. (Thompson, 
2004: 1091). From this it can be seen that ASEAN’s leadership at regional level has a solid link 
with domestic political conditions in that the presence of periodical leadership and the strong 
characters of some of it leaders have come from personal beliefs and political ideologies 
embedded at a domestic level. In relation to Chapter 5, where in transpired that Malaysia and 
Singapore have had poor democracy records owing a widespread mistrust of its benefits at the 
domestic level, there suitability as leadership candidates is somewhat questionable.           
7.6 Indonesia as a natural leader of ASEAN 
To recap so as to facilitate understanding of the discourse in this section, Indonesia has widely 
been commented upon by many analysts regarding its silent leadership in the region. As 
revealed in the previous sections, during the Suharto era it was at forefront of the foundation 
of ASEAN and the association always gained strong support from that nation’s governments. 
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The departure of President Suharto and the regional financial crisis in the late 1990s did spell 
the end of its active and assertive influence in the region. Later, while Indonesia’s economy 
regained and started to prosper, Indonesia’s presence and diplomatic posture in ASEAN 
remained relatively humble and unassuming. This allowed other ASEAN member states to 
establish themselves as equal partners and feel more comfortable when dealing with each 
other. The recent significant progress in the economic and political spheres has led Indonesia 
to revert to the form regional leadership more akin that of the Suharto era, but in a much less 
assertive way. This comeback has not been limited to within ASEAN, but goes beyond the 
region as the international community now recognizes Indonesia as a major actor at G-20 
Meetings, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and is also an important US partner 
(Areethamsirikul, 2011). Clearly, as many have argued, Indonesia’s regional and global profile 
is clearly on the rise. With more confidence and a better international profile, has Indonesia 
matured enough to become the entitled leader of ASEAN? This section examines and evaluates 
the different roles Indonesia has played in the development of ASEAN and the potentiality for 
it steering ASEAN towards success. 
Indonesia is the region’s largest nation, covering an area of 1.9 million square kilometres. It is 
the world’s fourth largest country in terms of population and also has the world’s largest 
number of Muslim inhabitants. Regionally, Indonesia comprised two-third of ASEAN’s total 
population and territory before the accession of Vietnam. It was the country that initiated and 
proposed the foundation of ASEAN as the means to end regional conflicts. With the advantage 
of having the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN Permanent Representatives located in the 
capital, Jakarta, it has become the centre of ASEAN diplomacy, providing an easy connection 
with other partners particularly when facing urgent matters or in need of calling meetings. 
Psychologically, the greatest pride of Indonesia’s nationalists is the self-made independence 
achieved by its uprising against the Dutch in 1940s, rather than it being given peacefully as 
with other regional fellows, such as Malaysia and the Philippines. As a result, Indonesian 
people are convinced that the independence victory is so meaningful because it was entirely as 
a result of their own efforts and so they feel indebted to no one. As a consequence of their 
painful experiences from colonization, most Indonesians have anti-imperialist sentiments and 
do not seem to favour international interference in both their domestic and regional affairs. 
This could be seen during the first two decades of ASEAN, when Indonesia was the country 
that played a leading role in stressing non-alignment and a general interest in removing the 
exercise of external powers from the region (Smith, 1999: 241). At the international level, it 
remains neutral, independent, self-reliant and ‘uninfluenced by the imperialists’ (Callis, 1978: 
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9). Moreover, many Indonesians believe that they are different from Westerners and Chinese, 
because their moral and spiritual values are far above the others’ materialistic attitudes (Callis, 
1978: 10). With these psychological perspectives coupled with the material advantages derived 
from sheer size and strategic location, Indonesia is widely regarded as the entitled leader, the 
most influential actor and the giant of Southeast Asia.    
On these grounds, Indonesians feel the ‘sense of entitlement’, believing that due to having 
better qualifications for leadership, they are destined to lead ASEAN. The influence of 
Indonesia in the region was clearly seen even before the establishment of ASEAN. Leifer (1999: 
37) pointed out that the short-lived Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) joined by Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand, prior to the setting up of ASEAN never attracted international 
respect, because of the absence of the largest and most populous country in the region. In the 
same vein, Antolik (1990: 17) contended that ASEAN is significantly differentiated from its 
predecessors owing to the addition of the membership of the region’s largest state together 
with its acceptance of accommodation. This implies that Indonesia has been markedly 
influential in the development of ASEAN since before its creation. During Sukarno’s era, the 
grievous consequences from his Konfrontasi policy were the key determinants of what has 
become ASEAN today. With respect to Antolik’s perspective, the formation of ASEAN has been 
‘a political process to obviate all future Konfrontasi’ (1990: 17). The following period of 
Suharto’s active administration made Indonesia’s regional leadership even more explicit. That 
is, his successful contributions to regional stability in the form of turning the battlefield into a 
peaceful environment, and domestic economic improvements provided Indonesia a position in 
ASEAN of more regional support and credibility. 
In contrast to its benevolent regional policy, Indonesia’s coercive action towards East Timor 
took away its international standing. This situation was intensified by the severe financial crisis 
that struck the region in 1997, which resulted in its influence in ASEAN being ultimately 
diminished owing to several domestic problems and hence loss of belief in Indonesia’s long-
term leadership role. Regarding the destabilising issues, Smith (1999: 238-239) identified the 
1997 financial and economic crisis, the Indonesian forest fires during 1997-1998, that nation’s 
reluctance for trade liberalism and the accession of Cambodia as having caused considerable 
strains within ASEAN. Since then, Indonesia has tried its best to exercise benevolent power in 
light of its domestic weakness in order to be ‘in tune with its natural position of leadership in 
ASEAN’ (Emmers, 2005: 648). After the decline of its position in ASEAN as a consequence of 
the aforementioned circumstances, Indonesia attempted to resume its former leading role in 
ASEAN once its economy had recovered after the 1997 crisis. One of the key mechanisms that 
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have fortified the process of regaining its reputation in regional affairs is the country’s 
consolidation of democracy. The introduction of genuine democracy that began after the fall 
of Suharto at the end of 1990s was a critical turning point in Indonesia’s political history as the 
country had been under the authoritarian rule since its declared independence in 1945, such 
that its foreign policy making was always derived from the leader’s individuality and interests. 
The recent national democratic elections in 2004 and 2009 were considered free and fair with 
only a little violence being reported, which was in contrast to those of its neighbouring 
countries, Malaysia and Singapore, which have been under one party rule for several decades 
(Reid, 2012: 5). In 2012, the country was even ranked by Freedom House as fully democratic, 
becoming the only country in Southeast Asia, alongside Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
(Freedom House, 2012). 
As mentioned previously in Chapter 3, under democratic peace theory it is suggested that 
democracies do not fight among themselves because a democratic system has many effective 
anti-war instruments. Moreover, when facing a dispute, democratic countries would expect 
the other country to sort the problem out peacefully. Also, it was elicited in the same chapter 
that democracy is likely to reinforce the regional integration process. Thus, such conventional 
insights imply that the political transition of the region’s largest state could encourage the 
peaceful conflict mechanisms and cooperative manners, thereby contributing to stability 
within ASEAN. Further, for Indonesia, the consolidation of democracy would mean the 
changing of values and in particular, the nature of its foreign policy, such that it transforms 
itself into a fundamental source of ‘soft power’ that would enhance international image of the 
association (Laksmana, 2011: 163-164). Nye (2004: 11) wrote in his book that the values, such 
as democracy, human rights, peace and collaborative manners, a government represents at 
the domestic level, in its international institutions and in foreign policy are an important 
source of soft power. This directly associates with the constructivist stance that emphasizes 
how benevolent power is derived from the soft power of ideas, values and institutions. 
Concerning this, Indonesia’s regional leadership driven by its soft power could be a key 
mechanism to dismantle antagonism, suspicion and uncertainty among ASEAN members, thus 
giving it more credibility and hence more rightful power to lead. 
In the previous section it was pointed out that leadership in ASEAN is strongly tied to individual 
capacities and characters, which indicates that it would prove beneficial to assess the current 
leader of Indonesia, for given this notion a strong one implies a more confident country. The 
current Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, or as called by the media, ‘SBY’, is 
widely considered a key driving force behind the country’s recent remarkable development. He 
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is the first ever president to be re-elected and his two landslide wins in 2004 and 2009 have 
guaranteed him widespread support from the people and thus provided him with a strong 
mandate to exert strong leadership in order to push forward the country in a more peaceful, 
stable and prosperous manner. The re-election came from the credit he gained as a result of 
some success in dealing with the unstable economy, deep-rooted problems such as corruption 
and the independence movement in Aceh province during his first term of presidency (Joshi, 
2009). Internationally, under his administration Indonesia’s role on the international scene has 
been considerably rising. He also earned widespread international respect and a number of 
awards: one of the 100 World's Most Influential People in 2009 by Time magazine, the 
Honorary Companion of the Order of Australia in 2010, the Honorary Knights Grand Cross of 
the Order of the Bath awarded by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II in 2012 and the World 
Statesman Award in 2013. In general, this international recognition, not only acknowledges his 
growing reputation, but also by association Indonesia’s recent impressive development. As 
appeared on the BBC in this regard, ‘being forced from office under successive presidents 
seems to have enhanced Mr Yudhoyono's reputation as a man of principle, willing to sacrifice 
his own ambitions for the values he believes in’ (Harvey, 2004). Similarly Anwar Ibrahim wrote 
in Time magazine (Ibrahim, 2009), ‘the time is right for Indonesia, as the world's most 
populous Muslim nation, to assume a more prominent position in Asia and throughout the 
Muslim world’. Seemingly, the right one has been found for Indonesia, and collectively for 
ASEAN.   
Indonesia is clearly on the rise on the international stage as it has started to gain credibility 
and reputation. A few years ago, one of the most influential American Journal Foreign Policy 
titled an article as ‘The Indonesian Tiger’, which demonstrates the rising potentiality of 
Indonesia (Keating, 2010). Another noteworthy article came under the heading ‘Roubini: 
Goodbye China, Hello Indonesia’ in The Financial Times. It discusses the dramatic growth of 
Indonesia’s economy and its emerging importance in the global economy. In this well 
respected economist’s own words, ‘now, along with most of its south-east Asian neighbours, it 
(Indonesia) has built up “massive reserves” and is in healthy shape’ (Deutsch, 2011). Among 
the several favourable economic fundamentals mentioned in the articles, the most significant 
factors of Indonesia’s economic growth are domestic consumption, which is derived from the 
expansion of middle-class income, and the considerable low amount of government debt 
(Reid, 2012: 4-5). However, there still has been ongoing criticism about such domestic matters 
as corruption, ailing infrastructure and extremist Islamic rhetoric. 
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Henceforth, Indonesia is now clearly in the new era as the past authoritarianism and the 
traumas of regional conflict have faded into history. The country would appear to be preparing 
itself to become a more engaged regional actor as it gets closer to being fully equipped with 
the necessary instruments for this outcome. As stated by a Malaysian scholar:  
“Indonesia has crossed a sort of democratic line and it will never go back… Indonesia 
now is very plural and pragmatic. Maybe, a good candidate for a leader could come 
out of Indonesia.”80  
Arguably, the material factors (sizes of land, population and economy, strategic location and 
natural resources), the psychological factors (spirit and self-reliance), the supplying of soft 
power (inducement and attraction) stemming from consolidated democracy and political 
stability as well as the charismatic individuality of leader co-produce the most realistic 
candidateship for leading ASEAN.  
7.7 Discussion and conclusion 
From the European experience, it has been explained that leadership during the regional 
integration process can involve two antagonistic positions. First, it can be an important driver 
playing a key role in accelerating and facilitating the negotiation and decision-making process, 
particularly in a large union which contains many different actors. Second, on the other hand, 
leadership can deter the progress and development of regional integration, because it can 
come in form of uncertainty and Euroscepticism, in particular, regarding economic-based and 
sovereignty-based worries. Indeed, the EU literature suggests that leadership is necessary for 
the regional integration process and hence important for the success of the community. 
However, if the leaders possess too much power and decide to go against the EU, they can 
threaten to end the union. A more viable alternative to handling leadership in the EU could be 
to stick to the original concept of having consolidated and commanding supranational 
institutions with a good balance of power, particularly with regards to the roles of: the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. That is, owing to 
their being established based on a supranational perspective, the institutional organs of the EU 
were ideally designed to be the engine driver with supreme power over the union. However, 
perhaps because the union has grown from 6 to 27 countries, the leadership issue has become 
a lot more complex. Hence, the original idea of Jean Monnet needs revision, in order to deal 
with the growing diversity and complexity, in the form of treaty change. In terms of leadership, 





perhaps the solution lies in appointing someone who is proficient, experienced, trusted and 
independent from domestic politics to take charge. This would help prevent situations when 
national politics interfered, thus ensuring the union would keep running smoothly unhindered 
by domestic affairs. Therefore, the EU should not rely solely on its leadership, but rather on its 
solid institutional structure, which is regarded as the backbone that provides support for 
everything else. All in all, the Franco-German pattern does not seem to be entirely compatible 
with the context of European integration and thus forms of leadership need to be considered. 
The matters of power and leadership would appear to be increasingly spurring on sceptical 
attitudes towards European integration, thereby posing a major threat further regional 
integration. Given that member countries are tied together by foreseeable future because of 
political and economic benefits offered by the EU, the distributions of power among national 
and supranational actors as well as the roles of national governments require significant 
revision. For, every deepening and widening attempt at more regional integration will put a 
great strain on the societies within the EU (Arato and Kaniok, 2009: 27). Thus, profound 
understanding of the EU should  not only rest with the political elites, but it should be clearly 
disseminated to a wider audience so as to forge a ‘populist consensus’ (Arato and Kaniok, 
2009: 34). It has become a fundamental fact that close Franco-German relations have been 
crucial for European integration as they have been the engine of Europe for many decades and 
have helped in the attainment of mutual outcomes. However, as the union has grown larger 
and more complex, although it cannot be denied that this shared structural leadership has 
resulted in vital initiatives in the building of the European community, such as the creation of 
the European Council, the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, the European Monetary 
Union and the Schengen Area, it is probably not this type of leadership that the EU will require 
in the future. That is, the success of leadership depends on whether the type supplied is 
suitable for making progress in the negotiating context (Beach and Mazzucelli, 2007: 19). If the 
EU is about going to be a united states of Europe and thus maintain the fate of 
supranationalism, someone who legitimately represents the whole union, on the basis of 
technocracy rather than someone whose accountability is derived from national electorates 
and under the influence of the French and German. 
As illustrated by the case of ASEAN, leadership in a regional organization can be a problematic 
and sensitive issue because it can involve domination of one or a group of states over the 
others. The ability of certain states to take the lead and the acquiescence of other states to live 
with that kind of assertiveness depends on many factors and ‘falls more into the realm of art 
than science’ (Anwar, 2006: 60). Nevertheless, to some extent, as Mattli (1999: 65) has made 
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clear in his book the existence of a hegemonic or dominant actor, serving as an institutional 
focal point and regional paymaster, is an important precondition of a successful regional 
integration. Similarly, a Filipino scholar said:  
“Leadership could help because it kick starts certain things.”81  
Another scholar indicated that: 
  “The leaderlessness in ASEAN can be a problem.”82  
From the discussion in this and previous chapters it clear that ASEAN is an intergovernmental 
and elitist-driven organization. That is, it is mobilized by the political leaders who, from the 
very beginning, will decide the objective, the visions, and the ideas of the organisation and 
later, they ‘will start to articulate how do we structured the organisation, what kind of power 
do we want to give the organisation’ (Mohamed Pero, 2011: 7). Regarding the matter of 
leadership, I posit that both the literature and interview data have confirmed that it is an 
important driver of ASEAN integration.  
The invisibility and complexity of leadership in ASEAN provides several useful insights. Firstly, it 
implies that the presence of two forms of leadership can be detected in every integrating 
region. In this regard, Indonesia’s Permanent Representative to ASEAN made it clear that both 
ASEAN and the EU carry out two forms of leadership, formal and informal. In the case of 
ASEAN:  
“The chairmanship of ASEAN is what we agreed officially. It is not only chairing the 
meeting but it is leadership also.”83  
Secondly, the invisibility of leadership in ASEAN is perhaps as a consequence of the principle of 
equality and remaining antagonism among members. So, the rotating chairmanship system is 
created to secure this golden rule and ensure the group’s collaborative framework and 
members’ willingness to coordinate regionally. More importantly, the rotating chairmanship 
helps to conceal the presence of unequally distributed power in the region, which could 
potentially pose a threat to regional peace and unity. Indeed, as the most structurally powerful 
                                                          
81
 CABALLERO-ANTHONY, M. 2013. Interviewed by the author [in person] Singapore, 7 January 2013. 
82
 EMMERS, R. 2013. Interviewed by the author [in person] Singapore, 22 January 2013. 
83
 SWAJAYA, N. 2013. Interviewed by the author [in person] Jakarta, 22 March 2013. 
190 
 
country in the region, the invisibility of leadership in ASEAN is conditioned by the Indonesia’s 
compensation for the sake of regional unity, which has transpired as being one of the 
Indonesia’s significant commitments to the association’s survival and success.         
In reality, integrating regions cannot deny the influence of structural powers, derived from 
material and resource capacity in every international bargain where national interests are 
contested. Even the European Union which has much more solid and effective institutional 
bodies grounded in the intention to drive decision making is influentially inferior to the Franco-
German alliance. In Mattli’s work (Mattli, 1999: 14), he contended that multiple potential 
leaders in a region would cause a coordination problem, which could consequently act as a 
deterrent to regional integration. Therefore, it is advised that ‘Successful integration requires 
the presence of an undisputed leader among the group of countries seeking closer ties. Such a 
state serves as focal point in the coordination of rules, regulations and policies; it also helps to 
ease distributional tensions through, for example, side-payments’. The discussion in the 
previous sections has revealed the presence of Indonesia’s influence over the region all the 
time that ASEAN has been in existence, although its exercising of power has been somewhat 
intermittent. Thus, is in line with Lübkemeier (2007: 7), Schild (2010: 1370-1371) and Beach 
and Mazzucelli’s (2007: 19) stance put forward in Chapter 484, I accept that the most effective, 
possible, suitable and realistic form of leadership in ASEAN should be driven by Indonesia, 
simply because it is a natural leader of the organisation. This conclusion comes both from the 
literature and the interviews, which have confirmed that Indonesia has a crucial role play in 
deepening ASEAN’s regional integration. Challenging this view, a Filipino scholar claimed that:  
“If Indonesia starts to be more aggressive, it doesn’t matter whether it is rich or poor, 
just by the sheer size of Indonesia it can affect and destabilize ASEAN.”85  
This perspective confirms that Indonesia’s foreign policy is a key factor determining the 
coordination and stability within ASEAN. However, Indonesia’s leadership is known as 
‘leadership from behind’, which is relatively invisible and tacit due to the principle of equality 
among members. With the low-posture politics of Indonesia together with the design of 
ASEAN, the association has created multilateralism and a neutral context in which smaller 
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states are able to feel less outclassed when dealing with Indonesia, thus avoiding the need to 
form a polarizing coalition in the region (Antolik, 1990: 159). 
In connection with the previous chapter, where the considerable weakness and dysfunction of 
ASEAN institutions was exposed, I also propose that ASEAN cannot rely wholly on structural 
leadership. That is, to some degree, it should incorporate some sense of entrepreneurial or 
ideational leadership as well. Moreover, a leadership that is accommodative and persuasive 
would help promote ASEAN’s international standing, for it would change the external 
perspective on the region being prone to coerciveness and antagonism. In other words, the 
association would be perceived as having a leadership that was exercising soft power. Nye 
(2004: 6), in his book claimed that if a leader represents these values, or at least those that 
others want to follow, ‘it will cost less to lead.’ A Malaysian scholar strongly supported this 
notion, by saying:  
“I would say the Secretary General position can be enhanced. This is the person who is 
able to build bridges between countries and convince the leaders. So, you also really 
need the entrepreneurial leadership.”86  
As stressed by several of the interviewees, the most important thing seems to be neutrality 
and realization beyond national interests. In other words, the person who is in charge of 
steering the association should not simply be looking at his or her own personal or national 
interests and political survival, but take responsibility for the region’s fortune as a whole.            
Moreover, sectorial leadership has an important role to play in ASEAN, because Indonesia still 
lacks the capability to make a strong contribution in some areas, in particular, on the economic 
and social fronts. As a result, this leaves some space for other member countries, especially 
Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, to take the lead at certain points in time. Finally, as the 
former Secretary General stated at the end of his interview:  
“ASEAN needs a leader like President Suharto used to be. He came from a very big 
country. He knew that he could not assert Indonesian influence all the time. The rest of 
us went to him and referred to President Suharto, he was the accepted wise-man. We 
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would not overstep his limit. That kind of system heavily depends on personality and I 
don’t think we can rely on that.”87 
Although this contribution would appear to be rather confused in its message, what is 
important about it is the way it focuses on a particular individual as having the destiny of 
ASEAN in his hands. That is, this exposes the fact that the debate regarding leadership of the 
organisation has tended to be very much to do with leadership by powerful individuals 
exercised periodically, rather than other forms. Moreover, I have contended that both ASEAN 
and the European Union have been driven by a structural type of leadership through the 
informal engagement of leaders. However, both models are different in terms of dependency. 
ASEAN relies heavily on individuality, which in the Secretary General’s opinion, could be a 
major weakness because, once a new leader comes in, there is no guarantee that the 
association will keep running smoothly and a real possibility of a power vacuum, or a stalemate 
situation, which would hold the region back. On the other hand, the EU possesses a system of 
effective institutions that can give support to the pursuit of leadership. Therefore, it is 
concluded that enhancing leadership in ASEAN cannot be done in isolation for also requires 
collaborative activity aimed at strengthening its institutional bodies. This resonates with Nye’s 
account of soft power (2004: 11): 
‘If a country’s culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If a 
country can shape international rules that are consistent with its interests and 
values, its actions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others. If it uses 
institutions and follow rules that encourage other countries to channel or limit 
their activities in ways it prefers, it will not need as many costly carrots and sticks’ 
Finally, while ASEAN is often seen to lack leadership, I have argued in this chapter that this 
matter will be determined in the context of elements of the ASEAN Way and the political 
configuration of Indonesia. Regarding the latter, the recent positive political developments in 
Indonesia are a good sign as they suggest that it is ready once again to play its part in the 
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8 SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter recapitulates the main arguments of the study and wrap up key 
findings from the empirical data. In light of the increasing trend towards regionalism, the main 
objective of this thesis has been to illustrate the dynamics of ASEAN integration through 
analysing the roles of democratisation, identity, institution and leadership in regional 
integration process and, from this, to distil implications for the theoretical understanding of 
regionalism in a comparative vein. In this chapter, the initial aim of this thesis is revisited and a 
synthesis of the main findings and a generalisation of the data will be presented. The chapter 
begins with a summary of the main findings of each empirical chapter, the central arguments 
and evaluation of the relationships between the four elements as well as how they interact in 
the process. Then, it will reveal the theoretical implications for integration theories and the 
study of regional integration. As a result of the synthesis of findings, this research has also 
provided some useful insights into the development of European integration which will be 
presented in the following section. Then, the chapter will end with a consideration of the 
research limitations and some suggestions for future study.         
8.2 Summary and Discussion 
The empirical premise for this study was that the case of ASEAN provides a significantly 
different experience for the study of regional integration from that of the EU, but that the 
empirical experience of the EU has typically driven theoretical examinations of regionalism. 
This thesis has sought to rebalance the study of regionalism by engaging directly with those 
Eurocentric theoretical concerns in an empirical case that varies considerably from the 
European experience.  While the degree of economic and political integration in ASEAN is far 
looser than that of the EU, ASEAN clearly goes beyond ‘passive geographical codification’ to 
being a ‘successful consultative process that these states have used in managing tensions 
among themselves and in dealing with the external environment’ (Antolik, 1990: 5). In Hund’s 
(2002: 118) characterisation, ‘the picture… is that of an organisation trying to integrate 
without actually integrating, of nation states trying to coordinate without being coordinated’. 
While both perspectives provide important inputs, they remain locked in an approach that 
explicitly or implicitly views the EU as the paradigmatic case against which other regional 
organizations are to be evaluated.  The approach of this thesis, instead, has been to take 
concepts key to the theorisation of the EU and examine how useful they are in understanding 
the ASEAN experience on its own terms.   
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In ASEAN, democracy is considered to be a sensitive issue that can determine continuity and 
unity in the regional bloc. Throughout its development path, ASEAN leaders have not made an 
explicit commitment to democracy at the regional level. The evidence provided in this thesis 
shows that ASEAN countries are not politically consolidated and, to varying degrees, still 
remain very much under authoritarian rules. Furthermore, such political and social conditions 
as well as the political diversity in the region have become a major obstacle and are not 
propitious for democracy to prosper. In the view of ASEAN leaders, democratisation is seen as 
a threat that can ruin the group’s unity and ASEAN’s elite-centred regionalism. As suggested by 
democratic peace theory, this would entail the incompatibility between democracy and ASEAN 
regionalism, particularly when considering the vitality of ASEAN norms. 
Empirically, the data demonstrate that ASEAN and most of its citizens reside in illiberal 
environments whereby political freedoms and the role of civil society are largely limited. The 
association is designed and structured to protect the rights and sovereignty of the member 
states rather than their citizens. In addition, because there is extensive difference in political 
regimes in ASEAN, non-democratic members are likely to refuse any reform that could 
potentially threaten their political survival. Even in the case of democratic members, the 
quality of their democracy remains low and problematic as there are many entrenched 
problems that continue to weaken the states such as corruption, lack of accountability and 
transparency, money and self-interest politics and social inequalities, as can be seen in the 
current political situation in Thailand as an example. Such hindering features would inhibit the 
development of civil society to become a significant force and limit the effects of democracy 
once it has been put into action. 
Indeed, the prospects for democratisation remain out of reach for ASEAN due to the political 
diversity, the inferior political conditions and the fact that most of the members still remain 
under authoritarian rule. As long as the principles of non-interference and consensus-based 
decision making continue to shield the member states, ASEAN would not be able to introduce 
any democratic reform and offer sufficient channels for the participation of civil society. 
Nevertheless, democracy nowadays has become an important international norm and an 
image of good governance. In the global scope, which is beyond the remit of this thesis, ASEAN 
could potentially face growing pressure from the international community calling for a long-
term commitment to democracy. 
In the case of the EU, the mainstream argument is that democracy is crucial for regional 
integration, particularly in helping to achieve the goals of peace and security. Reflecting on the 
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ASEAN case, however, what seems more tenable is the idea that it is broad regional consensus 
on democracy and democratisation that is important for regionalism, rather than an absolute 
commitment to democracy per se.  Put another way, political convergence is important for 
regional integration, but democracy is not the only base for political convergence, and in 
ASEAN a kind of illiberal semi-democracy constitutes an equally valid basis for integration from 
an empirical perspective. 
Beyond its own borders, of course, the consolidation of democracy in ASEAN would help the 
association to improve its international image and credibility as well as enable the 
participation of all involved parties. We may also see democracy as normatively desirable.  But 
if ASEAN should make best use of its existing power and mechanisms to facilitate and 
encourage bottom-up democratic reform by moving towards a more participatory community 
and engaging more with civil society, the implication is that this should be carried out little by 
little and should be designated as a long-term goal. The principle of non-intervention could be 
reinterpreted in a way that makes it flexible enough to allow members to discuss existing 
problems and express their concerns more openly and comfortably. 
Turning to the issue of collective identity, again we find a contrast with the European 
experience. Whereas in Europe, collective identity is seen as an emerging phenomenon on the 
mass level, the case of ASEAN represents the notion of ‘elite regionalism’, where collective 
identity can only really be found at state level in which such a common value is shared only 
among elites, diplomats and technocrats, while there seems to be a very limited sense of 
collective identity among ordinary citizens. This distinction parallels the democratic distinction 
above, with a more limited, elite version of collective identity constitutive of a more limited 
effective electoral franchise.   
The empirical data suggests that the substance of identity is very much linked to the elements 
of ASEAN Way. Discussion of collective identity can be divided into two different levels due to 
the substantial differences in the development of collective identity. At state level, the ASEAN 
Way acts as norms of association and reflects a collective identity shared among ASEAN 
countries and their political elites. Indeed, the solid construction of norms and the existence of 
collective identity do help heighten the level of trust among members and prevent interstate 
conflicts. Such emerging identity is sufficiently strong to provide cement for the sake of 
regional peace and unity at least for the foreseeable future. At citizen level, collective identity 
has not been significantly generated among ASEAN citizens. This is due to the remaining 
antagonism among people and the lack of citizen’s involvement in the ASEAN integration 
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process. On the whole, regional integration is itself a process of identity building because 
identity is forged through the dynamics of regional interaction and transnational activities. It 
helps in shaping ideas, decisions and action of states and helps citizens to distinguish 
themselves as members of the group and construct a sense of belonging. The point here is that 
the difference between European and ASEAN experiences of collective identity along with the 
internal consistency of this with the experience of democracy in each region may be suggestive 
that collective identity is a consequence of the particular configuration of regional integration 
rather than a precondition. 
Turning to the third concept we dealt with, institutions are considered to be one of the most 
important driving factors for the development of regional integration. ASEAN has undergone 
considerable changes over decades and revamped its institutional structure in ways that can 
support its administration and activities. The ASEAN Charter adopted in 2008 is the most 
recent and most significant step forward in strengthening its institutional organs. It improves 
the association’s compliance mechanisms, streamlines its decision-making structure and 
provides ASEAN with more rule-based conditions and more legally binding obligations. 
Nevertheless, the issues of institutions have always been at the centre of criticisms of ASEAN 
and demonstrate another area of great deficiency. Although ASEAN leaders realize these 
weaknesses and continue to strengthen the institutional mechanisms, it is understood that 
those commitments are clearly insufficient because there are several important factors that 
continue to limit the role of ASEAN institutions. 
Firstly, ASEAN institutions have a very limited role in policy-making and lack a mandate to 
ensure effective implementation. Secondly, the ASEAN Secretariat lacks financial resources to 
manage the association’s growing activities and to service the needs of deeper integration. 
This is mainly thought to be a result of the equal contributions of member states that are 
retained in order to reflect the norms of equality among members. Lastly, another concern is 
about a lack of professional staffs to support ASEAN activities. Moreover, ASEAN cannot 
attract talented, ambitious and capable people because people do not perceive working at 
ASEAN as a well-paid and challenging job – a stark contrast to the ‘gravy train’ image of 
Brussels. In addressing the weakness of institutions in ASEAN, the system of equal 
contributions should be substantially revised because it is not realistic and does not seem 
coherent with the current circumstances. Additionally, some new institutional creations such 
as a research wing and people’s council are worth considering as they can potentially fulfil 
areas of severe deficiency in ASEAN. 
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The final concept the thesis deals with was leadership. The case of the EU displays two 
contradictory understandings of leadership in regional integration process. Likewise, in ASEAN, 
there are widely differing perspectives on leadership. ASEAN is often thought of as lacking 
leadership for decades which is linked to the emergence of external interferences in the 
region. However, the evidence here suggests that leaderlessness in ASEAN is as a result of 
Indonesia’s demonstration of non-assertiveness and low-profile policy within ASEAN. This is 
because Indonesia is well aware of increasing doubt and suspicion of Indonesia’s dominance 
which could cause tensions among other members. Therefore, it can be inferred that ASEAN is 
not literally leaderless because Indonesia manages to keep its low-profile as necessary for 
maintaining the unity within ASEAN and the invisibility of leadership in ASEAN is caused by the 
principle of equality and containing antagonism among members. The parallel between 
Indonesia’s role in ASEAN and Germany’s role in the EU is clear. 
In the context of ASEAN, the picture of leadership is complicated. On the one hand, apparently 
there has been Indonesia’s invisible and inconsistent form of leadership throughout the 
lifespan of ASEAN. On the other hand, the data demonstrates that there are three other forms 
of leadership which existed in parallel with the unilateral leadership of Indonesia: Sectorial 
leadership, Cooperative leadership and Periodical leadership. However, after being halted by 
the departure of President Suharto and the financial crisis in the late 1990s, the recent 
significant political and economic development in Indonesia seems to indicate a new stage of 
Indonesia’s regional leadership. I argue that leadership in ASEAN remains to be determined by 
the elements of ASEAN Way and the politics of Indonesia. Indonesia’s leadership, driven by its 
soft power could be a key mechanism to dismantle antagonism, suspicion and uncertainty and 
the recent progress in Indonesia would provide a vital ingredient in building up confidence and 
credibility as well as enhancing the pursuit of leadership in ASEAN. 
 
Figure 8.1: The abstract relationship between norms, identity, and institutions 
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In terms of the relationships between the four elements, the process of ASEAN integration has 
relatively intriguing and robust dynamics. The empirical data demonstrates that the four 
elements investigated in this research are significantly interrelated and interdependent. To a 
certain extent, identity, institution and leadership are crucial as the driving force in the 
development of ASEAN integration rather than simply the level of integration. Moreover, as 
displayed in Figure 8.1, I have discovered that identity and institution have solid ties with 
norms of the association and this is guided by the constructivist explanation. One important 
finding of this research is that the vitality of norms is crucial for keeping the union going in the 
direction that will ensure the continuity of the association and lead it to achieve its original 
goals, which in the case of ASEAN are peace and security. The existence of norms accompanied 
by states’ interaction in the dynamics of the regional integration process will incrementally 
forge collective identity as well as shape the behaviour of political leaders and the design of 
institutions. Identity, once emerged, represents the norms to provide a meaning for involved 
actors, distinguish them from others and inform them of what they are here for. On the other 
hand, institutions are something of a by-product of the process, functioning to safeguard 
norms and as a key mechanism for promoting the construction and managing the conflict of 
identity. On the whole, these three elements are evidently correlated and reinforcing each 
other and intricately embedded in the dynamics of regional integration. 
Similar to the EU, leadership is often referred in an informal term and is more likely to be 
exercised based on material sense. I found that it does not substantially have influence on the 
whole dynamics of regional integration because integrating regions will usually arrange a 
formal form of leadership such as presidency and chairmanship to govern the union. But 
indeed, informal leadership could help the association accelerate, or increase the probability 
of, mutually-agreed outcomes as well as fulfilling some kind of brokering functions and 
building up confidence. However, it should be noted that leadership in ASEAN is incompletely 
functioning due to being constrained by the vitality of norms. As a result, the influence of 
leadership in ASEAN integration cannot be seen clearly like in case of the EU and this would 
explain why other leadership arrangements can be observed.        
Democratisation is a complicated one for ASEAN because the idea of Western democracy is 
not thoroughly. Although democracy is widely accepted as an international norm of good 
governance and highly acknowledged as norms of European integration, democracy proves 
problematic and causes a lot of internal tension once put in the context of ASEAN. Indeed, 
democratisation is not encouraged in ASEAN because it disrupts the practices of its elitism and 
could pose a threat to regime survival. Arguably, there is evidence that the problem of 
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democratic deficit and the divergent political values among ASEAN members lie at the root of 
all emerging major problems and criticisms as well as lead to a retarded progress of regional 
integration. That is to say, the principles of respect for national sovereignty, non-interference 
in internal affairs, equality among members and consensus-based decision-making, declared as 
a means of diplomacy and multilateralism, appear to help ASEAN avoid criticisms, conceal the 
authoritarian nature of most ASEAN countries and prevent them from potential threats to 
state’s weaknesses and their political survivals. This coincides with the viewpoint of 
Christopher Roberts (2010: 17-18), he argued:  
“Divergent political systems and values, combined with state weakness, will continue 
to inhibit regional cooperation over key issues… ASEAN members will need to continue 
with a process of internal consolidation.”         
In addition, democracy is globally considered as an international norm of good governance and 
has become a basis for international socialization. This could precisely have an impact on the 
organization’s image and international credibility. Thus, I foresee that more and more pressure 
will be exerted on ASEAN to demand explicit commitment to democracy and human rights. 
Acharya (2003: 377) clearly highlighted the importance of democracy in the development of 
ASEAN integration: 
‘Democratisation creates more domestic transparency in ways beneficial to regional 
understanding and trust… This could reduce suspicions among neighbours and expand 
regional security and economic cooperation. Democratisation may lead to more open 
and regularised interactions among states, reducing the importance of interpersonal 
contact. Democratisation produces greater openness and the rule of law not just within 
states, but also between them… This can be more conducive to regional collective 
problem solving.’   
This is perhaps a deadlock that we need to find the way to break. Without the realisation of 
domestic consolidation, I believe that ASEAN would not be able to make a significant progress 
in regional cooperation. Instead of the validity of norms, the achievements in regional 
economic cooperation that could contribute to country’s wealth and the increasing economic 
interdependence between members would increase the costs of coercive foreign policy and 
highlight the significance of regional cooperation. Moreover, the transnational exchange and 
cross-border interactions through various channels and instruments would act as a mechanism 




Figure 8.2: The dynamics of regional integration in ASEAN 
In the final analysis, Figure 8.2 could partially depict the dynamics of ASEAN integration as it 
illustrates how ASEAN is structured in the regional context and how each of the elements 
functions, interacts and plays out in the process. The triangle in the box represents ASEAN 
organization which is divided into two layers: the political leader part and the institutional 
part. The inner square represents norms of the association which in this case are those 
principles of ASEAN Way while the outer square symbolises the global or international sphere 
which is democracy in the context of this research. As can be seen, the political elites have a 
lot more space and are situated above the institutions in which its lower tier serves as a 
supporting base of the elite’s decision-making body. The triangle laid inside the inner square 
implies that the Association is solidly protected by the Association’s norms from the 
international influence of democracy. The norms function as a barrier filtering out influences 
that could potentially challenge the Association’s means of regionalism, giving protection from 
or deflecting emerging criticisms. Therefore, this implies that the penetration of democracy 
into ASEAN is largely limited and it will not be able to function properly and thrive to become a 
significant force in Southeast Asia. 
The figure also highlights the central roles of political leaders and institution in the integration 
process. As the empirical findings show, political leaders control the dynamics, the pace and all 
other key aspects of integration as well as making all important decisions. Under a command 
of political leaders, institutions act as a central supporting mechanism that turns the ideas, 
plans and decisions into concrete action as well as providing a bridge between elite and citizen 
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levels. It also provides an arena for all political activities and interactions. In connection with 
Figure 8.1, the figure can also provide an explanation for the abstract role of norms and 
identity in ASEAN integration. That is to say, all the components within the triangle are 
invisibly cemented by the ideational force of collective identity, which contributes to the 
group’s unity (the strength of the triangle) and the whole dynamics of integration. Meanwhile, 
the association’s norms (the inner square) are crucial in the sense that it helps ensure the 
continuity of the association (protecting the triangle from external threats) because ASEAN 
members are loosely tied due to its vast diversity among members and its preference for a 
non-legalistic approach to cooperation. Without the barrier of norms, ASEAN would be too 
weak to survive on the international scene. To sum up, both norms and identity help fortify 
ASEAN normatively in the way of solidifying its cooperation and this supports the abstract 
correlations between norms, identity and institution as displayed in the previous figure. Thus, 
in line with Acharya’s arguments in Chapter 6, I contend that no study of ASEAN can be 
complete without a consideration of norms and identity in which constructivism will 
increasingly become a dominant approach to the study of regionalism in Southeast Asia. 
Clearly, figure 8.2 represents a form of regionalism that is internally coherent but very 
different in configuration from the EU. In ASEAN, the configuration of identity, institutions and 
leaders create a bulwark against democracy; in the EU, democratisation as a precondition even 
for membership creates a very different configuration of identity, institutions and leadership. 
We can think about this in terms of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. In relation to 
the model, this is portrayed by the position of the line that separates the political leaders and 
institutions within the triangle. That is, in the case of European integration where 
institutionalisation and supranationalism are more prevailing, the equivalent line would move 
higher towards the vertex of the triangle, implying more influence of the institutions and less 
influence of the political leaders. The inner square will not be existed because the European 
norms are very much in harmony with the international force and the fact that the union is 
competently united by virtue of its legally-binding condition, its less diverse nature as well as 
its strong identity among European elites and technocrats. 
Relating this back to Jones’ argument about the dynamics of identity and institutions in ASEAN, 
it is true that understanding ASEAN integration should be undertaken in relation to the 
domestic context and the regional context of geopolitical transformation. However, instead of 
narrowly focusing on sovereignty and the functionality of the principles of non-intervention, 
one alternative option would be viewing it as a dynamic process where ASEAN integration is 
steered by various drivers. Fundamentally, every student of ASEAN integration should be 
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noted that ASEAN is a collection of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian stubborn states that 
used to be antagonistic towards each other. They are grouped in a vastly divergent regional 
environment and rigorously agreed to cooperate on the basis of intergovernmentalism which 
is guided by political elites.  
In this research context, we have seen that ASEAN is reluctant to embrace democratic values 
because of its vast ideological difference among members. ASEAN lacks identity at ground 
level and support from ordinary citizens because it never been far away from being elite-
centric. ASEAN adopts minimal forms of institutions to ensure that the manners of elitism are 
not disrupted. ASEAN lacks a strategically clear direction and active leadership because they 
are restrained by the norm of equality and remaining antagonism among members. With these 
drivers (democracy, identity, institutions and leadership) not functioning effectively, the 
association would have not been able to survive without the validity of norms. It seems to me 
that ASEAN’s principle of non-interference was neither intended to directly halt interstate 
tension derived from conflicts of national interests nor to pave the way for greater 
cooperation. Rather, it is associated with the intergovernmentalism manners to helps give 
some space and certainty to its members for domestic consolidation, reduce possibility that 
members will wage war against each other, and more importantly prevent discontinuity of the 
association. In addition, according to Figure 8.2, it can be understood that the norms also help 
to safeguard the association from external critics and influences. Therefore, I envisage that 
abandoning the norm of non-interference would be likely to result in breaking up of the 
association.                         
Overall, we have seen that the concepts drawn from the EU experience do matter for ASEAN 
integration, but in very different ways than in the EU.  The final task of the thesis is hence to 
return to the theoretical level and consider the implications for the study of regional 
integration.                       
8.3 Theoretical implication for the study of regional integration 
As stated in Chapter 3, there has been so far no theory able to explain the whole picture of 
regional integration process because each of them has an emphasis on different areas of 
regional integration. This is why a combination of four theoretical concepts was employed to 
help capture the multidimensionality, offering various instruments for different aspects and 
levels of analysis in ASEAN integration. Due to the fact that all of them were developed to 
provide an explanation and interpretation for European integration, the theoretical inference 
and the empirical findings from this study could offer an opportunity to examine the feasibility 
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and the generalisation ability of these theoretical frameworks, whether they are capable to 
explain such phenomenon in other regions.  
To begin with the main competing theories of European integration, neofunctionalism and 
liberal intergovernmentalism, although having been much criticised and amended, remain the 
most comprehensive arguments of regional integration. As one of the most substantial 
arguments made by neofunctionalists, the precedence of national governance will no longer 
exist in the light of a central supranational authority. Thus, although this theory is crucial in 
explaining EU structures and functions and it is important in the sense that it ensures the 
existence of supranationality and the requirements for institutional settings, as observed by 
this study, it is apparently unable to explain regional integration in a less developed model as 
most of the theoretical substance appears to be too ideal and inapplicable to the case of 
ASEAN. However, in my view the most significant contribution to other integrating regions 
would be that it emphasises the fact that regional integration process is a continuing process 
and such mutual commitments and interdependence between states make it too costly to be 
reversed or abandoned. Additionally, the theory is precise in the sense that it views institution 
as an important outcome of the integration process as well as a measure of the success of the 
integration project (see section 3.2.1), which could perhaps answer the question of why the 
pace of ASEAN integration is relatively slow and stagnated.    
On the contrary, liberal intergovernmentalism is fully applicable and can better capture the 
nuanced reality of contemporary ASEAN integration. Firstly, given that the theory does not see 
regional integration as a challenge to a nation state but rather as a mechanism for 
strengthening state sovereignty, this would appear to be reinforced as the case of ASEAN 
shows that regional integration provides, indeed arguably reinforces, space and certainty for 
members to consolidate their domestic politics – a space that is not necessarily democratic. 
Secondly, it emphasises the issues of economic interests as a main reason for cooperation. This 
can be seen clearly as the most progress of integration in ASEAN so far has been in areas of 
economic cooperation. Finally, the emphasis of the important role of national governments 
and domestic interests greatly reflects the picture of elite-centred regionalism and the 
dynamics of ASEAN.             
In relation to the four debates, I found that intergovernmentalist explanation about interstate 
negotiations and bargaining can be applied to make further discussions on some important 
debates on democratisation, institutions and leadership. For example, liberal 
intergovernmentalism provides some important perspectives on political diversity or different 
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ideological perspectives within the association (see Chapter 5). Moreover, it highlights the 
importance of institutions by viewing it as a mechanism that plays a key role in facilitating the 
negotiation process, providing reliable information as serving as some sort of a broker and a 
confidence builder. In terms of leadership, though the theory does not offer an answer for the 
question of who should lead the association or about the matters of leadership in the process, 
it does view leadership as a common phenomenon emerging from the difference in occupation 
of power and resources among involved actors and it does emphasise the predominance of 
the governments of the most influential states in the process.  
Although liberal intergovernmentalism provides a useful theoretical framework that captures 
important aspects of ASEAN and EU experience alike, it is less able to explain the role of 
collective identity and institution in ASEAN integration. Insights from constructivism helps to 
clarify the relationship between norms, identity and institutional building (see Chapter 6 and 
section 9.1 above). As the ASEAN Way evidently plays a vital part in the dynamics of ASEAN 
integration, hence constructivism can deliberately explain the construction of collective 
identity at regional level and could potentially be one influential approach to analyse 
subjective issues or things relating to the ideational force within integrating regions. Similarly, 
new institutionalism emphasises the importance of institutions and views it as a prerequisite 
for constructing a regional community. Nevertheless, the way it explains the role of institutions 
is relatively rigid and straightforward. It does pinpoint all functions of institutions in the 
process but it does not exemplify the dynamics or interactions with other important elements 
in the process. Furthermore, it does not give a clue about how to set up or design an 
appropriate arrangement of institutions based on the context of regional settings. In such 
integration process where norms play an influential role, new institutionalism would be 
relatively awkward as it cannot capture the whole dynamics and things revolving around 
institution. 
Finally, some important concepts elaborated in this research somewhat have the potential to 
be generalized and applied across regional settings. From Chapter 6, the notion of ‘institutions 
matter’ is relatively explicit both in cases of EU and ASEAN as institutions play a crucial role 
and act as a central mechanism in the dynamics of both integration models. Furthermore, as 
stated previously, the levels of institutionalisation could also be applied to assess the depth or 
success of other regional settings. Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 7, leadership 
arrangements in regional integration process will most likely fall into the realm of structural 
leadership indicating that the most powerful country based on the possession of material 
resources is likely to take the lead, although this may be different in terms of dependency.                                    
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8.4 Reflections on the European Union 
This research could make some contributions to the study of the EU mainly in two areas. 
Evidently, ASEAN has relatively clear regional boundaries and, seemingly, it is not very keen to 
seek further enlargement, despite the accession of East Timor which has recently gained 
independence from Indonesia in 2002. Instead, in terms of widening, it prefers enhancing 
cooperation with outside powers by dealing with them as a dialogue partner on the basis of 
intergovernmentalism and being multiple and open regionalism. On the other hand, the notion 
of “Zone of Peace” appears to give backing to the policy of further enlargement in the EU (see 
section 3.3.1). The privileges of EU membership and the massive financial assistance continue 
to attract more and more potential countries (perhaps neofunctionalist concepts of spillover 
were right in this sense). As enlightened by liberal intergovernmentalism in Chapter 3, 
enlargements would increase the diversity of national interests and ideological perspectives 
within the union which would complicate agreements and negotiations. In my own view, the 
ongoing accession of new members means more diversity, more problems and more 
difficulties in achieving shared outcomes and, of course, deeper integration. This could impede 
the current dynamics of EU institutions and is likely to spur scepticism and tensions among 
current members. It could also trouble the process of identity construction and lessen public 
support, as evidenced by the rising popularity of anti-European parties across the continent, 
such as UKIP. 
As previously addressed at the end of Section 2.3, another concern is that the EU now is 
expanding into sensitive areas where there are ongoing problems such as border conflicts, 
ethnic relations and corruption. Really, it needs to ensure that further enlargements will not 
import these problems into the union. Finally, the growing number of small members could 
skew the balance of power as large countries may increasingly move towards a more informal 
decision-making while small countries may lose confidence in the system. Without rebalancing 
and effective institutional change, this could undermine the fate of EU supranationalism and 
result in polarisation. On the whole, despite the vitality of the Acquis Communautaire that acts 
as conditionality screening out countries who cannot successfully implement all the 
requirements for accession, I would argue that the EU should make clear its future 
enlargement policy together with clarifying the blurred European territories as well as ensuring 
that those new entrants are willing to commit to regional cooperation, not fully persuaded by 
economic benefits and massive funding or based on a cost-benefit calculation.   
The other concern is that although the significant gap of identity between political elites and 
ordinary citizens in ASEAN has been witnessed in this research, ASEAN shows a positive sign of 
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enthusiasm for regionalism both among political elites and citizens. ASEAN may be 
encountering problems in terms of educating and cultivating ‘we-feeling’ at ground level but 
this is not too intricate to handle. This is perhaps because many ASEAN countries are highly 
diverse nations and have relatively recently gained independence from colonial powers, so 
they do not have a strong sense of nationalism, compared to many European countries, and 
there is unlikely to be conflicts of identity like in the EU. On the contrary, as described in 
Chapter 4, the issues of collective identity have been an important debate in the EU for 
decades. Evidently, there is remarkable force of continental scepticism within the union, not 
only among ordinary citizens but also governments of some important member countries 
which act as reluctant partners. In my view, if ASEAN is considered as “elite regionalism”, I 
would consider the EU as “institutionalised regionalism” because the dynamics revolve around 
institutions. Similarly, both ASEAN and the EU still have to work on how to gain their public 
support for integration at ground level, or how to develop “popular regionalism”. Both 
politicians and citizens need to realize and understand the usefulness or what benefits the 
schemes can bring as well as what they can do to defend their national interests in the union 
and how they can achieve more together. For a country, such regional commitment could 
develop to become a force-multiplier in which the pull of its gravity is too strong to escape.      
8.5 Limitations and future directions   
Throughout the study, I found that the most important limitation is the fact that there is a 
considerable gap of empirical and theoretical knowledge between Europe and Southeast Asia. 
ASEAN and international relations in Southeast Asia remains understudied and lack conceptual 
frameworks that are suitable for the regional context. Although liberal intergovernmentalism 
is relatively capable of explaining many components of ASEAN integration, it lacks clarification 
in some complex areas such as the issues of leadership. However, the issue of theoretical 
approaches for the study of ASEAN integration is still a matter of open debate. Secondly, 
among ASEAN countries, I also observed that there is a considerable gap of knowledge and 
competency relating to ASEAN between people from the five founding members (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) and the five newcomers (Brunei, Cambodia, 
Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar). As a result, this exposes a methodological shortcoming in this 
research as the researcher could not have an opportunity to engage with respondents from 
these countries whose opinions may potentially lead to some other important findings. One 
way to figure out the problems and to enhance understanding of ASEAN and its activities 
would be to improve the dissemination of information to all levels of society. Finally, because 
most of the respondents have limited knowledge on European integration and integration 
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theories, this could be troublesome when drawing a comparison or a discussion on some basic 
concepts of regionalism, some ideological perspectives and supranationalism.  
About suggestions for future studies, the findings from this research raise a number of issues 
and questions as well as opens up some new avenues for future studies. First of all, I would 
suggest that the four central concepts and the main arguments of this research could be 
studied in other regional contexts such as Latin America and Africa in order to examine the 
generalisation of the concepts. Moreover, as has been demonstrated in this research, the 
complex relationships between norms, identity and institution need further consideration and 
studies. Also, the different patterns of leadership explored in Chapter 8 could be built on and 
further developed to provide more precise understanding of leadership. Lastly, as highlighted 
in Chapter 7, the quest for how to arrange or design a suitable form of institution based on 
regional settings could be an important research indication for institutionalists and the study 




Appendix 1: List of key informant interviewees 
 
No Name Position Institution Date 
1 Siswo Pramono Director Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Republic of 
Indonesia 
5-Nov-12 
2 Yeo Lay Hwee Director European Union Centre 
in Singapore 
13-Dec-12 
3 Termsak Chalermpalanupap Research Fellow Institution of Southeast 
Asian Studies 
20-Dec-12 
4 Alan Chong Associate 
Professor 
RSIS 21-Dec-12 
5 Mely Caballero Anthony Associate 
Professor 
RSIS 7-Jan-13 
6 Joseph Chinyong Liow Associate Dean RSIS 17-Jan-13 
7 Ralf Emmers Associate 
Professor 
RSIS 22-Jan-13 










10 Ong Keng Yong High 
Commissioner 
High Commission of the 
Republic of Singapore 
21-Mar-13 
11 Ngurah Swajaya Ambassador, 
Permanent 
Representative 
Permanent Mission of 
Indonesia to ASEAN 
22-Mar-13 
12 Shafiah Muhibat Researcher CSIS 25-Mar-13 
13 Suvat Chirapant Ambassador, 
Permanent 
Representative 
Permanent Mission of 
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